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ABSTRACT 
Las Vegas in an Era of Limits: Urban Water Politics in the Colorado River 
Basin 
 
By 
 
Christian Harrison 
Dr. Greg Hise, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of History 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
 
Despite its status as the nation’s driest metropolis, the Las Vegas metropolitan 
area’s water supply is limited by law and not by local environmental conditions. The 
federal government allocates 300,000 acre-feet of water per year to the metro-area. 
During the 1980s the Las Vegas metro-area grew from 400,000 people to 750,000, 
stressing this allocation. During that same period, the metro-area’s water regime 
consisted of disunity and competition among four separate water agencies, as well as 
a combination of complex and sometimes competing city, county, state, and interstate 
laws. This regime contributed to an additional increase in water consumption rates 
beyond those associated with population growth. In 1991, metro water managers 
responded to these challenges by creating the Southern Nevada Water Authority 
(SNWA), an agency that centralized previously separate water agencies into a single 
organization, one that possessed legal authority to implement conservation policy 
throughout the metropolitan region and to engage in interstate political negotiations 
over acquisition of new water resources.  
 My study of the SNWA highlights a geopolitical condition many American 
metropolitan areas face in the twenty-first century: water management and resource 
acquisition occurs at a geographical scale that extends beyond city, county, and even 
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state boundaries. This reality necessitates both intra and inter-state political 
interaction, something the SNWA experience demonstrates. Unique to the Las Vegas 
metro-area, is the degree to which interstate and federal laws influence SNWA water 
policy. Reliance on the Colorado River required adherence to city, county, state, and 
interstate laws. During a four-year period of political consolidation, the SNWA 
absorbed local, county, and state level power, a combination that enabled it to 
negotiate political boundaries within Nevada, and the legal authority to engage other 
Basin state governments. The political composition of the SNWA has made it an 
effective body to navigate an era of limits, in which metropolitan areas face 
challenges of increased population growth, limited water supply, and complex legal 
systems. 
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CHAPTER 1 | INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In 1989, water use in the Las Vegas metropolitan area increased to 
unprecedented levels. Consumption rates there had always exceeded most other 
metro-areas, in part the result of its location in an arid environment; however, 
between 1988 and 1989, water use increased by eighteen percent, a development that 
alarmed many metro area water managers, people such as the Las Vegas Valley 
Water District’s General Manager Patricia Mulroy. Elected officials and water 
planners had been aware that the Las Vegas metro-area was among the fastest 
growing in the nation—but they were unprepared for such a dramatic increase in 
water use in such a short amount of time. Elected officials at both the state and county 
levels were caught off guard. Planners with the Colorado River Commission of 
Nevada had no contingency plan in place to address increased consumption rates in 
the metro-area and in one public meeting, Clark County Commissioner Paul 
Christensen stated that he was under the impression that the metro-area possessed 
enough water to last until the year 2020.  
Water planners in each of the metro-area’s four separate water utilities grew 
concerned that their water resources would be inadequate to support further 
population growth, a development that would, according to the University of Nevada, 
Las Vegas’s Center for Economic and Business Research, have an adverse effect on 
the southern Nevada economy.1 The Center predicted that without adequate water, 
there would be a sixty percent decrease in construction jobs, a nineteen percent fall in 
financial and real estate employment, and an eighteen percent reduction in the amount 
of hotel related service positions.2 There was a palpable sense of panic among the 
metro-area’s elected officials and water managers.3  
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In 1989, not waiting for assistance from the state or county government, 
planners for the metro-area’s largest water utility, the Las Vegas Valley Water 
District, took matters into their own hands. That year they applied for rights to nearly 
a million acre-feet of groundwater located in several rural valleys, 250 miles north of 
the metro area (fig. 1). The pipeline into northern Nevada would be difficult from a 
technical and legal standpoint. In order to utilize this resource, District engineers 
would have to design a conveyance system capable of transporting thousands of acre-
feet of water through desert valleys and over several mountain ranges.  
There was also the prospect that groundwater from the region would prove to 
be an unreliable resource. No one really knew how much water was available, or how 
long it would last if and when the District completed its pipeline. Despite this 
uncertainty, District water managers felt they had no other choice. During the 1980s, 
the Las Vegas metro-area’s population roughly doubled in size from 425,000 people 
to over 750,000.4 By 1989, growth rates showed no signs of slowing. Water managers 
feared they would not be able to meet demand.5 How was this possible though, when 
the Colorado River, the largest river in the southwestern United States flowing at over 
fifteen million acre-feet per year, coursed less than twenty miles away from the 
metro-area? Since one acre-foot was enough water to serve the annual needs for a 
family of five, the Colorado’s volume was certainly enough to supply a metro-area of 
750,000. Supply was therefore not the issue. Nor was infrastructure. The Water 
District possessed the pipelines and pumping stations necessary to convey Colorado 
River water to the metro-area’s homes and businesses. During the 1970s the federal 
government had built the Southern Nevada Water Project for just this purpose. What 
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factor, then, compelled the Water District to look north into one of the driest regions 
of the United States for water resources? 
The Law of the River, a common law doctrine of court decrees, legislative 
acts, and interstate agreements contained the parameters within which Las Vegas 
metro water managers had to operate. The key component of the law was the 
congressionally established allocations that specified each state’s share of the 
Colorado River. In Nevada’s, and by extension, metropolitan Las Vegas’s case, that 
amount was set at 300,000 acre-feet per year, the lowest allocation among the seven 
states that shared the river.6 In 1989, the Water District was not politically strong 
enough to challenge this law at the interstate and federal level and was thus unable to 
press for a solution to its impending water shortage. The Water District’s inability to 
utilize the closest available resource illustrates a central irony in metropolitan Las 
Vegas’s late twentieth century water history: despite being the nation’s driest 
metropolis, its water supply was not limited by local environmental conditions, but by 
federal law.  
The inability of the Water District to affect a political solution to its water 
crisis at the interstate level ushered in a new regime of Las Vegas metro-area water 
politics, one that is the subject of this dissertation. Dissatisfied with its lack of 
political power, in 1991 the Water District, along with the water utilities of North Las 
Vegas, Henderson, and Boulder City, unified into a new superagency, the Southern 
Nevada Water Authority (SNWA) (fig.3).7  
Las Vegas in an Era of Limits: Water Politics in the Colorado River Basin is 
an urban history of a desert metropolis within the politically defined region of the 
Colorado River Basin. The states that comprise this basin are Wyoming, Colorado, 
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Utah, and New Mexico in the Upper Basin, and Nevada, California, and Arizona in 
the Lower Basin. Water has always been a limiting factor for human existence within 
the Las Vegas Valley. But by the midpoint of the twentieth century, it became clear to 
Las Vegas metro-area water managers that the scale of water management was 
regional, not local. This is because southern Nevada water managers increasingly 
utilized the Colorado River as the metro-area’s primary water resource. This marked a 
shift away from reliance on local groundwater, a small resource, albeit one with 
comparatively few legal restrictions. When metro-area water managers began relying 
on the Colorado River in the 1970s, they tapped a larger resource, but one that came 
with a host of regulatory requirements. By 1989, metropolitan population growth 
began to strain the limits of the metro-area’s Colorado River allotment, limits that 
were imposed solely by the Law of the River. This project examines the manner in 
which Las Vegas metro-area water managers addressed this challenge between 1989 
and 2010.  
The central argument of my dissertation is that the Law of the River, not 
environmental conditions, is the main limiting factor during the fifth (SNWA) regime, 
from 1989 to 2014. My argument is one that differs from the SNWA’s and other 
political units within the Colorado River Basin. Up until 2005, SNWA spokespersons 
often blamed the Law of the River for the metro-area’s water challenges. Since 2005, 
however, the SNWA has downplayed the inequitable distribution of the Colorado 
River. The Authority ultimately found it more productive to work with the other 
Basin states, and calling for changes to the Law of the River not only exposed the 
limits of the SNWA’s political power in comparison to the other basin states, but it 
also put officials in those states on the defensive. In other words, the SNWA’s 
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decision to avoid mention of the Law of the River was a political expedient. However, 
from the historian’s vantage point, shortages imposed by the Law of the River are 
indeed the central issue driving SNWA water policy. After all, federal restrictions on 
access to the Colorado River served as the impetus for metro-area water managers to 
create the SNWA. 
The Law of the River has influenced nearly every single SNWA policy 
decision since 1991, including the construction of the groundwater pipeline 
mentioned above. The SNWA assumed responsibility for this project the year the 
agency was created. Ironically, the pipeline project reflects the limitations of the 
agency’s political power. The SNWA’s pursuit of water in White Pine County 
represents one of the first times in Nevada history that a water utility has attempted to 
procure water resources from such a distant location. However, the SNWA has faced 
enormous opposition from rural interests and the success of the pipeline project is not 
assured. Additionally, and more importantly, the fact that the SNWA is pursuing it in 
the first place represents the agency’s inability to obtain a greater share of the 
Colorado River.   
The primary contribution of this project is that it examines the impact of the 
Law of the River at the metropolitan level. Other works tend to focus on intra-state 
competition for water resources, such as that between Los Angeles, San Diego, and 
the Imperial Valley agricultural communities, or interstate conflicts, such as those 
between Wyoming and Colorado, or more often, between Arizona and California.8 
The Las Vegas example is useful in that it presents a case in which the link between 
federal policy and metro-area is clear and immediate. In all of the other Colorado 
River Basin states, multiple users possess rights to the Colorado River. These users 
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are widely distributed geographically, are both urban and rural, and comprise a wide 
range of economic interests. Metropolitan Las Vegas, on the other hand, presents a 
more economically homogeneous and geographically constrained case study, and 
makes the urban reaction to federal policy more easily discernable.  
Additionally, this project focuses on the aspects in which the Las Vegas 
metro-area is truly unique. Many critics have commented on metropolitan Las 
Vegas’s distinctiveness, but often their analysis of the metro-area tends to focus on 
gaming and divorce, prostitution and alcohol consumption, highlighting the socially 
permissive aspects of the southern Nevada economy, and implying that “what 
happens in Vegas” only happens in Las Vegas.9 These treatments emphasize the 
sensational and conflate economic drivers with local social norms. In succumbing to 
these trite characterizations, critics fail to acknowledge traits Las Vegas shares in 
common with many other urban areas throughout the nation. Many benign aspects of 
recreation drive the Las Vegas metropolitan economy: hotel room fees, restaurant 
bills, car rentals, taxi cab fairs, tips to bartenders, and so on. These things, however, 
are not unique, nor especially noteworthy. Reliance on recreation and, increasingly, 
gaming form the economic underpinning for numerous cities across the nation. The 
difference between Las Vegas and other resort towns (places such as Atlantic City, 
New Jersey; Leadville, Colorado; and Ledyard, Connecticut as well as the skiing 
communities located in New England’s White Mountains, the Colorado Rockies, and 
Sierra Nevada) is a difference of scale, not kind. Like Las Vegas, Americans travel to 
these areas in order to enjoy a sensory experience.10  
However, the Las Vegas metropolitan area is unique for the manner in which 
its water policy developed. Las Vegas metropolitan water policy evolved entirely 
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within the confines of the Law of the River, a legal regime that applies to a territory 
of nearly 800,000 square miles. Equally distinctive, was the response to the Law of 
the River by the metro-area’s four water utilities. In an uncommon development 
within the Colorado River Basin, the five separate water agencies that serviced the 
Las Vegas metropolitan area decided to unify into a member-based superagency, in 
which each formerly separate utility had equal standing. This was a departure from 
other Colorado River Basin water agencies, nearly none of which unified into larger 
metro-level water agencies. One notable exception, the Metropolitan Water District of 
Southern California (MET), does represent a member based, multi-city water agency. 
However, the political standing among the MET’s twenty-seven member agencies 
varies widely. 11 This was a model that Pat Mulroy, the General Manager of the Las 
Vegas Valley Water District and later the SNWA, actively sought to avoid.12 
An additional theme of this dissertation is the comparatively late development 
of the Las Vegas metropolitan area and how that affected water policy decisions. 
Among major American metropolitan areas, it is one of the newest, being founded in 
1905. In fact, it is the only major metropolitan area in the American West to be 
founded in the twentieth century.13 Some recent media treatments of the Las Vegas 
metro-area applaud the development of high-rise condominiums and a move by 
businesses to relocate downtown, labeling the trend the “Manhattanization of Las 
Vegas.”14 This mistaken assumption presumes that the southern Nevada metropolis is 
on the same developmental trajectory as New York City. Every urban area in the 
United States developed in a unique context, whose circumstances exerted a particular 
set of pressures. These pressures in turn influenced the course of urban development. 
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While Las Vegas does share similarities with other major American cities, the 
historical context in which it developed differed.  
In 1989, the greatest challenges facing metro-water managers were water 
scarcity, metropolitan political fragmentation, and population growth. Though 
officials in other American metro-areas had also faced these challenges, their 
counterparts in metropolitan Las Vegas did so in a later era in which a different set of 
economic, social, and political circumstances existed. For example, the previously 
mentioned SNWA pipeline project places the Las Vegas metro-area alongside other 
major cities that have built, and now utilize, hinterland pipelines. Examples include 
New York (the Croton Aqueduct), Los Angeles (the Owens Valley Aqueduct), San 
Francisco (the Hetch Hetchy Aqueduct), Denver (the Colorado Big-Thompson 
Project), Boston (the Pressure Aqueduct System), and Atlanta (which relies on Lake 
Lanier, an artificial reservoir approximately forty miles distant).15  
However, Las Vegas, unlike these other cities, is building a pipeline in an era 
in which the Endangered Species Act exists, a time of increasing environmental 
uncertainty, and a “Post Owens Valley” era. The notoriety of the Los Angeles 
Department of Water and Power’s early twentieth century campaign to appropriate 
water from the Owens Valley has influenced nearly every single water project 
nationwide since, to include the SNWA pipeline.16 Not only were there additional 
political barriers to pursuing more water, but most of the Colorado River Basin’s 
available water resources had already been appropriated by earlier developing areas. 
Metropolitan Las Vegas must vie with both metro-areas and agricultural interests that 
have early twentieth century, and therefore superior, claims to the region’s water 
sources.  
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Las Vegas’s late development had in-state ramifications as well. Urban 
governance in southern Nevada has always been subservient to state government. 
This trait is not unique to Las Vegas; however, other cities throughout the state had 
longer to develop and have not experienced the same rates of growth as those that 
have occurred in southern Nevada. The combination of state supremacy and rapid 
growth challenged local efforts to address various infrastructure needs. Since 1991, 
the SNWA has labored to recapture a level of local governance, something that could 
be labeled “regional home rule.” Between 1993 and 1995 the SNWA partially 
achieved this goal when it compelled the Nevada legislature to restructure the state’s 
Colorado River Commission (fig. 4).  
Recognizing Las Vegas’s water history helps provide a more complete 
historical picture of western American urban development, and can serve as a useful 
example for water planners throughout the Colorado River Basin. Las Vegas water 
managers reacted to shortage by banding together to form a new agency to increase 
the metro-area’s political power and to decrease overall water consumption. This is a 
model that could theoretically be employed on a larger geographic scale, such as the 
Colorado River Basin. These realities are what make an examination of Las Vegas 
water worthwhile.  
Though the focus of this dissertation is an analysis of the SNWA from 1989 to 
2010, a quick overview of the prior historical water regimes that existed in the Las 
Vegas Valley (the valley in which the Las Vegas metropolitan area developed) 
provides some valuable historical context. The first, which I label the Pre-Urban 
Regime, was the longest, stretching from 10,000 B.C. to A.D. 1905. Dozens of 
springs flowed throughout the Las Vegas Valley and formed the primary water source 
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for Native Americans for thousands of years. Little manipulation of water sources 
occurred during this period. Euro-Americans occupy a small span of time during this 
regime, beginning in 1855. That year, Mormon missionaries established a fort 
alongside the Las Vegas wash, through which water from the previously mentioned 
springs flowed. The Mormons only resided in the valley for two years before being 
recalled to Salt Lake City for the impending war with federal troops that ultimately 
never came. After the Mormons left, ranchers moved in. While these Euro-Americans 
practiced agriculture to a greater degree than their Native American predecessors, 
their manipulation of local water sources extended primarily to digging irrigation 
ditches to divert water from the Las Vegas wash to their alfalfa fields.17  
The second regime marks the beginning of the urban period in Las Vegas’s 
water history. Regime Two lasted from 1905 to 1954, during which the Union Pacific 
Railroad and its subsidiary, the Las Vegas Land & Water Company managed local 
water resources. Regime Two is characterized by private ownership of water and the 
first large-scale manipulation of the local environment to increase water supply. In 
1905, the Union Pacific Railroad established a link between Los Angeles and Salt 
Lake City and utilized the groundwater beneath the Las Vegas Valley as a commodity 
and as fuel. The railroad spurred economic activity, which in turn drew settlers. By 
the nineteen twenties the Union Pacific and its subsidiary, the Las Vegas Land & 
Water Company, were sinking wells, installing pumps, and building pipelines to serve 
commercial and residential purposes. The inconsistencies between the commercial 
pursuits of the Union Pacific and the needs of the public initiated the onset of the third 
regime.18 
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Regime Three occurred between 1954 and 1971, when local water resources 
came under the control of a public utility, the Las Vegas Valley Water District. The 
third regime is marked by public ownership of water, local control, and a shift from 
groundwater to the Colorado River as the metro-area’s primary water resource. In 
1954, groundwater remained the Las Vegas Valley Water District’s primary water 
resource, but the District also built a modest pipeline, able to convey 54,000 acre-feet 
per year of the state’s Colorado River allocation to the metro-area. This amount 
equaled only one sixth of the state’s entire allocation of 300,000 acre-feet, but it was a 
sign of things to come. Local boosters like newspaper owner Al Cahlan, and U.S. 
Senator Alan Bible began to pursue federal assistance to build the Southern Nevada 
Water Project, an infrastructure system that could pump Nevada’s full allocation to 
the Las Vegas metropolitan area. The central irony of Regime Three is that this was 
the period in which metro-area water managers traded local environmental limitations 
for those imposed by the Law of the River. Once Colorado River water began flowing 
into Las Vegas taps, metro-area water managers were required to abide by a federally 
imposed legal system applicable to the seven states that used the river. In 1954, 
however, metro-area water managers did not view this limitation as a problem.19 
During the next regime, Regime Four, it did become a problem. This period is 
characterized by metropolitan population growth and increased competition among 
local governments over water resources, as well as state administration of metro-area 
water supply. The fourth regime began in 1971, when the federal government 
completed the first phase of the Southern Nevada Water Project. The legislature had 
given the Colorado River Commission of Nevada the authority to manage the Las 
Vegas metro-area’s water supply. State management of a local resource proved 
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problematic. The Colorado River Commission instituted a system of individual 
allocations for each of the metro-area’s municipalities, a system that unintentionally 
increased overall consumption as each municipality used more water than needed in 
an effort to justify an enlarged allocation the following year. As consumption 
increased, so did the level of political tension among metro-area governments. The 
tension finally came to a head in 1989; the year local water mangers sought a way out 
of the crisis (fig.2). The Fifth (SNWA) Regime, and subject of this dissertation, 
emerged out of this situation.20 
Patricia Mulroy, the General Manager of the SNWA from 1993 to 2014, is the 
primary human actor in this analysis. No person had greater influence on SNWA 
policy than Mulroy. She was at the forefront of every major political discussion at the 
city, county, state, and interstate level during her tenure. Mulroy and the SNWA have 
become synonymous in the public eye, in no small part because she served in the 
chief executive’s post for a quarter century. The degree to which elected officials and 
the public identify Mulroy with the SNWA is shared by perhaps only one other water 
figure in history, William Mulholland. Not comfortable with the comparison, Mulroy 
has nevertheless influenced the historical trajectory of the Las Vegas metropolitan 
area as thoroughly as Mulholland did Los Angeles. Upon her retirement, Mulroy had 
become a regarded political figure not only in southern Nevada, but also throughout 
the Colorado River Basin and by federal water officials. Her presence accompanies 
the major developments analyzed in this book.21  
Mulroy’s longevity was the result of proficiency and effective leadership. One 
of the stipulations of her appointment in 1992 was that she appear for an annual 
review, during which the SNWA board could decide whether to extend her position 
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for another year. The board, comprised of elected officials from North Las Vegas, 
Henderson, Las Vegas, and Boulder City, recognized Mulroy’s talents for leadership 
and reaffirmed her position every year for twenty-five years.22  
Mulroy possessed an unexpected background for the principal water manager 
for the nation’s driest metropolis. Mulroy was born in 1953 in Frankfurt, Germany, 
the daughter of a German mother and American father who worked as a civilian for 
the Air Force. She lived there for twenty-one years and then moved to Las Vegas in 
1974. There she completed her bachelor’s and master’s degrees in German literature. 
She pursued a Ph.D. at Stanford but moved back to Las Vegas for family reasons. She 
applied for work with Clark County in the late nineteen seventies and worked there in 
a number of minor management roles for a few years until the county manager, 
Richard Bunker, took note of her abilities. He thought her leadership skills well suited 
for use in the Las Vegas Valley Water District, the utility charged with delivering 
water service to urban Clark County and the City of Las Vegas.23 
The District was, and still is, the largest water utility in the metropolitan area. 
Bunker realized someone with a management background was needed to head the 
LVVWD. This was a departure from previous eras in which engineers held the top 
leadership positions at the District. Bunker felt the challenges for water management 
were political, not technical, and that someone with a management background would 
be a better fit. Mulroy distinguished herself and rose to the general manager’s position 
of the District in 1989 and then the SNWA in 1993.24  
The basic narrative of SNWA development is one of internal administrative 
consolidation followed by the wielding of this strengthened position on an interstate 
political plane. The primary impetus behind this consolidation, then use of political 
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power, was the Law of the River. As a collection of fragmented water utilities, the 
Las Vegas metropolitan area’s pre-SNWA water regime was a non-entity in Colorado 
River Basin water politics. Mulroy quipped that the Las Vegas metropolitan area was 
“the Rodney Dangerfield of the river . . . we got no respect.”25 This apparent lack of 
respect stemmed from the fact that the Las Vegas metropolitan area posed no threat 
politically. The political discord among the metro-area’s water agencies diffused its 
political power. The best water source to utilize for the growing urban population, 
given its proximity and size, was the Colorado River. Since the Law of the River 
governed the Colorado, any hope to affect change would require a political solution. 
Mulroy and her counterparts throughout the metro-area recognized that to have any 
chance to modify the Law of the River, the metro water-agencies would need to pool 
their political resources and unify.  
The outline of this book begins with the local unification process by the four 
separate water utilities of North Las Vegas, Henderson, Boulder City, and the 
LVVWD. This process included restructuring the Nevada Colorado River 
Commission, the body charged with distributing the state’s Colorado River water to 
the Las Vegas metropolitan area. The state legislature gave the Colorado River 
Commission this authority largely as a result of the competition among the metro-
area’s separate city governments. But the formation of the SNWA entirely arrested 
this competition, which rendered the Colorado River Commission redundant, and 
from the point of view of local water managers such as Mulroy, superfluous. 
After consolidating city, county, and state level political control over the Las 
Vegas metro-area’s water supply, Mulroy and the SNWA began to negotiate with the 
six other Basin States to modify the Law of the River. Since 1991, these interactions 
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have resulted in interstate shortage sharing agreements and temporary increases to the 
amount of Colorado River water the SNWA can withdraw annually. These 
modifications represent unprecedented changes to the Law of the River, changes that 
were, in part, the direct result of initiatives Mulroy and the SNWA spearheaded.  
As we shall see, however, despite the SNWA’s consolidation of local, county, 
and state level political power, the Authority has only been able bring about 
temporary changes to the amount of Colorado River water available to the metro-area. 
Between 1995 and 2005, the governments of the other Colorado River Basin states 
agreed to allow the SNWA to withdraw additional water from the Colorado River. 
However, these agreements only provided temporary relief. They specified that the 
SNWA could only withdraw water until its pipeline project came online. This was 
problematic on two counts. The first was that it only granted a temporary right to 
additional Colorado River water. Second, scientists who have analyzed the SNWA 
pipeline either do not know how long the resource will last or predict that 
groundwater pumping will deplete aquifers and eliminate them as a long term 
resource option. Given that it took tens of thousands of years to fill these aquifers, it is 
entirely plausible that any amount of pumping will draw these aquifers down faster 
than natural recharge. If the pessimistic predictions come true, then the SNWA will be 
back where it started: looking to the Colorado River to alleviate its water resource 
challenges. The temporary nature of the agreements and the SNWA’s continued 
reliance upon the pipeline demonstrate a fundamental rigidness to the Law of the 
River. Neither option provides resource security for the Las Vegas metro-area.  
Which returns us to the original assertion that the Law of the River exerts 
unique pressure upon the Southern Nevada Water Authority and the Las Vegas metro-
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area community. Despite the fact the pipeline is hydrologically independent of the 
Colorado River, it nonetheless remains entwined within the complex political 
framework of Colorado River water politics and serves to illustrate how all water use 
in Las Vegas, regardless of the source, is ultimately tied to the Colorado River. 26
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CHAPTER 2 | 1989: AN ERA OF LIMITS AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY 
 
 
The 1980s serve as the prologue for the creation of the Southern Nevada 
Water Authority (SNWA). In that decade there existed a contentious relationship 
among Las Vegas metropolitan area water agencies: the Las Vegas Valley Water 
District (LVVWD) which served the City of Las Vegas and urban Clark County, and 
the public utilities for Henderson, North Las Vegas, and Boulder City (fig. 2). Also 
present within this political milieu was the Colorado River Commission of Nevada 
(CRC). The CRC was a branch of state government that administered Nevada’s 
annual 300,000 acre-foot allocation of Colorado River water. By 1982, this resource 
comprised ninety-percent of metropolitan Las Vegas’s water supply.  
On March 7, 1989, members of the CRC and LVVWD gathered together in 
what turned out to be a contentious meeting, one originally intended as a forum to 
discuss the water crisis facing water agencies in the Las Vegas metropolitan area. It 
had become apparent that population growth was threatening to exhaust the metro-
area’s Colorado River water supply, a contingency that, if not addressed, would occur 
by the mid nineteen-nineties. During the meeting LVVWD general manager Pat Pine 
rose and publically accused CRC director Jack Stonehocker of not doing enough to 
ease the crisis. Pine had good reason to be angry. The CRC administered the metro-
area’s Colorado River water supply. Pine even implied that the Commission’s polices 
were making the situation worse. Stonehocker sarcastically responded that the CRC 
could not simply manufacture additional water. He was not alone among his fellow 
commissioners in thinking the metro water agencies themselves were to blame for the 
water crisis. Stonehocker noted that metropolitan Las Vegas had one of the highest 
per capita water usage rates in the nation (nearly 400 gallons per day), pointing out 
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that residents in Phoenix and Tucson used far less (250 and 155 respectively) than 
their counterparts in southern Nevada.1  
This exchange between Pine and Stonehocker illustrated the frustration many 
metro-area water managers felt over the state of their water resources in 1989. Pine, 
whose anger with the CRC was representative of his counterparts in Henderson, North 
Las Vegas, and Boulder City, felt that his agency did not have enough water to meet 
demand in the rapidly growing metropolis, and he felt powerless to get more. He (and 
other metro water officials) also wanted a greater degree of local control over the 
southern Nevada water supply, of which the Colorado River comprised the majority. 
Establishing local control, however, would require a greater level of 
collaboration among the metro-area’s four separate utilities. But for various political 
reasons these agencies were unwilling to work together. In short, metropolitan Las 
Vegas water mangers wanted more control over their own water resources but were 
too suspicious of one another to put a plan in place to make that happen. In March of 
1989, it appeared that Henderson, North Las Vegas, Boulder City, and the LVVWD 
were in imminent danger of running out of water.2 
The year 1989 marked a pivotal point in the history of metropolitan Las 
Vegas. Three key events occurred that year that would alter the trajectory of metro-
area water policy, all of which contributed to the creation of the Southern Nevada 
Water Authority (SNWA) in 1991. In the last year of the 1980s, the Lower Colorado 
River Basin States (Arizona, California, and Nevada) collectively used 7.5 million 
acre-feet of water from the Colorado River. This represented the entire amount of 
Colorado River water entitled to the Lower Basin under federal law. This heralded 
what the United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) called the “era of limits,” an 
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era in which surplus water on the Colorado River would likely never occur again. The 
population of the Lower Basin States had grown from a 1980 population of just over 
twenty-seven million, to almost thirty-five million by the end of the decade.3 Any 
surplus Colorado River water from 1989 forward would have to come from the Upper 
Colorado River Basin States (Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and Wyoming). It was 
only a matter of time before these states would also develop to the point they would 
need their full 7.5-million acre-foot per year allocation of the Colorado River.   
As water planners in the seven-state Colorado River Basin region faced the 
prospects of increasing water scarcity, in November 1989 casino impresario Steve 
Wynn opened a resort of unprecedented size and cost on the Las Vegas Strip. At over 
2,049 rooms and a cost of over 600 million dollars, the Las Vegas Mirage was larger 
than any casino ever built on earth. It was also more exotic and opulent, featuring 
attractions that no previous casino had possessed. The Mirage contained a 1.6 million 
gallon dolphin habitat that initially housed five of the aquatic mammals. Additionally, 
Wynn included a 20,000-gallon exotic fish aquarium behind the concierge, an evening 
show featuring the magicians Siegfried and Roy and several of their Siberian tigers, 
several fine dining restaurants, and a fifty-four foot replica volcano that emitted 
flames and steam to entertain and attract patrons.4 Wynn was the first person to 
combine all these elements into one resort, and the Mirage established a new standard 
for anyone else who wanted to open a casino on the Las Vegas Strip. In order to 
compete, would-be casino operators had to build bigger and higher quality resorts. 
Two individuals, William Bennett and Kirk Kerkorian, followed Wynn’s lead. In the 
five years following the opening of the Mirage, Wynn, Bennett, and Kerkorian 
opened four additional mega-resorts: Bennett’s Excalibur (1990) and the Luxor 
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(1993), Kerkorian’s MGM Grand (1993), and Wynn’s Treasure Island (1993). These 
resorts raised the hotel room total in the metropolitan area by approximately 20,000 
rooms and triggered an economic expansion that brought the population from 850,000 
in 1990 to just over 1.5 million ten years later.5  
It was against the backdrop of a fully appropriated Colorado River and an 
immanent casino construction boom on the Las Vegas Strip that on October 17, 1989 
LVVWD officials filed a claim with the Nevada State Water Engineer for rights to 
groundwater in over twenty desert valleys in White Pine and Lincoln Counties, as far 
as 250 miles north of the metro-area (fig. 10).6 Pat Pine (as well as his counterparts in 
Henderson, North Las Vegas, and Boulder City) was worried that the District could 
not supply water to all the new homes and businesses that the casino construction 
would initiate. Pine’s first choice for water would have been to look to the Colorado 
River, but federal and state law prevented this. The Law of the River did not allow 
states to withdraw an amount beyond their basin allocation.7 Additionally, the CRC 
possessed legal authority over the state’s Colorado River allocation.8 The only option 
left for Pine was water contained within the borders of Nevada, and the only 
unappropriated water remaining in the state was located underground in rural Lincoln 
and White Pine counties.  
The groundwater filings were an act of desperation by the LVVWD and 
illustrated how Pine and other metro water managers felt about the existing water 
regime: state administration of Colorado River water and balkanization among metro 
water utilities was a fundamentally flawed system. The solution, at least from Pine’s 
point of view, was local control over Colorado River resources. The main obstacle to 
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this was intra-metropolitan struggles over water, struggles that were largely the result 
of CRC policy. 
The CRC had a system of allocating specific amounts of water to each metro-
area water utility. The District received the majority of this water (LVVWD—
174,712; North Las Vegas—17,962; Henderson—16,161; and Boulder City—7,273).9 
Continued rights to these allocations were contingent upon amounts used. In other 
words, a metro water utility only received as much water as it had consumed the 
previous year. The unintended consequence of this “use it or lose it” policy, as local 
water officials called it, was that it incentivized consumption. Each utility used as 
much water as possible to protect their allocations. Indeed, water managers in Boulder 
City once uncapped their fire hydrants to ensure they utilized their full yearly 
allocation.10 This in turn increased metropolitan water rates to some of the highest in 
the nation.  
The CRC, for reasons we will examine in greater detail in Chapter 4 was, in 
effect, the central water agency for metropolitan Las Vegas. It was the only agency 
with an inter-metropolitan purview. By the late 1980s, metropolitan water officials 
became increasingly vocal in their opposition to this arrangement. They believed the 
CRC worked to maintain a position of supremacy over metro-water agencies by using 
the promise of allocations as a way to pit them against one another. In 1989, there was 
near universal opposition to CRC policy among metro water agency officials, but 
these same individuals were also not willing to work with one another to produce a 
locally created solution—at least at first.11   
Among metro water agencies, the direction of the animus flowed from the 
smaller cities—Henderson, Boulder City, and North Las Vegas—toward the 
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LVVWD, which represented both the City of Las Vegas and urban Clark County, a 
region that included the Las Vegas Strip (fig. 8). Opposition from the smallest cities 
was based largely on the fact that the Clark County Commission served as the 
LVVWD board of directors. Officials from the smaller cities suspected that the 
county commission simply wanted to take over the CRC’s responsibilities. In March 
of 1989 the county commissioners stoked this fear when they adopted a water 
resource plan that called for, among other things, the county to assert control over the 
state’s 300,000 acre-foot Colorado River allocation.12 
For its part, the county commission also proposed a conservation plan to 
reduce consumption rates within the LVVWD service area.13 Officials in the smaller 
cities did not support this effort, however, because of the “use it or lose it” policy. 
Why conserve if it meant a possible decrease to their annual allocation? It was the 
apparent impossibility of the situation that compelled Pine to seek a solution.  
Pine knew that rates of water consumption were unsustainable. He discovered 
that between 1987 and 1989 water use increased by over seventeen percent within the 
metro-area.14 Furthermore, the District did not know how much water it had 
committed to developers. For Pine there was a real concern that his agency would not 
have enough water to honor the commitments it had already made. Pine brought these 
concerns to the attention of the Clark County Commission, acting in its capacity as 
the Board of the Las Vegas Valley Water District. Several commissioners, including 
Paul Christensen, Jay Bingham, and Thalia Dondero, had expected supplies to last 
until at least the year 2020. Under Pine’s predictions, however, the consumption rates 
would exhaust the metro-area water supply by the turn of the century.15 
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Pine happened upon a possible solution to the crisis when perusing an 
engineering trade journal.16 In it Pine noticed an article describing a consulting firm, 
Water Resources Management, Inc. (WRMI), that specialized in moderating multi-
party disputes over water—exactly the situation then occurring in the Las Vegas 
metro-area. According to LVVWD Deputy General Manager David Donnelly, Pine 
had a genuine interest in trying to help find a solution to the diminishing water supply 
and political acrimony among the metro-area’s water agencies. During a conversation 
with Donnelly, Pine discussed his wish to establish a partnership with WRMI.  
Pine was never able to follow up on his desire to invite WRMI to the Las 
Vegas metro-area. Despite this desire to pursue a resolution, the Clark County 
commission began to identify flaws in Pine’s management style. Chief among these 
was Pine’s contentious relationship with other metropolitan water managers. In 1989, 
the commission published a water resource plan that stressed the need to work across 
political and municipal boundaries to arrive at regional solutions to the metro-area’s 
dwindling water supply.17 Instances in which Pine publicly berated the director of the 
CRC noted earlier in this chapter set a tone counter to that which the County 
Commission was attempting to establish. According to one assessment, Pine acted 
“like a bull in a china shop” during interactions with other metro-water agencies. As a 
result, the county commission requested Pine’s resignation. The board needed 
someone with a better understanding of the political complexities and nuances of the 
Las Vegas metropolitan water regime, someone who was assertive, but also more 
politic.18.  
They found this combination in the person of Patricia Mulroy. The county 
commission recognized that water management was becoming an increasingly 
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complex task in metropolitan Las Vegas and thought that someone with a more 
refined set of management skills was needed. In a decision that would have a 
significant impact on the future of the metro-area, the commissioners appointed 
Patricia Mulroy to take over Pine’s position as General Manager.19 Mulroy had 
previously served as a research analyst and legislative lobbyist for Clark County, and 
was also well connected politically, having been originally recruited into county 
government by the most powerful lobbyist in Nevada, Richard Bunker. Bunker was 
head of the Nevada Gaming Commission and had been involved in Las Vegas urban 
issues since the 1970s.20 He thought Mulroy possessed the political acumen to be an 
effective administrator within the county government. Initially, Mulroy served in a 
variety of general management positions, but moved over to the LVVWD in 1985. By 
1989 she had become Deputy General Manager – one step below Pine.21 Starting with 
Pine, the County Commission began appointing individuals with an administrative, 
rather than engineering, background. Mulroy had the requisite experience.  
By her own assessment, Mulroy’s previous jobs had prepared her well for the 
task of managing the water district.22 She served as a lobbyist for Clark County during 
legislative sessions in the 1980s, a position that honed her negotiating skills and 
ability to work with a wide range of constituents. Mulroy fully supported the WRMI 
initiative that Pine had started. She also knew, however, that Pine’s manner had 
damaged political relationships among the metro-area’s municipalities. One of her 
first tasks, therefore, was to “walk … hat in hand to every single manager and 
apologize” stating “we need to start over. Can we … create a process how we do this 
together?”23 Shortly after this outreach, Mulroy and her staff conducted an initial 
round of meetings with the other water agencies to begin formal talks discussing a 
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way out of the crisis.24 By August of 1989, Mulroy had calmed the political situation 
down enough that metro-area water agencies were ready to begin formal negotiations 
over local water supplies. As a result, that same month the LVVWD board directed 
Mulroy to contract with WRMI. 
One District water official remembers that when she became General Manager 
it “was a real breath of fresh air.”25 Other LVVWD officials shared this sentiment. 
According to SNWA Deputy General Manager Dick Wimmer, “Making that change 
to Pat Mulroy was a change to a person with a much better managed ego, and more 
political acumen than what her predecessor [Pine] had. Which is what got him in a 
little trouble.”26 
Negotiations among metro water agencies began in November 1989.27 As part 
of the process, WRMI officials invited managers from a wide range of southern 
Nevada agencies dealing in water. These interests included the Big Bend Water 
District, the City of Boulder City, the Clark County Department of Comprehensive 
Planning, the Colorado River Commission of Nevada, the City of Henderson, the City 
of North Las Vegas, the City of Las Vegas, the Las Vegas Valley Water District, 
Nellis Air Force Base, the Nevada Department of Conservation and Natural 
Resources, and the United States Bureau of Reclamation.28 WRMI’s guiding 
philosophy was to build coalitions. This meant involving every interested party. In 
this way opposing interests could express their positions, establish common ground, 
and move forward.  
The Clark County Commission assumed financial responsibility for the 
WRMI proceedings, and did so for a number of reasons. One, it was the largest 
government body in southern Nevada. Two, the Clark County Commissioners 
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comprised the board of the LVVWD, the largest water agency in the metro-area. The 
commission therefore needed to demonstrate leadership to move the project forward. 
Lastly, given the scale of construction in the LVVWD service area, the county was 
facing the most pressure from developers and business leaders among the metro-
area’s cities and townships. As the commission discovered when it published the 
previously mentioned water resource plan, unilateral actions had thus far been 
ineffective in curbing increased water use. Henderson and North Las Vegas officials 
chose not to adopt a conservation policy.29 In essence, what arose was a classic 
“tragedy of the commons” situation in which one entity, the county, attempted to save 
water, but the other two, Henderson and North Las Vegas, did not see conservation as 
being in their best economic interests and continued to commit water to future 
housing development projects.30 Because the county did not wish to lose development 
projects to either of these smaller cities, it too failed to fully commit to the 
conservation policy.  
While it was a valuable first step, Clark County’s 1989 conservation program 
was not enough for District Planners. In February 1991, Mulroy told the County 
Commission that she was issuing a temporary moratorium on building permits 
(referred to by the LVVWD as will-serve letters). On February 14, the LVVWD 
stopped providing water to developers for all construction projects in an event the 
local press dubbed the “St. Valentine’s Day Massacre.”31 Inexplicably, up until this 
point, the District had no water accounting system in place. Between 1982 and 1989, 
if a developer brought a construction proposal to the District and asked for a water 
commitment, he or she received it.32 The District did not keep a ledger comparing 
these transactions against the amount of water the agency possessed. By 1991 District 
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personnel had grown sufficiently concerned that they had over committed the water 
they had available. They therefore called for a halt in issuing any additional will-serve 
letters until the District could properly take stock of its resources.33  
The will-serve cessation had significant ramifications for the Las Vegas 
Valley. Without water, developers could not build housing tracts, and without 
construction, a major pillar of the local economy was removed. To give a sense of 
how much money local government generated through construction, considered in 
1989 alone, Clark County collected over one billion dollars in housing permit fees.34 
During the assessment process Donnelly noted that the District had promised 
developers significantly more than the agency possessed.35 It turns out that this 
“significant amount” was a little over 18,000 acre-feet.36 This was a surprise to 
District personnel, local governments, and the development community. The District 
began preparing to revoke water rights, and developers clamored for assurances that 
their projects were not in jeopardy, assurances the District could not provide.37 
However, these actions were not enough. New supplies of water were needed, but 
securing new water was impossible since the only new source of water was the 
Colorado River, and the Basin states and federal government remained opposed to 
increasing Nevada’s allocation.38  
While developers in the District’s service area wrung their hands over the 
will-serve cessation, other cities like Henderson and North Las Vegas allowed 
construction to proceed.39 While North Las Vegas and Henderson were not legally 
obligated to stop building, their actions came at the expense of the City of Las Vegas 
and urban Clark County. County Commissioner Paul Christensen criticized the 
mayors of these two cities in a letter when he stated, “We all take our water from the 
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same glass, just through different straws. From my vantage point, you are drinking 
our water.”40 Christensen noted that developers merely started going to Henderson 
and North Las Vegas when the District ceased issuing will-serve letters, a trend that 
did nothing to alleviate the impending water shortage. North Las Vegas Mayor 
Michael Dyal countered, “We the water suppliers look forward to having an 
allocation of 53,000 acre feet. With that coming, I don’t see us doing anything 
differently.”41 County Commissioners realized the danger embodied in this attitude. It 
meant that a single city had the power to significantly decrease the entire metro-area’s 
water supply. Without collective action, efforts at the metropolitan level toward 
conservation were destined to fail.  
County Commissioners and LVVWD staff guided the process forward 
because they recognized that water agencies in Henderson, North Las Vegas, and 
Boulder City did not have the financial capacity to assume this responsibility, nor did 
they have the experience of administering water to as large a population. The 
LVVWD had administered water to the City of Las Vegas and urban Clark County 
since the 1960s. Additionally, the District interacted with a more diverse set of 
governments, including the State of Nevada and the federal Bureau of Reclamation. 
Collaborating with the metro-area’s three other water agencies was merely an 
expansion of the LVVWD’s metropolitan operations. 
WRMI’s specialty was facilitating compromise and agreement among 
competing parties over contested water resources. The key to the organization’s 
success was structuring negotiations in a way that forced technical experts from each 
of the agencies to collaborate on the same set of problems. In this case, engineers and 
technicians from the LVVWD, Henderson, North Las Vegas, and Boulder City would 
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first engage in a process of data collection, specifically how much water was available 
to the metro-area. With this data, technicians could then address potential responses to 
water shortages. As a result of the WRMI exercises, technicians discovered that, 
under present conditions, the metro-area’s municipalities would tap their entire 
Colorado River allocation by 1995, a mere five years away. The respective water 
agencies could postpone this event by adopting rigorous conservation measures, but 
this would still only preserve the local water supply until 2007.42 After that only the 
acquisition of new water sources (almost definitely, Colorado River water) would 
allow the continuation of urban development in southern Nevada.  
Remembering the panic she and others felt upon hearing this news, Mulroy 
recounts that after the WRMI exercise, “we all realized that we were going to run out 
of water between 1992 and 93, and that it was just a matter of months before each one 
of us was going to go off the cliff first, second, third.”43 (The sequence to which 
Mulroy alluded was in reference to the allocations and priority rights each metro-area 
water agency possessed.) Under the worst-case scenario WRMI representatives put 
forth, the LVVWD would possess an adequate water supply for the longest amount of 
time since it had the largest allocation (approximately seventy-five percent) of 
Colorado River water. However, Henderson and North Las Vegas would experience 
economic hardship more quickly. Each of these cities had to split the remaining 
quarter of the metro-area’s Colorado River allocation. (Boulder City possessed a 
slow-growth policy and its officials were less concerned over the amount available). 
Presented with this stark version of the future, technicians from the various agencies 
set about finding a solution. They found two, one contingent upon the other.44 
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During the course of the WRMI process, technicians discovered that the 
metro-area could potentially access an additional 58,000 acre-feet of water per year 
from the Colorado River. This would be available in the form of return flow credits. 
Southern Nevada theoretically possessed rights to return flow credits since the 1963 
Arizona v. California Supreme Court decision. The Court defined consumptive use of 
Colorado River water as “diversion from the main stream less … return flows.”45 
What this meant was that water agencies in California, Arizona, and Nevada could 
withdraw more than their basic allocation as long as they returned the difference. For 
example, Nevada could legally withdraw 450,000 acre-feet of water per year as long 
as it returned 150,000 acre-feet after use. Since 1971, Nevada had been taking 
advantage of return flow credits to varying extents. But during the 1970s and early 
1980s, return flow credit accounting was not a priority for local water agencies, since 
the metro-area was not withdrawing more than its basic allocation (300,000 acre-feet). 
The situation changed in the late 1980s, as the metro-area began using more than its 
basic allocation. At that point, return flow credits became a vital resource.46  
The WRMI process helped expose the extent to which metropolitan political 
fragmentation had diminished the amount of water available to southern Nevada. Not 
only did the fragmentation lead to increased use within the metro-area (thus 
decreasing the amount flowing back to the Colorado River), it also made the Colorado 
River Commission and Bureau of Reclamation reticent about providing the metro-
area with additional return flow credits. These two agencies especially did not want to 
become involved in local political conflicts, and were not going to assume 
responsibility for accounting the return flow credits.47 Instead, metro-area 
governments needed to account for return flows and then submit their findings to the 
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USBR. The USBR would verify these figures and provide a corresponding amount of 
return flow credits to individual metropolitan water agencies.  
Differing policies among the individual municipalities precluded the 
opportunity to take full advantage of the return flow credits available through the Law 
of the River. In order to receive these credits, metro water agencies needed to 
standardize policy governing the treatment and return of wastewater to the Colorado 
River. In 1989, however, there was no metro-wide policy governing return flows. 
North Las Vegas, urban Clark County, and the City of Las Vegas each cleaned their 
Colorado River allocation and returned it to Lake Mead, but Henderson and Boulder 
City did not. Instead, those two cities used their allotments for domestic purposes, 
cleaned it, and then used it for various other functions, such as outdoor irrigation of 
public green space. This policy, known as “full consumption”, represented a situation 
in which a municipality continued to reuse its water until it was gone. This was an 
efficient use of water, though it did not provide Henderson and Boulder City—and by 
extension the rest of the metro-area—a larger amount of Colorado River. 
The prospect of implementing a policy that each of the metro-area’s water 
agencies would agree to follow was daunting. The historical tension among 
municipalities created deep political divisions. However, the collaborative WRMI 
process reduced the collective suspicion. It was designed to present scientific data in 
transparent terms. This gave everyone involved access to the same information. As a 
result, technicians from each agency knew how much water was available to the 
metro-area as a whole. Because they had all worked through the process together, 
water officials knew the other agencies were not hiding intelligence. This 
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transparency reduced the level of paranoia among the metro-area’s water agencies and 
allowed them to move closer to a political solution. 
Following a workshop in November 1990, officials from various agencies got 
together for dinner and drinks. Present were David Donnelly of the LVVWD, Mort 
Cowland and Kurt Segler of Henderson, and Gary Holland of North Las Vegas.48 The 
plan’s complexity was a frequent topic of discussion among WRMI negotiators, and it 
happened to be the topic this particular evening as well. Donnelly recounted that after 
several hours of discussion, one person in the group said, “you know, when you look 
at all these problems we’ve got . . . the best thing is probably a regional water 
agency.”49 But what form would it take? The dinner attendees debated the merits of 
having the Colorado River Commission assume the role, but they quickly decided that 
was not something they wanted. During the 1960s, officials with the City of Las 
Vegas and the LVVWD had opposed state efforts to designate the Commission as the 
metro-area’s master water agency. Donnelly and his colleagues knew this history, and 
wanted something different. After all, the main point of the WRMI process was to 
establish local control over water. They did not want an arm of the state government 
in charge of the metro-area’s water supplies. Donnelly recounted that another 
suggestion was for the LVVWD to assume responsibility over metropolitan water 
distribution. This idea was also dismissed. At that point there was still too much 
distrust among the agencies to have the District take over water administration for the 
entire metro-area.50 By the end of the evening, Donnelly and his counterparts realized 
they needed to create an entirely new organization. Essentially, they were proposing a 
“do-over”—to ignore, to an extent, the existing framework and design an entirely new 
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agency that was not beholden to the myriad municipal jurisdictions and the long 
history of conflict present throughout metropolitan Las Vegas.  
In December, Donnelly and his colleagues took their proposal to their 
respective agencies’ general managers (principals).51 The principals agreed to meet in 
early January 1991, at which time they would conduct negotiations over the contours 
of the new regional water agency. Donnelly recounts the meeting:  
 
Each of the agencies were to write down their proposal and bring it to a 
common table. And we had this table, and we all had out attorneys. We had 
our Colorado River attorneys. Henderson had theirs. North Las Vegas had 
theirs. We made the attorneys sit on the outside of the table, they could not 
talk. They could be in the room but they could not say anything. So we all, me 
and Mulroy, we put our proposal together, and we basically at that time said 
‘look, we are the big bad guy, we are the Water District.’ Now all the other 
cities were much smaller then, so we have to show some leadership here 
because if we don’t do it, it is not going to get done because they were just 
scared of us because we were the big bad gorilla. So we put together a 
proposal on how we would allocate the water, [an agreement] we thought was 
fair.  
 
We put a proposal together, we all came to the table, and who is going to go 
first. Who is going to be the first to turn up their cards? Of course Pat 
[Mulroy] can’t stand it, and she said ‘I will turn mine.’ She turns hers up and 
says ‘this is how I think we should do it.’ Phil Speight [Henderson City 
Manager] takes his and puts it into his brief case. They were all happy with 
it.52 
 
 
The substance of Mulroy’s proposal was that the new organization would be a 
member based super authority in which each of the water purveyors would have an 
equal say in policy decisions.53 The Southern Nevada Water Authority (SNWA), as it 
would be called, would consist of seven “member” agencies. Five of the agencies, the 
Las Vegas Valley Water District, the City of Boulder City, the City of Henderson, the 
City of North Las Vegas, and Big Bend Water District were water providers and were 
classified as “purveyor agencies.” The remaining two were wastewater agencies—the 
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City of Las Vegas and the Clark County Reclamation District—and did not hold the 
same political status within the SNWA as the five purveyor agencies. Additionally, 
the principals established allocation levels for each of the purveyor agencies that 
would stay the same each year irrespective of how much each entity used.54 Purveyors 
would not, therefore, have to use their allocation in order to protect it. This policy 
would enable the SNWA to implement a number of conservation strategies in the 
coming years.  
During this round of negotiations the principals agreed to the provision that 
purveyor agencies would have equal standing within the SNWA, regardless of size. 
This meant that Boulder City, then a town of just over ten-thousand residents would 
be on par with the Las Vegas Valley Water District, which had the responsibility of 
delivering water to over half-a-million residents. Under this arrangement, certain 
policy decisions would require unanimous consent. These included: amendments to 
the SNWA Cooperative Agreement, implementation of strict conservation programs, 
the incorporation of a new SNWA member agency, individual agency water 
allotments, cost sharing for the construction of infrastructure, and shortage sharing 
agreements in time of drought.55  
These were the most critical issues with which local managers were 
concerned. The basis for concern, among the smaller city agencies, was of a financial 
nature. For example, Boulder City did not possess the tax base, nor the population to 
necessarily justify a project such as the LVVWD’s Cooperative Water Project. 
Boulder City adopted a slow growth policy in the 1970s, which allowed for the 
construction of only thirty to forty structures per year.56 The pipeline project was in 
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fact, a major reason why the other member agencies expressed some reticence about 
joining the SNWA.  
Mulroy, however, also proposed that each agency be given the right to veto 
certain capital works projects; additionally, she offered to share the water from the 
District’s Cooperative Water Project with each member agency if and when the 
project went forward. The so-called veto provision provided a measure of security for 
the smaller purveyors and was key to the SNWA’s creation. The veto clause protected 
small city member agencies against capital expenditures they viewed as harmful to 
their interests. No less a factor in moving the project forward was the promise that the 
District would share a significant amount of its own water with the other member 
agencies.57 After the principals established the basic working arrangement for the 
SNWA they had to take the proposal to the metro-area’s county commission and city 
councils. Their stamp of approval was necessary for the SNWA to become a reality. 
The water agencies briefed local elected officials in January 1991.58 Because 
there was consensus among the water agencies, the metro-area’s governments 
required little convincing, with one exception. Clark County was the first to join, 
though it did not do so with the unanimous consent of the commission. 
Commissioners Don Schlesinger and Karen Hayes, were concerned that the metro-
area was growing too rapidly and that the LVVWD’s Cooperative Water Project 
would only help fuel this trend. Furthermore, they also worried that county residents 
would have to pay for the project through increased taxes. They wanted to debate that 
issue before lending support to the SNWA because they felt that joining the new 
agency would increase the likelihood that the CWP would go forward.59  
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Despite Schlesinger’s and Hayes’ opposition, the five remaining 
Commissioners held no reservations about the speed of urban development in 
southern Nevada and voted to join the SNWA in early July.60 Next to follow were 
Henderson and North Las Vegas, both with pro-growth city governments. Boulder 
City then joined on July 10. Upon signing the agreement, City Manager George 
Forbes reassured residents that the SNWA Cooperative Agreement provided legal 
safeguards that would protect its autonomy within the new super-agency.61 
The situation with Las Vegas, on the other hand, was rather different. As early 
as March, Las Vegas Mayor Jan Jones and the City Council expressed reservations 
over the composition of the SNWA. The City of Las Vegas was initially left out of 
high level negotiations because it was not a water purveyor (it did not deliver potable 
water to customers).62 This task was left to the LVVWD, which provided water for 
the city of Las Vegas and for urban Clark County. This worried city officials who felt 
they might not receive fair representation under the new regime. Numerous city 
officials reacted negatively to the exclusion. During the course of negotiations, Las 
Vegas voters elected a new mayor. Despite the change in administrations, the new 
mayor, Ron Lurie, was also opposed to the city being left off the SNWA board. 
Shortly after taking office, Lurie declared “we need to be working together . . . water 
is important to our growth and we should be involved [with] the county [in] making 
these decisions.”63 Las Vegas City Councilman Steve Miller, engaging in a bit of 
hyperbole, stated that the exclusion would lead to a conflict between the city and 
county on par with “World War III.”64 As a result, city officials refused to offer 
political support for the SNWA, a stance that threatened to undo the entire 
collaborative process.  
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The Las Vegas city council was the second largest local government in the 
metro-area after the county commission. Over 250,000 people lived in Las Vegas in 
1990, and the city governed an area of over 125 square miles.65 Given the scale of its 
demographic and geographic responsibility, the city council was concerned it would 
not have a direct say in major policy matters concerning water. City officials therefore 
wanted assurances that they would receive at least half of any new water supplies due 
to the LVVWD. At play was a significant amount of water. Under the conditions 
established during the WRMI process, the District was poised to receive 32,000 acre-
feet of water per year, an amount that in 1991 could support approximately 128,000 
people.66 If Las Vegas city officials had their way, they would be entitled to a 
guaranteed supply of 16,000 acre-feet.  
The opposition from the City of Las Vegas is easier to understand when 
placed in a broader historical context. Political tension between the City of Las Vegas 
and Clark County existed since the 1940s; arising first over city plans to annex 
territory along the Las Vegas Strip. In 1954 the legislature established the LVVWD as 
a special service district primarily to service the water needs of the city of Las Vegas. 
The legislature also gave the District the authority to administer water to the handful 
of small settlements scattered throughout the Las Vegas Valley and Clark County. 
During the 1960s, growth in the unincorporated county south of the Las Vegas city 
limits began to drastically increase. During the 1970s, unincorporated Clark County 
began to rival, and by 1980, surpassed the city of Las Vegas in population.67 The 
Clark County Commission became the default “city” government for the 
unincorporated townships. As such, it became a rival local government to the Las 
Vegas City Council. Not only that, the added constituency and economic power of the 
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resort sector along the Las Vegas Strip actually made the county commission the most 
powerful form of local government in southern Nevada. In 1975 the legislature further 
increased the power of the county commission when it passed a law stipulating that 
the Clark County Commission would also serve as the Las Vegas Valley Water 
District board of supervisors. This reflected the reality that the LVVWD was no 
longer essentially just a Las Vegas city utility, but one with a purview regional in 
scale. Population growth drove all of this change and created a new political 
landscape that some Las Vegas city officials found difficult to accept.  
The historical tension between the county commission and Las Vegas city 
government notwithstanding, there were more recent factors at play in the city’s 
opposition. In the summer of 1991, city officials were still reeling from the District’s 
February “will-serve” moratorium. This action threatened a number of construction 
projects within Las Vegas city limits, most notably the Summerlin master planned 
community, a 22,500-acre development on the west side of the metro-area.68 Dozens 
of developers were already building in this community, and dozens more had plans to. 
The majority of homes there catered to middle and upper class residents and tended to 
be more expensive on average than most others in the metro-area. Sales of these 
homes would generate property tax revenue for the City of Las Vegas. City officials 
were therefore motivated to ensure they had the requisite water to support the 
Summerlin project.  
The primary factor in this was that city officials had no say in the moratorium 
decision. They instead had to defer to the county commission and LVVWD 
leadership. Las Vegas City Councilman Scott Higginson gave voice to this larger 
discontentment when he asserted, “Once again, the City of Las Vegas has no 
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jurisdiction over the allocation and determination of water use in the city limits. We're 
subject to another elected board.”69 Viewed in this context, it becomes easier to 
understand why officials such as Lurie, Higginson, and Nolen wanted a guaranteed 
amount of any new water under the SNWA agreement. They did not want to face a 
situation in the future in which they had no official standing in water policy decisions 
and no recourse but to accept a District mandate.  
Mulroy and other District staff, on the other hand, were not solely focused on 
events within the metro-area. There were several issues, regional in scope, driving 
Mulroy’s ambition to have the city of Las Vegas join the SNWA as quickly as 
possible. In the spring and summer of 1991, District officials were engaged in 
discussions with the CRC, USBR, and California and Arizona over the SNWA’s 
impending acquisition of 58,000 acre-feet of Colorado River water. As stated 
previously, this water would come in the form of return flow credits and only if the 
metro-area’s water agencies successfully created the SNWA. Mulroy needed to 
provide assurances to the federal government and other Basin states that the metro-
area would implement a uniform water policy. Mulroy understood the larger regional 
political reality and needed the support of every metro-area government for the 
creation of the SNWA. She knew that every city in the metro-area, demonstrations of 
independence to the contrary, was still subject to the Law of the River.  
There was also concern from Mulroy and others that if metro agencies did not 
form the SNWA, the Bureau of Reclamation would allow California to withdraw the 
58,000 acre-feet instead. Since 1985 drought conditions had existed in California, a 
condition that provoked a range of urban and agricultural interests to pressure 
California Governor Pete Wilson to procure additional water. In 1991 the 
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Metropolitan Water District of Southern California expected to receive only half of its 
normal Colorado River allotment, and farmers in the Imperial Valley only received 
thirty-five percent of their annual supply. The drought became enough of a challenge 
for California that Interior Secretary Manuel Lujan took notice and urged Colorado 
governor Roy Romer to “loan” the Golden state some of its Colorado River water. 
Given the magnitude of the Basin States’ regional political situation, Mulroy did not 
want to be overtaken by events and lose the water she hoped to acquire. She therefore 
set a July 15 deadline to form the SNWA to avoid that contingency. 70 
Throughout this process, the moratorium exerted pressure that compelled local 
agencies to come together and think about water at a metropolitan, rather than 
municipal scale. There is some question as to the degree to which Mulroy employed 
the moratorium as a coercive tactic. It is clear that Mulroy and District staff were 
genuinely concerned whether they possessed enough water supplies.71 The 
moratorium and subsequent cancellation of building permits did in fact increase the 
District’s water reserves. On the other hand, it also appears that Mulroy intended to 
use the moratorium as a wake-up call for metro-area water agencies. Mulroy herself 
indicated this was the case when she asserted, “I think the thing that put pressure on 
the creation of the Authority was the declaration of a moratorium. Because it took the 
creation of the Authority to lift the moratorium…[which] put a huge [amount of] 
community pressure on the process.”72  
This was not simply a case of a large agency bullying a smaller one; the 
county was feeling the effects of the moratorium just as much as the City. The District 
delayed projects on county lands and cancelled others. Developers and business 
leaders lobbied the county commissioners, urging them to allow the resumption of 
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construction as soon as possible. Commissioner Jay Bingham, himself a partner in a 
local housing construction company, was eager to lift the moratorium for political and 
financial reasons. Ten months into the process he and fellow commissioners Thalia 
Dondero and Paul Christensen began discussing the possibility of lifting the 
moratorium with Mulroy; but Mulroy held fast. She acknowledged the fact that the 
commissioner’s constituencies were exerting a “tremendous amount of pressure to 
keep people in jobs,” but that until the metro-area obtained new water, the District 
would not issue any new permits.73 As time progressed, tensions between the 
commission and city increased, to the point that some commissioners accused city 
officials of deliberately stalling as a way to leverage additional water rights. Jan 
Jones, the newly elected mayor of Las Vegas stated as much, declaring that the city 
was holding out to improve its negotiating position.74   
City officials recognized that their strategy was proving politically costly, 
generating animus among metro-area water agencies. One opinion piece in the Las 
Vegas Review-Journal criticized the city council’s decision to delay, arguing that, not 
only was it against the city’s interests, but that it hurt the community as a whole.75 
Aware of growing disapproval of the city’s delay tactics, in July the county 
commissioners extended an olive branch to Las Vegas officials.  The commissioners 
verbally agreed to Mayor Lurie’s and the city council’s terms to divide new water. 
This proved acceptable to the city officials, who then agreed to support the creation of 
the SNWA (fig. 6). On July 25, 1991, Nevada Attorney General Frankie Sue Del Papa 
signed the agreement between the Las Vegas Valley Water District, Boulder City, 
Henderson, North Las Vegas, and Big Bend Water District, thus bringing the SNWA 
into existence (fig. 3).76 
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With the creation of the SNWA came an independent organization whose 
primary responsibility was procuring additional water for the Authority’s member 
agencies. The immediate concern of the SNWA board was obtaining the remainder of 
the state’s Colorado River allocation. Its first move in this direction was to appoint 
Walter Fite, a former Bureau of Reclamation official, as the SNWA’s first director. 
During Fite’s twenty-five year career he worked extensively with officials in the 
Colorado River Basin states and seemed to have a firm grasp of the regional political 
composition. According to Mulroy, “Our number one focus for the new authority is 
the Colorado River, and that’s where [Fites’] experience lies.”77 The choice of Fite 
was an important political decision for the SNWA board. There was a crucial need to 
establish the legitimacy of the new agency at the metropolitan and interstate level. Las 
Vegas metropolitan water purveyors needed to see that someone independent of local 
politics was going to lead the Authority. The Board also hoped Fite’s appointment 
would project a degree of competence to the other Basin states and federal 
government. Referring to Fite’s appointment, Mulroy said: “It gives the Authority 
instant credibility.”78 
 Despite the SNWA board’s initial enthusiasm for hiring Fite, it was not long 
before his leadership style became an issue. In the words of one former District 
official, Fite “had a divide and conquer mentality.”79 According to Mulroy, Fite “was 
extremely competent technically [and] knew the river soup to nuts, but [he] didn’t 
understand the organization dynamic, so he failed.”80 Fite had not taken part in the 
WRMI process and was therefore not present to witness the emergence of the 
cooperative ethos among the member agencies. Upon assuming command, Fite tried 
to assert the supremacy of the LVVWD within the SNWA’s member agency 
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framework—essentially trying to make the District the first among equals. This was 
an alarming development to officials in the member agencies. Phil Speight of 
Henderson called Mulroy within the first three months of Fite’s tenure saying he did 
not think he [Fite] was the right person for the job. According to Mulroy, “he made 
the classic mistake. He came in and right away wanted to play the great game of 
divide and conquer. If you tip one agency against the other, then all of a sudden you 
are more important. We [the principals] all looked at each other after he had been 
there six months and went, ‘oh, this is not going to work because that is not the way 
the Authority was built.’”81 According to Donnelly, Fite “couldn’t work the local 
politics, [which] as you know are pretty brutal. He was playing purveyors against 
each other and this ran contrary to the spirit of the SNWA.”82 One SNWA board 
member stated, “Walt Fite is a lifelong federal bureaucrat who knows the ins and outs 
of water, who knows the Colorado River, but who hasn’t got a political antenna in his 
body.”83  
From the SNWA Board’s point of view, Fite was engaging in the same type of 
political intrigue that caused tension among metro-area water agencies during the 
1980s. Fite’s actions revealed that he did not understand the emphasis the creators of 
the SNWA placed on the equality of each agency within the Authority. Egalitarianism 
was the central tenet of the SNWA and the most important element contributing to its 
internal political solidarity.  
 Fite’s management style was not the only problem from the SNWA board’s 
perspective. While the individual water agencies had been interested in creating a 
separate and independent SNWA, Fite’s policies may have been a bit too 
independent. Upon signing the SNWA Cooperative Agreement in July 1991, the 
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District officially transferred responsibility for its Cooperative Water Project to the 
Authority.84 Despite this, the District continued to be deeply involved in the planning 
of the project—especially on the political front. District staff publicly asserted the 
need for the project and the vital role it would play in the metro-area’s water supply. 
Water from the CWP was also an enticement for the other member agencies, and the 
promised use of this water was one of the reasons they agreed to join the Authority. In 
April 1992, Fite contradicted the District’s disciplined message over the need for the 
CWP, stating that at the rate Las Vegas was growing, it would run out of water before 
the project would come online and that other options “needed to receive more 
attention.”85 This not only put Fite at odds with the County Commission and the 
LVVWD, but also the other member agencies who had a vested interest in the CWP.  
One potential result of Fite’s political position was the effect it would have on 
local lending institutions doing business with construction companies. A message of 
uncertainty over future water resources could certainly have had this effect. Fite’s 
declarations that the metro-area would run out of water before it could build the CWP 
contrasted with the county commission’s message that the SNWA would be able to 
meet this challenge. Indeed, a small group of planners within the Authority had begun 
to formulate a new policy in which the SNWA would base estimates of the available 
resources on future acquisition efforts.86 This was an unprecedented way of crafting 
water policy, and one that Fite, a veteran of the conservative Bureau of Reclamation 
would likely not have sanctioned. 
According to the Las Vegas Review-Journal, Mulroy “bristled” over Fite’s 
assertions, stating that he was not “close enough to the project to know” how vital it 
was to the metro-area.87 Fite’s opposition to the CWP was in part the result of his 
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newcomer status. The LVVWD had been involved in planning the CWP since the 
mid-1980s. It was a project that emerged from concern among District officials that 
the agency would not be able to procure enough water from the Colorado River to 
keep up with the growing population. Because Fite had come to the metro-area after 
1989, he had not witnessed the convergence of Colorado River shortages, casino 
construction, and groundwater applications. As a result, he did not have the same 
sense of urgency as his metro-area counterparts, especially Mulroy. While it may 
have seemed like a good idea in 1991 to hire an outsider like Fite, it became clear that 
the expertise he brought with him did not outweigh the political discord he caused. As 
a result, in April 1992, the board notified Fite that they were beginning a nationwide 
search for his replacement.88 
 The Board wanted someone who understood local politics, had knowledge of 
the Colorado River, and knew about water administration in a desert climate. On 
April 16, 1992 the Board authorized a recruitment effort throughout the American 
West for a new general manager. In the following months the Board received 132 
applications for the position, but, according to County Commissioner and SNWA 
board member Pat Shalmy, “no one person jumped out at us as the person we would 
recommend.”89 To help expedite the process, Chairman Hardy recommended the 
board narrow its focus to people already in water management positions in the 
southern Nevada and Lower Basin states.90 However, this too failed to produce an 
acceptable candidate.91 As the board searched for a new general manager, people 
continued to move to southern Nevada, which increased the pressure to find a 
solution.  
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 During the nearly yearlong search for Fite’s replacement, a parallel 
development emerged that would have lasting legacy. During this time, several board 
members began expressing support for the idea of having the District take over 
staffing duties for the SNWA.92 While the board searched for a replacement, it 
simultaneously realized that the composition and size of the Authority was 
insufficient for the job at hand. At that time the SNWA had a staff of four people. 
This was inadequate for an agency tasked with representing the Las Vegas metro-area 
on the political and geographical scale of the Colorado River Basin. Las Vegas-area 
water officials created the SNWA, in part, to negotiate and work with the other Basin 
states and federal government to secure additional Colorado River water. The river 
was (and remains), the most hotly contested waterway in the nation.93 For example, 
from the 1920s to the 1960s, on four separate occasions, the state of Arizona sued 
California over Colorado River rights.94 In the 1970s Mexican President Luis 
Echeverría threatened to take the United States to the World Court in The Hague over 
the river’s rising salinity levels.95 Additionally, over 20 million people throughout the 
American West relied on the Colorado River for drinking water in the early 1990s. To 
effectively negotiate this challenging political environment, the SNWA would need 
greater institutional depth going forward, including a cadre of lawyers and engineers.  
 During an October 1992 board meeting, Director Paul Higginson officially 
proposed the LVVWD should administer the SNWA.96 Going one step further, he 
pointed out that Mulroy’s knowledge of local politics made her an ideal choice to 
replace Fite and suggested she be placed in charge of the reorganized SNWA. 
Director Higginson seconded this and declared “it is the board’s responsibility to the 
people in this community …  to hire the best people they can to do this job of finding 
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new water for this valley … this contract, by placing the technical responsibility for 
that with the Las Vegas Valley Water District, does just that.”97  
 Board members representing the smaller agencies immediately expressed 
reservations about Higginson’s proposal. Director Lorin Williams of Henderson was 
concerned that Mulroy would be unable to keep her role as General Manager of the 
LVVWD and SNWA separate. Williams was concerned that the District might come 
to dominate local policy choices to the detriment of the smaller agencies.98  
This was a reasonable concern. The previous years witnessed not only conflict 
among the metro-area’s water agencies, but also the domineering leadership style of 
Walt Fite. Vice Chairman Brent Hardy of North Las Vegas was concerned that 
allowing one agency—the District—to manage the SNWA would potentially undercut 
the spirit of consensus that formed the foundation of the SNWA.99 At the most 
fundamental level, each board member was trying to protect his or her city’s ability to 
continue growing.100  
In order to help persuade representatives of the smaller member agencies, 
Chairman Dondero pointed out that the SNWA Cooperative Agreement, to which 
they were all signatories, established and protected each of their water allotments, as 
well as their financial obligation to the Authority. The current proposal would in no 
way threaten that arrangement.  
 Compelling as Dondero’s argument may have been, neither Williams nor 
Hardy were ready to support the merger in October and voted against the measure. 
Though he supported the merger, Director Bingham voted with the opposition. He did 
not want to pass the bill unless there was unanimous board support.101 After the vote 
he stated he would spend the next month meeting with Hardy and Williams to build 
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consensus. Bingham stated that if he was unsuccessful he would vote to either 
dissolve the SNWA or override the others—because each of southern Nevada’s city’s 
faced too many challenges for the Board to “sit around for another year and wait for 
things to happen.”102 
 During the intervening thirty days, District officials negotiated with the other 
member agencies to find a way around the impasse. For the smaller agencies, not only 
would the metro-area’s largest and most powerful water agency assume responsibility 
over water policy, but one of the most politically savvy people in southern Nevada, 
Pat Mulroy, would also lead it. By this time nobody doubted Mulroy’s political 
competence. She had played a key role in bringing together the disparate water 
agencies to create the SNWA and had begun the process of procuring additional water 
resources in the metro and Basin state region.  
While the combination of the LVVWD/SNWA merger and Mulroy’s potential 
ascendance to the General Manager’s position caused significant unease among the 
member agencies, the growth challenges affecting the metro-area were not going 
away. As the agencies negotiated, growth continued, and individual water purveyors 
continued to face increasing pressure from the business community and elected 
officials. Ultimately, Williams and Hardy agreed to allow Mulroy to lead, and the 
District to administer, the SNWA. What ultimately convinced them to support the 
initiative was an additional change to the cooperative agreement. The member 
agencies agreed to a stipulation that each year they would vote whether to reaffirm 
Mulroy’s tenure as General Manager and whether to allow the District to continue 
staffing the SNWA. If there was not unanimous agreement among the member 
agencies, then this arrangement would come to an end.103 
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 Mulroy’s ascendance to leadership may seem surprising given the earlier 
opposition among the smaller member agencies. However, according to several of her 
counterparts in Henderson, North Las Vegas, and Boulder City, Mulroy had proven 
herself to be both proficient in her job, as well as just. Her overall performance and 
impartiality throughout the entire SNWA negotiation process demonstrated her 
trustworthiness to her colleagues. But it appeared that the member agencies were only 
willing to extend their trust so far—they trusted Mulroy, but could not be assured that 
anyone else would exhibit the same qualities of job proficiency and fairness. This was 
the flipside to the annual agreement reaffirming Mulroy’s tenure. The member 
agencies also wanted to ensure they could hire someone who, like Mulroy, possessed 
the necessary attributes to lead a member-based water agency. Should someone less 
fair-minded step into the General Manager’s position, the member agencies wanted 
the legal recourse to rectify the situation in a timely fashion.104  
 In retrospect, the suspicion over Mulroy’s appointment was unfounded. Phil 
Speight, Henderson City Manager, observed that Mulroy “earned the compliance” of 
the member agencies: “Whether she could . . . put on another hat and become the 
regional czar was something that she had to establish with all of the entities . . . she 
was able to develop trust with all of the administrators as well as the political leaders 
of each of the entities through her work ethic.”105 It did not take long after her 
appointment that Mulroy became the face of the SNWA, both to the member agencies 
and to the wider public.   
 When the District merged with the SNWA, it created an agency with a 
significantly different geographic orientation than what its creators had originally 
intended.106 Planners had initially envisioned the SNWA as an organization with a 
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geographically outward orientation. Local water issues would be the domain of the 
individual member agencies, and the SNWA would operate at the county and 
interstate level. In other words, they saw the Authority as an organization that would 
have minimal influence on local (domestic) policy and would spend most of its time 
trying to obtain additional water from the Colorado River. This would mean that the 
Authority would interact primarily with the Colorado River Commission, the Bureau 
of Reclamation, and the other Colorado River Basin states.  
However, when the LVVWD and SNWA merged, it integrated the domestic 
orientation of the District and the outward orientation of the Authority. While the 
official SNWA position is  “the LVVWD operates the SNWA under contract, [and] 
the two entities are legally separate,” for all intents and purposes, the agency is a 
single unit.107 According to SNWA Natural Resources Director Kay Brothers, “The 
[District], is one organization with two missions. One is the purveyor mission [the 
District] and the other is the regional mission [SNWA]. But it is one organization.”108 
Instead of there being two agencies with two separate geographic foci, it became a 
single organization able to launch policy initiatives at the metropolitan and interstate 
levels.  
The standardization of effluent policy across the valley was one such example 
of the new agency’s capabilities. This policy enabled the SNWA to withdraw 
additional water from the Colorado River, increasing the metro-area’s water supply 
through resource acquisition. Conversely, the SNWA was also able to increase the 
volume of its resource pool by eliminating wasteful consumption practices. This 
occurred as a result of the shortage sharing agreement among the member agencies. 
Under SNWA guidelines, if a water shortage occurred in the metro-area, each 
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member agency would assume a proportional burden of shortage. This changed the 
dynamic of the individual municipality allocations. Since each had to share in 
shortage, this discouraged overuse of water and contributed to an overall decrease in 
consumption rates. Furthermore, under the Cooperative Agreement, allocations were 
no longer contingent upon use. As a result of policies such as these, the SNWA found 
itself better able to simultaneously coordinate regional acquisition efforts with local 
conservation measures, leading to a more comprehensive system of water 
management.   
 In the decade following the SNWA/LVVWD merger, one of the Authority’s 
chief policy initiatives was water conservation. Staff specifically began targeting 
various forms of outdoor water use. Water used outdoors had a greater impact on Las 
Vegas’s water supply than indoor water use. After consumption, water used indoors 
for drinking and cleaning flowed back into the metro-area’s water system, was 
cleaned, and returned to Lake Mead. This water was then used for return flow credits, 
and thus actually helped the SNWA obtain additional water from the river. However, 
water used outdoors was lost to the system. After a resident sprayed water on their car 
or lawn, it evaporated. The SNWA could not recover any of this water. The SNWA 
therefore began restricting outdoor water use in the early 1990s.109 In 1999, the 
SNWA augmented this policy with financial incentives. That year the Authority 
initiated a rebate program that paid southern Nevadans to remove grass in favor of 
more geographically appropriate desert plant species. As of 2013, the “Cash for 
Grass” program has removed enough grass to decrease the metro-area’s consumption 
rate by seven billion gallons per year.110  
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While programs such as these increased the metro-area water supply, they also 
served a valuable public relations purpose. Conservation efforts in the metro-area 
helped improve the Authority’s political standing within the Colorado River Basin, a 
point of importance since the Authority was poised to seek additional Colorado River 
water. The Authority’s conservation efforts served to demonstrate to the Basin states 
that the metro-area was actively working to get its own house in order before it sought 
any non-local water sources.  
When the SNWA board voted to allow the District to manage the Authority, it 
gave the agency the tools it needed to effectively manage water at the metropolitan 
and interstate scale. Between 1989 and 1993, from the WRMI process to the 
LVVWD/SNWA merger, the SNWA was imbued with authority from the local and 
county levels. This allowed it to implement conservation measures throughout 
southern Nevada in a more uniform fashion, something that had never occurred up 
this point. Member agencies no longer had to use their water or lose it. Water 
managers could conserve and not face the threat of losing the following year’s 
allotment. The creation of the Authority also established an organization that could 
work across municipal boundaries, a rarity in southern Nevada. The main factor to its 
success was the egalitarian nature of its political structure—each member agency 
possessed a veto on vital policy decisions regardless of the size of the agency or 
population it served. The Cooperative Agreement, therefore, helped the SNWA to 
solidify its political power within the metro-area. As a result, the SNWA was in a far 
better position to engage with the Basin states and Bureau of Reclamation to seek a 
change to the Law of the River.  
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In March 1992, the Authority obtained the rights to the final 58,000 acre-feet 
from the Bureau of Reclamation.111 As the Authority distributed the new water to the 
member agencies, planners rested a bit more easily. The new water went to support 
several large-scale housing developments throughout metropolitan Las Vegas, which 
in turn spurred the local economy.112 But while metro-area planners may have thought 
their troubles were over, the influx of new Colorado River water complicated policy 
and threatened the stability of the SNWA. This helped bring about the next phase of 
SNWA history, the Paradigm Shift. 
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CHAPTER 3 | THE PARADIGM SHIFT: BECOMING A METROPOLITAN 
WATER AGENCY 
 
 
“We created a bookkeeping nightmare”—David Donnelly 
 
 
“The greatest distractor for anybody who has a very large external mission is internal 
turmoil. I mean, it’ll cripple you. You won’t be able to put the time and effort into 
what you need to do if your internal organization is crumbling in front of you.”—
Patricia Mulroy 
 
On January 22, 2000, U.S. Senator Harry Reid, Governor Kenny Guinn, and 
Clark County Commissioner Mary Kinkaid, Chairwoman of the SNWA and a host of 
other dignitaries and members of the metropolitan growth coalition gathered at the 
base of the River Mountains southeast of the Las Vegas metro-area to celebrate the 
completion of the Capital Improvements Project (CIP). The cornerstone of the CIP, 
the “second straw,” a massive water intake valve approximately twelve feet in 
diameter had just been finished and was ready to begin siphoning water from Lake 
Mead and sending it to customers throughout metropolitan Las Vegas.1 The CIP was 
capable of withdrawing 700,000 acre-feet of water per year, more than twice 
Nevada’s annual Colorado River allocation. The large scale of the CIP reflected the 
expectation by SNWA planners that the Authority would acquire additional water 
resources in the decades to come. This expectation was the central tenet of the 
Paradigm Shift, a term coined by Mulroy to describe the SNWA’s new policy of 
eliminating individual member agency allocations and sending water to where it was 
needed most in the Las Vegas metro-area, irrespective of municipal boundaries.  
The Paradigm Shift was arguably the single most important development in 
the history of the SNWA. The Paradigm Shift itself was a policy change from a 
system of allocating specific amounts of water to each of the SNWA member 
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agencies to a new system based on sending water where it was needed. Under the new 
Paradigm Shift system, or simply Paradigm Shift, individual member agency 
allocations were eliminated. Water became a metropolitan resource, collectively 
owned and administered. Distributing water in this fashion, however, required the 
acquisition of new water resources. This was not an immediate concern among 
SNWA planners. The agency had enough reserve water supplies in 1991 to support 
construction projects for the next two decades. After that point though, the Authority 
would need more water. The Paradigm Shift was thus also an institutional risk 
management program.2  
Under the Paradigm Shift, SNWA planners did not set aside water for specific 
municipalities. Instead it was based on a first come, first served process. This 
provided builders throughout the metro-area an equal chance to start construction 
projects. Additionally, the policy required builders to build. This eliminated 
speculation over water rights. If developers did not initiate construction projects, the 
SNWA would not grant water permits. The highest profile example of this new 
system occurred in 1993 when Steve Wynn began building the Treasure Island Resort 
and Casino. Prior to construction he requested a water permit from the SNWA, but 
under the new water distribution system he was denied. He was well into the project 
when the SNWA finally gave him the water he needed. The Authority wanted to 
make sure Wynn was serious about the project before it committed water. The SNWA 
also convinced Wynn to implement a number of water conservation measures in the 
new resort, to which he agreed.3  
Two distinct components comprised the Paradigm Shift. The first was the 
conceptual phase. In this phase SNWA planners established the philosophical and 
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technical framework that would guide the Paradigm Shift policy, to include the water 
permitting process mentioned above. Fundamental to this was the expectation that the 
SNWA would be able to procure additional water resources for the metropolitan area 
through various means.  
The second phase is the process by which the Paradigm Shift moved from 
abstract principles to physical infrastructure. Reflecting the expectation of new water, 
the SNWA planners had to expand the existing water infrastructure, sometimes by as 
much as fifty percent.  
Infrastructure expansion occurred later in the Las Vegas metropolitan area 
than other western cities. While this reflects growth patterns common to many 
metropolitan areas, the CIP is unique in that the infrastructure is tied to a specific 
policy. This was not the case in San Francisco and Los Angeles during the early 
twentieth century and in Denver and Phoenix in the 1940s and 1960s.  Policy and 
infrastructure in the Las Vegas metropolitan area are integrated to a degree not found 
in these cities. The Paradigm Shift could not have occurred without infrastructure, and 
infrastructure could not have been built without the Paradigm Shift.  
The Las Vegas metropolitan growth coalition was a key ally in the SNWA’s 
campaign to enact the Paradigm Shift. As we shall see in the pages that follow casino 
resort owners, housing developers, and labor unions lent financial and political 
support to the project since it promised to bring economic expansion and additional 
jobs to Southern Nevada. The Paradigm Shift was not without its detractors, however.  
Critics assailed the SNWA on a number of points. Was it wise to base water 
resources on future supplies? What about the environmental impact of bringing more 
water to the metro-area?4 More water would likely attract a greater population, which 
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would then necessitate the bulldozing of more tracts of fragile desert landscape, 
spewing dust and other pollutants into the atmosphere. The added number of residents 
would also increase pressure on public institutions such as schools, libraries, parks, 
medical facilities, and most importantly for this study, water infrastructure. Existing 
water infrastructure was barely large enough to provide water for the rapidly growing 
metropolis during the early 1990s. Additionally, the Paradigm Shift would raise Clark 
County taxes, sparking opposition from the libertarian leaning Las Vegas Review-
Journal, the Republican Liberty Caucus, Las Vegas state assemblyman Harry 
Mortensen, and the Nevada Seniors Coalition, a metro-area senior citizens advocacy 
group. 
Criticism over the cost of the Paradigm Shift revealed a misperception over 
the cost, necessity, and effectiveness of urban water infrastructure not unique to 
metropolitan Las Vegas. Reliance upon infrastructure to deliver water to residents is 
common to every urban settlement in the United States. The only difference is the 
scale in physical size and geographic expanse. Los Angeles, New York City, Boston, 
San Francisco, Denver, Phoenix, and Salt Lake City all expended large sums of 
money to build reliable water delivery systems. But these are merely arbitrary 
examples. As Historian Martin Melosi points out, the more reliable a water delivery 
system is, the less visible it becomes. Water’s delivery into a home becomes so 
deeply internalized that it does not even register in the mind of a consumer as an 
amazing thing to behold. Historian William DeBuys writes, “the fact that faucets in 
Malibu flow with snowmelt mixed from the Wind River Mountains of Wyoming, the 
Colorado Rockies, and both sides of the Sierra Nevada is a daily miracle.” Malibu 
presents an extreme case of reliance upon infrastructure, but the average resident of 
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that town likely thinks very little about the effort and materiel involved in conveying 
water directly into their household. This infrastructural ignorance is common to most 
urban areas, and it manifested itself in metropolitan Las Vegas in 1998 at the height 
of the SNWA’s Paradigm Shift fund raising campaign.5   
The Paradigm Shift was an important step in strengthening the internal 
political solidarity of the SNWA. The individual member agency allocations were a 
vestige of the old, pre-1991 system. They were only included as a political expedient 
to make the process of forming the SNWA easier. However, the continued presence 
of allocations in the SNWA cooperative agreement had the potential to create political 
strife within the Authority. To become a water agency with a truly metropolitan 
purview, the SNWA needed to eliminate the system of individual water allocations. 
The pages that follow will take the reader through the process by which the Paradigm 
Shift moved from a plan in the abstract to an official SNWA policy and a physical 
system of infrastructure.6 
 
Part I | The Conceptual Paradigm Shift: The Plan 
As part of the original SNWA negotiations, the representatives from Boulder 
City, Henderson, and North Las Vegas (small cities) insisted upon including specific 
allocations for each prospective SNWA member agency, as well as a shortage sharing 
agreement. These were essentially placeholders, inserted into the cooperative 
agreement in case the SNWA failed (fig. 6). The small-city member agencies wanted 
the legal means to maintain a claim on the metropolitan water resources portfolio.7 
While this eased the SNWA creation process, including individual allotments in the 
cooperative agreement created the potential for individual member agencies to hoard 
water. This was the same thing that occurred during the 1980s that led to political 
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tensions among the metro-area water agencies. Unintentionally then, the member 
agencies included a proviso that potentially threatened the long-term survivability of 
the SNWA.  
Even before the SNWA was created, at least two County Commissioners, Paul 
Christensen and Jay Bingham, expressed reservations about adopting a cooperative 
agreement in which individual cities retained specific allocations. In September 1991 
they worried allocations could lead to further political divisions and would “politicize 
development questions.”8 These two recognized that concessions would have to be 
made in order to coax the small cities into joining the SNWA, and they did not make 
an issue out of their concerns. However, two years later, several SNWA officials 
began to address this topic once again.   
In 1993 the SNWA’s allocation system became a matter of concern to several 
of the Authority’s top leaders, General Manager Patricia Mulroy, and Deputy General 
Managers David Donnelly and Richard Holmes.9 Each of them recognized the 
inherent danger of having a membership based upon individual allocations. They 
knew this system threatened internal political solidarity among member agencies. 
Mulroy’s prior experience with the LVVWD showed her that internal divisions were 
a more dangerous threat to an organization’s effectiveness than any other factor. 
During the 1980s the relationship between management and labor within the LVVWD 
had become strained. Interaction between supervisors and subordinates were often 
contentious. Mulroy recounted that morale among the workforce in 1989 had reached 
an all time low. One of her first acts as LVVWD General Manager was to hire a 
consultant to create a plan to improve the situation. For two years, Mulroy oversaw 
the process, spearheading efforts to establish an employee generated mission 
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statement and a code of ethics. These later became official LVVWD policy. 
Furthermore, Mulroy fired at least one manager who was reported to have verbally 
abused subordinates. Over the course of two years, Mulroy had reinvigorated the 
LVVWD’s workforce and improved morale. Mulroy recounted that her number one 
concern throughout the process was to improve the internal solidarity of the LVVWD. 
She said the organization simply could not function in the way it was intended if the 
workforce was pitted against one another. Mulroy brought this value with her when 
she assumed command of the SNWA.10   
Donnelly and Albright explained that they did not want to see a situation arise 
in which developers began choosing locations to build based on water availability. 
Donnelly recalled individual allocations created a situation in which you had “some 
people who have got more water on their ledgers than others. Pretty soon we are 
going to have some developers in Henderson [who] can’t build, and [we] are going to 
have to tell them to go to Las Vegas because they are the only ones with any water in 
their ledger. That is going to destroy this community.”11 
Donnelly recognized that if developers built in some municipalities and not in 
others, this would increase the economic disparity among the metro-area’s cities. As 
shown in the first chapter, local governments welcomed developers since housing 
construction was an economic asset. Indeed, the desire to attract developers to 
individual municipalities over others was a central reason for increased metropolitan 
water consumption and political tension among the local governments. The 
allocations reflected the fundamental irony in the SNWA’s creation: the very point of 
creating the SNWA was to end competition over resources by individual metropolitan 
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water agencies, yet, member agency allocations were threatening to reproduce these 
exact conditions.  
In 1993 neither Mulroy nor Donnelly knew what to do. There were no 
examples the SNWA could look to for guidance. The most closely analogous western 
water agency was the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, but for 
reasons that will become apparent below, it was not an agency Mulroy and her staff 
wished to emulate. 
The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MET) was created in 
1928 to manage the state of California’s Colorado River allocation. It was comprised 
of twenty-six member agencies representing over three hundred cities and 
municipalities. Membership in MET was not based on equality, rather, it was based 
on assessed valuation. In other words, the more money your city was worth, the 
greater your political power within MET. And the more political power a member 
agency had, the larger its allocation. This has led to considerable tension among 
members, especially the San Diego County Water Authority (SDCWA) and the Los 
Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP). 
Decades-long tension has existed between these two organizations with the 
SDCWA charging that it has long been dominated by the LADWP. Part of this was 
the result of SDCWA being nearly totally reliant upon the Colorado River water that 
MET delivered. Indeed, San Diego is in much the same position as metropolitan Las 
Vegas in that its water supply is almost entirely comprised of Colorado River water. 
San Diego’s near total dependence on a single water source has placed it in a 
politically vulnerable position. SDCWA officials, fearing their over-reliance upon a 
single resource, have long chafed at the restrictions MET has placed upon its water 
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use. For their part, officials with the LADWP have charged that residents of Los 
Angeles are paying higher prices for Colorado River water as a result of higher 
valuation within the city of Angels, therefore subsidizing water that San Diegans 
consume. At the core of the dispute, however, is the inequitable nature of membership 
voting power within MET and allocation distribution. Tensions between the two 
organizations have in fact led to at least five lawsuits between them since the mid-
1990s.12 
Donnelly was clear about his distaste for the MET model: “All the problems 
the metropolitan water district in southern California was having was because what 
we considered, or what I considered, an archaic way of allocating water. That you 
have the haves and the have-nots. It just doesn’t work.”13 Mulroy felt the same way. 
She wanted to increase the political solidarity among the SNWA member agencies 
and knew the MET model would not accomplish this goal. Mulroy remembered that 
she and her staff “looked at [MET] when we created the SNWA and said okay, we’re 
not crazy about … the voting [structure], we’re not crazy about a lot of things they’ve 
got embedded in there. I mean … they don’t have a shared shortage arrangement, in 
fact, we did a lot of things deliberately different because we had witnessed … the 
consequences … of MET’s structure.”14 Donnelly was first to actually propose doing 
away with the allocation system. He recruited Mulroy, Albright, and Richard Bunker, 
president of the National Resorts Association and an influential member of the 
metropolitan growth coalition who had influence with gaming and development 
interests, to also push for the Paradigm Shift. 
Additionally, individual allocations “created a bookkeeping nightmare” for 
Donnelly. He recalled the difficulty of attempting to keep track of each member 
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agency’s water allocations during early SNWA planning meetings. The SNWA 
acquired three new sources of water during its first three years as an institution, 
totaling nearly 100,000 acre-feet.15 As the SNWA gained title to this water, Donnelly 
had to recalculate how much each member agency was entitled to. Complicating 
matters further, agencies were not using their maximum allotment, only a portion. 
This required the SNWA to distribute water on a percentage basis, and one that 
frequently shifted. He also had to oversee the permitting process for development 
projects and keep track of how much water the Authority had committed.16 Finally, 
there was the responsibility of accounting for return flow credits. It was not simply a 
matter of keeping track of how much water to distribute to each member agency, but 
also the volume each agency returned to the Colorado River.17 Donnelly was 
understandably ready to adopt a different accounting procedure.  
Mulroy was initially reticent about the Paradigm Shift. She supported the 
philosophy but questioned the political timing. The SNWA was only two years when 
discussions over the Paradigm Shift began, and while the unification had decreased 
the political tension among member agencies, the potential for a flare up was a 
distinct possibility.18 Water allocations remained a politically sensitive topic—other 
member agencies were covetous of water and saw the allotments as their security to 
future growth. Donnelly, Bunker, and Mulroy discussed the merits of the Paradigm 
Shift and came to the conclusion that the risks of delay outweighed the risks of 
upsetting the status quo. The Paradigm Shift required action on several fronts—
obtaining water, planning infrastructure, and securing funding. The SNWA needed to 
move forward on these components, which is why Mulroy made the decision to 
support the Paradigm Shift.19 
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Hesitance among the member agencies over adopting the Paradigm Shift is 
more understandable when placed in historical context. The Paradigm Shift 
represented an entirely new water management policy. There was no local or regional 
precedent. The SNWA was asking member agencies to do two things. One, relinquish 
rights to its water and throw them into a commonly held trust, and two, base the water 
supply on future acquisitions. It was a large step for member agencies to take.  
There are times in history when personality has had a major influence over 
future events. This was one such occasion. Mulroy was the right person to have in this 
position at this pivotal moment. By 1993 metropolitan water managers and elected 
officials had recognized Mulroy’s leadership abilities. Mulroy had demonstrated 
courageous leadership on a number of occasions, to include her central role in the 
WRMI negotiations, the politically perilous decision to issue the will-serve letter 
cessation on Valentines Day, 1991, and her recent assumption of the General 
Manager’s position with the SNWA. She had replaced Walt Fite, whom SNWA board 
members and water managers considered ineffective and domineering. For over a 
year Mulroy briefed the SNWA board over the need for the Paradigm Shift and in 
November 1994 the SNWA board gave its final ascent to adopt the policy.20 
 
Criticism 
The Paradigm Shift allowed development to occur throughout metropolitan 
Las Vegas (most of all, at the urban periphery and along the Las Vegas Strip, fig. 8). 
The SNWA predicted it had a large enough supply of water to support development 
until 2010. Growth after this point, however, required additional resources.21 This was 
the most critical aspect of the Paradigm Shift—it relied on the acquisition of future 
water resources. 
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The SNWA came under criticism for this policy. One article in particular 
encapsulated many of the themes present in negative assessments of the Paradigm 
Shift. Two metro-area journalists and environmental advocates, Susan Green and 
Mary Hynes, found fault in the SNWA policy, implying the Authority was basing its 
future acquisition efforts on faith alone. The authors asserted SNWA officials were 
being irresponsible, writing the Authority’s approach to water management was akin 
to “a family not balancing its checkbook, confident that some new but unknown 
income will trickle in.” Green and Hynes noted that the LVVWD had previously 
taken the responsible approach in February 1991 when the agency had ceased issuing 
will-serve letters.22   
Green and Hynes continued that the chances of obtaining new supplies of 
Colorado River water were unlikely, citing political opposition from the Basin States 
and the legal challenges inherent within the Law of the River. However, Green and 
Hynes ignored certain key facts. At the time they wrote their article, the SNWA had 
already concluded a Colorado River Commission Restructuring campaign. The result 
of this campaign was that the SNWA gained state level power and the ability to 
negotiate directly with other Colorado River Basin states and the Secretary of Interior 
for water. In 1996, the SNWA was involved in political discussions with California, 
Arizona, and the Secretary of the Interior over Colorado River water. These talks 
ultimately lead to agreements that provided the SNWA additional Colorado River 
water.23 (Green and Hynes had to have ignored this because their colleague at the Las 
Vegas Review Journal, Jon Ralston, had written several articles on the CRC 
restructuring campaign the year before.)24 
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Instead, Green and Hynes asserted that “None of these [Colorado River] 
options is in hand” and that “economics is at the core of the Paradigm Shift.” The 
criticism that the SNWA was collaborating with the local business community relied 
upon a premise that this was simultaneously sinister and unique. However, 
coordinated efforts between utilities and growth coalitions are a nearly universal 
practice throughout the nation. In Los Angeles, San Francisco, Denver, Seattle, New 
York City, and Boston water utilities worked hand in hand with development interests 
and mainly did so in a transparent fashion.25 The same held true for the SNWA in the 
1990s.  
Rick Holmes conceded that there was more private land in metropolitan Las 
Vegas in 1991 than the Authority had water for. In other words, if private developers 
built on every square mile of undeveloped land in the metro-area, the SNWA would 
not have enough water to provide them. Holmes said this scenario was unlikely. He 
equated the Paradigm Shift to the risk insurance companies assume when providing 
policies to their customers. Insurance specialists employ various actuarial tables in an 
effort to predict how much money the company will need in reserves in order to 
provide insurance benefits. Company specialists know that not every one of their 
customers will require an insurance payout at the same time. Likewise, Holmes, 
Mulroy, and Donnelly realized not every tract of private land would be developed at 
once. They had SNWA technicians conduct their own actuarial studies and discovered 
that the rate at which the SNWA was acquiring new water resources, coupled with its 
potential to acquire more, justified the adoption of the Paradigm Shift.26 
Green and Hynes’ assertions notwithstanding, there was good reason for 
SNWA planners to be optimistic. In 1992, as a result of unifying local water agencies 
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into the SNWA, the Authority gained rights to 58,000 acre-feet per year of additional 
Colorado River water. This volume of water came in the form of additional return 
flow credits. In 1993 the Authority purchased rights to 23,000 acre-feet per year from 
the defunct California Edison Power Plant, and in 1994 purchased 14,000 more from 
Basic Management, Inc. in Henderson for a total increase of 95,000 acre-feet per year. 
None of this water was “new” Colorado River water, however, a fact that provided at 
least some substance to Green’s and Hynes’ charges. The state did not increase its 
Colorado River allocation. This amount remained at 300,000 acre-feet of consumptive 
use per year. What the return flow credit and power plant acquisitions represented 
was an internal reorganization of the state’s Colorado River allocation being sent to 
the Las Vegas metro-area.  
In addition to these purchases, SNWA planners were already establishing 
strategies to obtain three more water sources: the Virgin River, Cooperative Water 
Project (Great Basin groundwater pipeline), and an increase to the state’s Colorado 
River allocation (fig. 1).27 Faith was thus unnecessary. SNWA planners had a 
substantial amount of empirical evidence supporting the Paradigm Shift. 
 
Water Resource Plan 
In 1996, the SNWA published its first water resource plan as a means of 
countering misperceptions over the Paradigm Shift.28 In it the SNWA identified 
current water resources and their size. It also listed future water resource options and 
the measures the authority was employing to execute its resource acquisition strategy. 
The water resource plan reflected a policy of transparency and a conscious decision to 
involve the public in aspects of metropolitan water policy. Mulroy recognized that 
support from the metropolitan community was vital for the SNWA to implement 
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various aspects of the Paradigm Shift. One area of support was in the issue of 
conservation. At approximately the same time the SNWA released its water resource 
plan, it initiated a study to determine the effects of residential turf removal in the 
metro-area. The SNWA predicted it might be able to decrease metropolitan water 
consumption by as much as twenty percent, water it could then use as an additional 
resource.29 The SNWA would expand its conservation efforts during the 1990s to 
include bans on car washing, proscribed watering days for grass, providing incentives 
to use swimming pool covers, and tiered pricing to discourage water consumption.30 
Additionally, the SNWA set conservation goals of reducing the metropolitan water 
consumption ten to fifteen percent by 2000. The SNWA listed these conservation 
programs in its water resource plans beginning in 1997.31 
The water resource plan and conservation efforts served two purposes. One, 
they helped bring transparency to the SNWA’s Paradigm Shift. The public was able 
to read about the SNWA’s efforts and stay abreast of developments (the SNWA 
revised its water resource plan on an annual basis).32 Two, resource plans and 
conservation involved the metropolitan community in water acquisition efforts. Every 
acre-foot saved was an acre-foot gained. Conservation efforts came to play a vital role 
in the SNWA’s overall acquisition strategy from 1996 onward. All of the SNWA’s 
acquisition and conservation efforts promised to bring over 100,000 additional acre-
feet of water to the metropolitan area per year. This brings us to the second part of the 
Paradigm Shift equation. 
 
Part II | The “Physical” Paradigm Shift: Infrastructure 
In 1982 the Bureau of Reclamation completed the Southern Nevada Water 
Project. This water system was capable of delivering 299,000 acre-feet per year to 
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metropolitan Las Vegas. This system was not big enough to absorb the volume of the 
SNWA’s recently acquired water. To successfully implement the Paradigm Shift, 
then, the SNWA would also have to build the infrastructure to absorb and distribute 
the metro-area’s enlarged water supply. The SNWA called this infrastructure 
expansion the Capital Improvements Program (CIP).  
The SNWA began planning the CIP at about the same time Mulroy and her 
staff began discussing the need for the Paradigm Shift. By 1995, the SNWA was 
ready to begin construction. The CIP was the largest and most expensive capital 
works project in southern Nevada since the construction of Hoover Dam in the 1930s. 
The CIP called for the construction of thirteen pumping stations, almost sixty miles of 
laterals (underground pipelines) around the periphery of the metropolitan area, 
nineteen storage reservoirs, a new water treatment plan to augment the existing one, a 
2,089 foot tunnel through a mountain range, and a new intake valve into Lake Mead 
(fig. 7). 
The laterals were capable of transporting over seventy million gallons of water 
per day throughout the metropolitan area. While the laterals were technically designed 
to support the metro-area as a whole, they were strategically placed in the areas of 
highest growth along the urban periphery. The need for the laterals was increasing 
daily. In 1995 alone, the year the SNWA launched the CIP, Clark County granted 
permits for the construction of over 27,000 homes and 1,000 commercial properties.33 
The cost of the CIP to the SNWA was substantial—just over two billion dollars. The 
only funding mechanisms available to the SNWA in 1995 were connection fees that 
housing developers paid to connect new homes to municipal water mains, and sales of 
water to customers. Planners were concerned that basing the entire cost of the CIP on 
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these two funding methods would drastically increase water rates and exert a 
disproportionate financial burden upon new homebuyers. SNWA officials wanted to 
phase in a cost increase, but reliance on the existing funding options made this 
impossible.  
In an effort to consider other options, the SNWA created a committee, the 
Integrated Resource Planning Advisory Committee (IRPAC), a group of twenty-one 
residents of the metro-area representing a range of business interests. The SNWA 
used the IRPAC as a kind of think tank, the members of whom would examine 
alternative methods for funding the CIP beyond simply raising hookup fees and water 
rates. Once a month for two years IRPAC met and discussed a range of funding 
options. They came to a consensus that some type of tax assistance was needed. They 
considered a range of options to include excise, gaming, and room taxes. However, 
they ultimately decided that increasing the Clark County sales tax rate by a quarter of 
one percent would be the most effective means of raising funds for the CIP.34 
The Committee reasoned that, unlike in other metro-areas, the large number of 
annual visitors to southern Nevada would help the community spread the tax burden 
more equitably among the population. Metropolitan Las Vegas was unique in that it 
was the destination for over thirty million visitors per year, all of whom IRPAC 
assumed would contribute sales tax revenue. Analysis conducted by the SNWA 
revealed metropolitan residents and businesses each contributed thirty five percent of 
the sales tax burden, with tourists accounting for the remaining thirty percent.  
Developers supported the measure because it would prevent an increase in home 
prices, and the gaming industry supported it since it would affect casinos less than the 
gaming and room taxes IRPAC had considered.35 SNWA adopted this 
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recommendation and introduced a bill (AB291) at the legislature in 1997 to raise the 
Clark County sales tax.36  
The SNWA needed legislative approval because under the Nevada 
constitution, the state had supremacy in powers of taxation. Local governments were 
barred from unilaterally raising taxes. This arrangement became an issue during the 
1990s because the state legislature met biennially. Though not unique (most cities and 
counties are political subdivisions of, and therefore subservient to, the state) the 
inability of the Clark County Commission to raise the sales tax rate added to a list of 
challenges it faced, including building enough schools, roads, and hospitals to serve 
the three to four thousand people per month moving to the metro-area during the 
1990s. That decade, Clark County was the fastest growing metropolitan region in the 
nation.37 
Mulroy, along with several of her staff and IRPAC members lobbied 
lawmakers throughout the six-month legislative session. Members of this contingent 
testified before assembly and senate committees on over ten separate occasions to 
explain the need for the tax increase. One session in particular illustrated the general 
theme of the SNWA’s lobbying efforts. In May, SNWA Deputy Director Dick 
Wimmer and Irene Porter, an IRPAC member and Executive Director of the Southern 
Nevada Homebuilders Association, argued that without the sales tax increase the cost 
of homes in the area could rise to as high as thirty thousand dollars beyond their 
current cost.38 Wimmer explained that under the current funding plan, seventy-nine 
percent of the infrastructure revenue came from the regional connection charge, a 
charge the Authority levied on all newly built structures in Clark County. He pointed 
out that this targeted new homebuyers. He added that both regional connection 
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charges and water rates would increase dramatically unless other forms of revenue 
were found. Porter reinforced Wimmer’s message testifying, “without the [sales tax], 
the connection fees … would make purchasing a home beyond the reach of most 
families.”39 
Mulroy, her staff, and members of the metropolitan Las Vegas growth 
coalition continued their economics-based lobbying efforts in subsequent committee 
meetings. As general manager of a major metropolitan water agency, Mulroy wanted 
to be able to keep up with urban growth, casino representatives wanted to foster the 
positive image of Las Vegas in the minds of tourists, housing developers wanted to 
continue selling homes, and labor representatives wanted to maintain a healthy job 
market for individuals looking for employment. Mulroy’s cohort found a sympathetic 
audience. Just over sixty percent of the legislators came from districts in metropolitan 
Las Vegas, many of whom represented new homebuyers and developers. In July 1997 
the legislature passed the sales tax bill (AB291) and granted the Clark County 
Commission the authority to raise the sales tax.  
In a complete surprise to Mulroy, the Clark County Commission chose not to 
use their recently obtained authority to implement the tax increase. Instead, fearing a 
potential public backlash, the Commission proposed placing the issue before voters. 
Mulroy and the IRPAC felt this was a serious threat to the CIP. The CIP was a major 
capital works project, one of the most important in the metro-area’s history; as a result 
of the County Commission’s actions, the CIP was now subject to a voting population 
with a historically mixed record on supporting public funding measures. In 1994 
voters rejected a bond issue that would have provided funding for overcrowding in the 
metro-area’s schools. The pivotal voting block in that election had been the metro-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
80 
area’s senior citizens, many of whom had recently moved to southern Nevada to 
retire. They often did not have any familial ties to the area and therefore saw no need 
to support a tax increase. However, two years later, seniors widely supported another 
bond measure for the same issue. Mulroy, her staff, and the metro-growth coalition 
therefore had no way of knowing how the sales tax funding measure would turn out. 
It was possible that water infrastructure would resonate with a broader cross-section 
of the metro community than the issue of public schools. At that point, however, it 
was impossible to tell. The uncertainty over the sales tax increase inspired the SNWA 
and Paradigm Shift supporters to initiate a public relations campaign urging voters to 
support the sales tax increase.40  
The Las Vegas Review-Journal editorial staff was opposed to the sales tax 
increase on idealist grounds. The Review-Journal had long displayed the libertarian 
views of its publisher Sherman Frederick. The newspaper sponsored a number of 
polls leading up to the 1998 Clark County general election. Many of the polling 
questions were presented in a way that emphasized the impact of taxation over the 
benefits to be derived from the CIP.41 The Review-Journal’s stance is somewhat 
surprising, given that news media are frequently part of metropolitan growth 
coalitions. It becomes more puzzling still when considering that the CIP would likely 
support Las Vegas metropolitan population growth, which would in turn increase 
readership of the newspaper.  
The Republican Liberty Caucus was another metro-area opponent of the sales 
tax increase. The group’s spokesperson Chuck Muth argued, “government should 
look for ways to cut spending first – this was the only option never considered.”42 
What Muth did not realize, was that there were a range of issues that compelled 
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metro-area governments to “not consider” scaling back in other areas, not least of 
which the financing of government and water utilities was completely separate. As a 
political subdivision of the state, the SNWA’s funding mechanisms were highly 
proscribed and clearly delineated. In short, they were limited. As per state law, the 
SNWA received the entirety of its funding through connection charges and sale of 
water. Indeed, the SNWA’s largest member agency, the LVVWD had for several 
decades sought to obtain tax funds for various infrastructure projects. However, the 
District’s 1947 enabling legislation specified the agency could only collect funds 
through hookup fees, water rates, and bonding.43 This law remained unchanged and 
was also the basis for the SNWA’s funding options. It was impossible for metro-area 
governments to cut back in order to support the CIP. There was no legal mechanism 
in place to redistribute any saved money to the SNWA.  
Muth’s attitude was actually representative of a larger issue, one that is present 
in any developed society and stems from the widespread failure to understand the cost 
and resources necessary to provide reliable water services. In Muth’s case, it showed 
that he did not have a firm grasp of the basic composition of water infrastructure in 
the Las Vegas Valley. Not only this, he did not understand the scale of the 
infrastructure and its vitality. In this, he was not alone. Residents of the metro-area 
likely did not see the River Mountains Pumping station, the pipelines, or the water 
treatment plants that conveyed water to their homes; these people simply turned the 
faucet handle and water came out. Muth, like so many Americans, remained ignorant 
of where their water came from. Indeed, this ignorance reflects the central irony of 
urban water infrastructure: the more reliable the system, the greater the degree of 
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ignorance over its operation. If it works seamlessly, it is invisible. And if it is 
invisible, people rarely have any reason to investigate.44 
Others within the community were concerned over the inherently regressive 
nature of a sales tax. Democratic Assemblyman Harry Mortensen from Las Vegas 
thought that a sales tax would unfairly burden families of lesser means. He asserted 
that the gaming and construction industry should bear the cost since they were the two 
entities drawing new residents to the metro-area in the first place.45 His proposal to 
add a room tax to casinos in addition to continued reliance on hookup fees and water 
rates was a view shared by Ken Mahal, spokesperson for the Nevada Seniors 
Coalition. Mahal argued those living on a fixed income were especially vulnerable to 
a regressive sales tax. He asserted seniors should not have to “subsidize growth” for 
the construction and casino industries.46  
Mulroy and the IRPAC worked to counter the anti-tax advocate’s message. 
They wrote letters to the editor, sponsored news and television advertisements, and 
IRPAC members created a public relations advocacy group—Nevadans for 
Solutions—to initiate a campaign to educate the metropolitan community about the 
stakes in the upcoming election. They contributed over 300,000 dollars for an 
advertising campaign and countered tax opponents direct-mailing efforts with mailers 
of their own.47 Nevadans for Solutions drew financial support from the Nevada AFL-
CIO, Nevada Resort Association, Nevada Taxpayers Association, the Bellagio Hotel 
Casino, as well as local homebuilders Del Webb Communities, Lewis Homes of 
Nevada, and American West Homes.48  
After a year of campaigning, Mulroy penned an op-ed piece in the Review-
Journal just one week before the November general elections. Mulroy reiterated the 
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need for system reliability and the advantages that a sales tax provides since it 
allowed tourists to pay a large portion of the CIP cost. She was also careful to point 
out that, contrary to charges from people like Mortensen and Mahal, the tax was not, 
to use their phrase, a subsidy for the growth industry. The SNWA already charged 
builders a connection fee on new homes, money that went back to the SNWA for their 
own operations. Since the revenue from the quarter-cent tax would also come back to 
the SNWA, this would prevent additional increases in hookup fees and water rates. It 
is difficult to deny critic’s assertions, however. Wimmer and Porter had specifically 
stated the reason for the tax was to make it easier for consumers to purchase new 
homes, which directly assisted housing developers. Mulroy closed by countering 
Muth’s criticism, declaring the SNWA had limited funding options and that “the 
Legislature has given us only one option – the sales tax – to help pay for this much-
needed project.”49  
Mulroy was also concerned at this time about how local events would affect 
the regional political setting. During this period the SNWA was trying to establish its 
stature within the Colorado River Basin State’s political landscape. Guiding and 
implementing the quarter-cent sales tax initiative would help establish the still new 
SNWA’s ability to follow through with difficult political campaigns, thus enhancing 
its reputation throughout the Colorado River Basin. It would show that the SNWA 
was able to handle its domestic affairs.  
The most pressing regional concern for the SNWA in 1998 was interstate 
water banking agreement negotiations with Arizona. SNWA officials were attempting 
to establish an agreement that would allow Nevada to store its unused apportionment 
of Colorado River water in Arizona’s aquifers.50 This was a complex arrangement 
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involving water managers from Nevada and Arizona, as well as federal officials in the 
Interior Department. Key to Arizona’s willingness to support the agreement was 
Nevada’s ability ensure the quality of water flowing into Lake Mead through the Las 
Vegas Wash. And this was another area in which the quarter-cent tax came into play. 
A significant portion of the money raised through the sales tax would fund Las Vegas 
Wash remediation efforts, ones intended to reduce the level of pollutants then flowing 
into Lake Mead. Since the wash helped purify water that could potentially be sent into 
Arizona’s aquifers, water planners there and in the SNWA were paying close 
attention to events in the metro-area. 
At this point in its history, the SNWA still did not have enough influence to 
guarantee the outcome of the sales tax campaign. From the point of view of the 
Colorado River Basin states, this created a sense of uncertainty over the direction of 
Las Vegas metropolitan water policy. The SNWA did not want to convey this 
message to the region, which is one of the reasons officials worked tirelessly with 
other sales tax supporters. Losing the sales tax battle would have damaged SNWA’s 
credibility among the five SNWA member agencies, in the Nevada capital, and with 
the state governments of the six other Basin states. It was essential, therefore, that the 
SNWA continue defeating political opponents throughout the 1990s to establish itself 
as the undisputed central water agency for the Las Vegas metropolitan area.  
Despite numerous Review-Journal polls indicating up to seventy percent 
disapproval for the tax increase, just the opposite result occurred. On Election Day 
approximately seventy percent of the voting public endorsed the sales tax increase.51 
The SNWA campaign had succeeded. Mulroy was understandably elated by the news. 
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Immediately following the election results she stated, “I feel pretty darn good. We 
worked really hard, and we were very pleased to see the results of the election.”52 
The following year (1998), sales tax revenue began flowing toward CIP 
projects underway.53 The CIP would support a metropolitan population increase of 
over 600,000 people in the next ten years.54 The implementation of both aspects 
(conceptual and physical) of the Paradigm Shift had resulted in a larger metropolitan 
area in physical size and population. It fostered the continued expansion of the 
development and gaming economies, both of which were central goals of the 
metropolitan growth coalition. Conversely, the Paradigm Shift also contributed to 
increased congestion, which required freeway widening and interchange 
improvements, further school crowding that necessitated additional bond initiatives, 
continued air quality degradation, and higher sales taxes. In short, the effect on the 
metropolitan area was good for some residents and bad for others 
Solely from an administrative viewpoint, however, the benefit of the Paradigm 
Shift to the SNWA’s political structure is difficult to overstate. Eliminating the 
allocation-based policy removed the final barrier to creating a truly metropolitan 
water agency. The Paradigm Shift made water a common resource shared by the 
metro-area as a whole and had the effect of turning a confederation into a singular 
unit. The Paradigm Shift was also important in the sense that it was the final 
component in a process of local political consolidation. Member agencies were now 
fully integrated into the SNWA.  
The SNWA would now project this power to seek changes in water policy, 
first at the state level in Carson City, and then at the Colorado River Basin States 
level. This outward focus of power was the opening phase of a campaign to change 
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the Law of the River. The next chapter examines the SNWA’s acquisition of state 
level power that enabled it to operate on an interstate plane alongside other state 
governments.
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CHAPTER 4 | REGIME CHANGE: SEIZING STATE POWER 
 
 
Thus far this narrative has focused on SNWA efforts to consolidate control 
over Las Vegas metropolitan water policy. This had been a two-part process 
consisting of the creation of the SNWA in 1991 and the adoption of the Paradigm 
Shift between 1991 and 1998. Between 1991 and 1995 a parallel political process 
occurred in which the SNWA waged a campaign to assert control over the state’s 
Colorado River allocation. Since 1935 authority over this resource resided with the 
Colorado River Commission of Nevada, an executive agency under the direction of 
the governor. While the Colorado River ostensibly belonged to the state as a whole, 
the Las Vegas metropolitan area alone was geographically situated to use the 
waterway. The historical role of state government is to moderate disputes among 
competing users over a shared resource. However, the creation of the SNWA and 
implementation of the Paradigm Shift eliminated disputes among the only competing 
interests in Nevada that used the Colorado River. For SNWA officials this rendered 
the CRC irrelevant and superfluous (figs. 2, 4).  
The SNWA strategy against the CRC evolved over a two-year campaign. 
When the SNWA initiated its efforts in 1991, Authority leadership sought to abolish 
the CRC. However, the CRC had existed as an institution since the 1930s and had 
administered the state’s allocations of both water and hydroelectric power. It had 
supporters in the governor’s office and the state legislature. This made it a more 
resilient institution than Mulroy had expected. SNWA officials began to think that 
outright elimination of the CRC was increasingly unlikely. The SNWA therefore 
changed tactics and in 1993 lobbied for the legislative restructuring of the CRC’s 
governing board to include three SNWA appointees of the seven directors.   
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The SNWA campaign would instigate a public conflict between officials in 
the Authority and the Colorado River Commission of Nevada, a majority of which 
would play out during the 1993 legislative session. At its root, the contest represents a 
philosophical difference over which level of government can best manage resources 
for the citizenry. SNWA officials felt that since they had to deal with the challenges 
of limits and growth firsthand, they were a more appropriate body to administer the 
state’s Colorado River supply. After all, the entire allocation went to the Las Vegas 
metropolitan area. Officials with the Colorado River Commission, on the other hand, 
were not confident that the SNWA, less than two years old at the time, would survive. 
Conflict, not collaboration, was the predominant theme during the majority of 
metropolitan Las Vegas’s water history. As a result of this contentious history, the 
Colorado River Commission did not want to entrust the SNWA with the state’s 
precious Colorado River allocation.  
But how had this state level agency come to be responsible for the metro-
area’s water supply in the first place? Like the Law of the River, the Colorado River 
Commission came into being when the demographic, economic, and political 
composition of Nevada and the Southwest were much different. The CRC had, since 
the 1920s, been responsible for the state’s Colorado River allocation. It had assumed 
this responsibility because at the time the state gained rights to the river, southern 
Nevada’s population and governmental institutions were too small to justify local 
control over the water supply. Furthermore, there was little interest among Las Vegas 
officials to import Colorado River water into the Las Vegas Valley in the 1920s and 
1930s. Groundwater remained abundant, and construction of water infrastructure to 
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bring water from Lake Mead was not economically justifiable for such a small 
population.  
When the CRC assumed control over the state’s Colorado River allocation, the 
Las Vegas Valley contained fewer than 20,000 residents. By 1990, this figure had 
risen to over 700,000.1 The Colorado River was the only resource that could sustain 
this type of population growth. In an effort to more effectively manage local water 
supplies, the SNWA wanted the ability to directly engage federal and Basin state 
officials over Colorado River policy. In 1991 the SNWA did not have this legal 
authority. Within the first year of the SNWA’s existence, officials came to see the 
CRC as a barrier that hindered their ability to change the Law of the River. This was 
the central issue driving the SNWA campaign to seize administrative control of the 
Colorado River.  
The result of this campaign is one of the most significant aspects of SNWA 
history. With the CRC restructuring, the SNWA absorbed state level authority. This 
provided the SNWA a position of power from which it could directly challenge the 
Law of the River. It would not longer need a state intermediary to conduct discussions 
with other Colorado River Basin state representatives and federal officials. The 
SNWA, however, did not completely displace the state’s role in Colorado River 
negotiations. Representatives of the CRC would continue to take part in interstate 
political interactions. From 1993 onward, however, SNWA officials would also be a 
part of this process. With the possible exception of the Southern California 
Metropolitan Water District, no other local agency had sought this degree of political 
authority over a state’s Colorado River allocation.  
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The State and the Colorado River 
Nevada state officials had been interested in the Colorado River from as early 
as 1869. That year Congress expanded Nevada’s boundaries to their present 
dimensions, which established the Colorado River as the state’s southeast border. 
During the final three decades of the nineteenth century, the state government’s chief 
concern was developing the Colorado River’s navigability. Initially, state leaders 
hoped riverboats could access various settlements along the Colorado River and that 
this might spur agricultural production there. The Colorado River proved too volatile 
for river born commerce, however, and by 1902, the state’s interests had shifted to 
reclamation and hydro-electrical power generation. That year elected officials 
throughout the American West and Washington D.C. began to see the river’s potential 
to support agriculture in the region.  
In 1919, officials from the seven states that shared the Colorado River 
(Arizona, California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and Wyoming—the 
Colorado River Basin states) identified the stream’s economic potential and met to 
discuss ways they might develop and share the waterway. These Basin states 
established themselves as the League of the Southwest, the two most influential being 
California and Colorado. They possessed the greatest population, political power, and 
most developed agricultural economies. Despite having none of these attributes, 
Nevada was an interested party. Nevada officials recognized that, while the state 
could not put to use as great an amount of water as other Basin states, it could still 
foster modest agricultural production and utilize electrical power in various mining 
enterprises in southern Nevada. By 1920, state officials recognized the need for 
action, prompting Governor Emmett Boyle to appoint a Commission on Colorado 
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River Development, comprised of seven citizens and the State Engineer, James G. 
Scrugham. The Commission’s task was to “safeguard the interests of Nevada in all of 
the extensive negotiations under way and imminent, looking to the utilization of the 
stream.” The Legislature added its imprimatur in 1923 when it “re”-created the 
Colorado River Development Commission, by officially establishing the body as an 
agency of the state government, and increasing its responsibilities, funding, and legal 
power.2  
 By 1922, the Basin States had established a broad plan for division of the 
Colorado River. Delegates to the negotiations established an upper and a lower basin. 
The upper basin consisted of Utah, Colorado, Wyoming, and New Mexico, with 
California, Nevada, and Arizona comprising the lower. Each basin was to receive 7.5 
million acre-feet of water per year, with the remainder going to Mexico. Of 
importance was the perception by negotiators that the Colorado River’s annual flow 
was approximately 16.5 million acre-feet. As revised meteorological records have 
shown, the Colorado River has an average flow rate of over twelve million acre-feet 
per year. The period in which negotiators established basin allotments was one of the 
wettest periods in the geologic history of the Colorado River. In subsequent decades, 
the disconnect between climatological reality and river allotments would contribute to 
an enormous amount of political tension.3  
In 1928, Congress passed the Swing Johnson Bill, which federally sanctioned 
the Colorado River Compact and authorized the Secretary of Interior to build Boulder 
(Later Hoover) Dam. In order to seize upon the economic benefit the Dam might 
provide Nevada, in 1935, the legislature increased the agency’s responsibilities and 
funding. It also shortened the Colorado River Development Commission’s name to 
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the Colorado River Commission of Nevada (CRC). The CRC’s central legal function 
from that point forward was to safeguard the state’s share of Colorado River water 
and the hydroelectric power from Hoover Dam. For the first four decades of the 
Commission’s existence, its primary focus was hydroelectricity. This was because 
there was no infrastructure capable of delivering the state’s allocation to Las Vegas 
until 1971. Furthermore, groundwater remained plentiful enough to support the 
metro-area during this period. This changed, however, in 1971, when the federal 
government completed the first phase of the Southern Nevada Water Project (SNWP). 
At that point, the CRC became the metro-area’s de-facto water distribution agency. 
The legislature had designated the CRC as the state’s guardian of Colorado River 
water in the 1930s and since no other metropolitan water agency existed with this 
authority in the 1970s the CRC began to distribute water to the metro-area’s 
individual municipalities.4 Almost as soon as the CRC assumed the role of 
metropolitan water agency, local officials voiced their disapproval with the 
arrangement.5 In a trend that would last until 1991, local water mangers came to view 
many of the CRC’s water distribution methods and policies as inappropriate and 
ineffective in a metropolitan setting. 
Between 1971 and 1991 metro-area water managers came to see the 
arrangement of having a state agency in charge of urban water distribution as 
unworkable. They took issue especially with the Commission’s apparent 
unwillingness or inability to take a leadership role in local water politics.6 The 
Commission was noticeably absent in local political scuffles among water agencies, 
and by the late 1980s this absence had eroded the Commission’s legitimacy in the 
metro-area. The failure to lead also played a role in the metro-area’s dwindling water 
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supply. The Commission was the only agency that had the statutory power to 
implement policy across municipal boundaries. Had it worked more closely with local 
water agencies to enact a uniform policy, the metro area could have withdrawn an 
additional 58,000 acre-feet of water per year. However, the Commission never did 
take this course of action, and it was the SNWA that ultimately unified policy and 
utilized the return flow credits.7 
SNWA officials were dissatisfied with the CRC’s performance. They did not 
think the CRC was a proactive agency and believed that it accepted the status quo on 
the river. For Mulroy and others, this was born from a disconnect based on distance 
between events in the Las Vegas metropolitan area and the state capital four hundred 
miles away. It was the metro-area’s proximity to, and reliance upon, the Colorado 
River that drove local officials to seek greater control over the state’s allocation. In 
short, metropolitan water officials wanted local control over what they considered a 
local resource.  
The creation of the SNWA was a local response to local environmental and 
legal conditions. It was also a rejection of the previous regime in which the CRC 
administered water to individual metro-water agencies. The issue of local versus state 
control came to a head in 1991 after the creation of the SNWA, when metropolitan 
water managers came to see the state’s role as redundant. According to Mulroy, “The 
Colorado River Commission always functioned as the mediator between us [the Las 
Vegas metropolitan area]” and the federal government.  “Well, once we created the 
Authority, we didn’t need a mediator. We didn’t need anybody that would play parent 
to us.  Because we’d grown up. And, the Colorado River Commission represents the 
governor … We said, you know, this makes no sense.”8 This rationale inspired 
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Mulroy and other staff to pursue legislation at the state level in 1993 to increase the 
SNWA’s authority over local water resources.  
Two things formed the basis for the SNWA viewpoint, the first of which was 
the Authority’s geographical proximity to its customers. The SNWA board, 
comprised largely of locally elected officials representing southern Nevada’s cities, 
felt they were better geographically suited to act on behalf of southern Nevadans than 
officials within the state government.9 The second reason was of a financial nature. 
The SNWA argued that since the local population was funding water acquisition 
efforts and paying for utility services, that a local –not state – agency should be in 
charge of water from the Colorado River. Las Vegas City Councilman Scott 
Higginson gave voice to this larger discontent just prior to the 1993 legislative session 
when he stated, “the decision of which options should be pursued I believe should be 
with the local elected officials [since] I’m going to be the one to push the button to 
raise rates.”10 
The SNWA also wanted the legal authority to engage in regional water 
acquisition efforts. There was a period of confusion following the SNWA’s creation 
in 1991 over what role each agency would play in efforts to obtain more water. 
During the next two years the SNWA began putting together a regional water 
procurement strategy, looking at water sources in Utah and Arizona. These efforts 
clearly intruded upon the CRC’s purview. Indeed, in 1991, when the Authority was 
created, State Senator Hal Smith sponsored legislation clarifying and emphasizing the 
CRC’s role in representing “the state of Nevada in consultations with other states, the 
United States, foreign countries and nongovernmental persona.”11 Tensions over their 
respective roles publicly erupted in 1992 after the CRC issued a draft mission 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97 
statement and list of objectives which included: “acquiring or leasing water rights 
from Indian tribes and other entities; as well as desalinating ocean water for seaside 
communities in exchange for additional Colorado River water.”12 What seemed like a 
simple enumeration of the CRC’s responsibilities was in fact a clear and direct 
message to the SNWA: the CRC would handle matters related to the Colorado River, 
not the SNWA.  
The SNWA reacted strongly against this mission statement. Mulroy argued, 
“there is no revenue source for [the CRC] to do the ambitious things they outline in 
their objectives statement.”13 Mulroy’s contention was based on the difference in 
funding structures for the CRC and the SNWA. The CRC, as a state agency, was not 
as financially vulnerable as the SNWA. The CRC could draw upon state funds, as 
well as revenue from water and power sales. Until the late 1990s, the SNWA was 
entirely reliant upon water rates and hookup fees. This revenue was generated entirely 
within Clark County and was consequentially much smaller than the CRC’s financial 
resources.  
SNWA board member Paul Christensen seconded Mulroy’ view, stating: “I 
don’t want to fund the Colorado River Commission’s search for water because I have 
no say in where they go and what they do.” Christensen revealed an additional reality: 
the SNWA board members, invariably elected officials, constantly faced pressure 
from their voting constituencies. The projects the CRC pursued would create a 
financial obligation that the citizens of the metro-area would have to pay off. The 
citizens would look first to the local utility (the SNWA) as the agency responsible for 
increasing local taxes. For this reason as well, SNWA officials wanted a presence on 
the CRC board.  
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Robert Crowell, chair of the CRC board countered, stating that the CRC’s 
mission statement was “not an attempt to step on the Southern Nevada Water 
Authority’s toes,” but nonetheless declared, “the Southern Nevada Water Authority 
does not speak for Nevada.”14 CRC officials were clear that they intended to continue 
their work as guardians of the state’s Colorado River allocation, and appeared ready 
to assert themselves with the SNWA. The disagreement between SNWA and CRC 
officials revealed the jurisdictional crisis that affected the metro-area in 1993. 
Officials in both the CRC and SNWA felt their individual agency was best suited to 
address the metro-area’s water needs, not the other. As each agency pursued 
independent strategies, tensions increased, as did collisions over jurisdictional 
authority.  
For Mulroy the issue boiled down to geographic appropriateness and what 
agency was more accountable to its constituency. Mulroy contended, “the SNWA is 
able to perform certain functions that the CRC cannot. The CRC cannot make a 
commitment for either the Clark County Sanitation District or the Las Vegas 
treatment plant to put the return flows back into the Colorado River. The CRC cannot 
dictate conservation standards or how shortages will be allocated amongst members 
of the SNWA,” and “these duties can only be performed by the SNWA, because it has 
been assigned these responsibilities and holds the contracts with the federal 
government.”15 In the minds of metro-area planners, including Mulroy, the problems 
of growth, coupled with the CRC’s lack of responsiveness, were acute enough to 
compel the SNWA to lobby Governor Bob Miller and state lawmakers to either 
abolish, or restructure the Colorado River Commission.16 
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Mulroy’s dissatisfaction with the CRC did not emerge from nowhere. She was 
merely the latest in a line of metropolitan water managers dating back to the early 
1970s who viewed the CRC with disdain.  These individuals had wanted local control 
since that time, but the conditions had not been right to force a political change until 
1993. Population growth, a legislature that met every other year, and the threat of 
water shortage coalesced to create a crisis that gave the SNWA the political capital it 
needed to establish itself as the metro-area’s sole guardian of the state’s Colorado 
River Allocation. In the pivotal year of 1989, these political factors slowly began the 
process of alignment.  
In 1989, the Clark County Commission put the first piece of a strategy 
together to wrest control of the Colorado River away from the CRC. That year the 
County Commission published a water resource plan that asserted the need for the 
establishment of a uniform water policy throughout the metropolitan area. The plan 
also called for county control over the state’s Colorado River allocation. County 
Commissioners were well aware of the effects of the CRC’s “use it or lose it” water 
distribution policy. They were also disappointed in the CRC’s unwillingness to lead 
and the power vacuum this created. The plan’s authors argued that much of the 
tension and political conflicts among metro-area water agencies was the fault of the 
CRC.17 The report also noted that the balkanized nature of the metropolitan water 
agencies meant the region could not take full advantage of the return flow policy. This 
meant the metro-area was missing the opportunity to acquire an additional 58,000 
acre-feet per year.18  
The report gave several local officials the idea that perhaps restructuring the 
composition of the CRC board would be the most politically viable method of gaining 
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local control over the state’s Colorado River allocation and “suggested that the 
membership of the Colorado River Commission be reevaluated by the legislature.” 
Metro-area politicians such as North Las Vegas City Manager Michael Dyal 
recognized that the county commission was serious about exerting additional control 
over the Colorado River stating that the county commissioners “obviously want to see 
the Colorado River Commission disappear.”19 Three years after the reports 
publication, the county commissioners’ ambition became a reality when the SNWA 
asked for legislation to restructure the CRC board.20 
However, Colorado River Basin water politics complicated the situation. At 
the same time metro-area planners began calling for the CRC’s dissolution, Governor 
Bob Miller and the River Commission were actively engaged in secret negotiations 
for water with state officials in Colorado.21 These negotiations highlighted a 
significant philosophical difference between the SNWA and CRC. In 1991 the River 
Commission entered into negotiations with oil and gas interests in the state of 
Colorado. Chevron Shale Oil Co., and Getty Oil Exploration Co., possessed rights to 
water in a Colorado River tributary called Roan Creek. According to CRC officials, 
the deal would mean a fifty year guaranteed supply of water for the Las Vegas metro-
area. 
By 1993 the CRC had progressed far enough into negotiations with Chevron 
and Getty to reach, in the words of Director Tom Cahill, a “gentleman’s agreement” 
with the oil company consortium.22 Upon hearing details of the proposal Mulroy, 
incredulous, replied, “build a new reservoir on the Colorado? Are you serious? Fifty 
years, that's it? That's useless. What happens to the reservoir after fifty years? It blows 
up?”23 CRC policy emphasized the acquisition of new water resources. Such an 
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approach was indicative of an older, pre-1990s water management philosophy that 
focused on acquiring resources and building dams over conservation and 
comprehensive management of resources.24 Donnelly shared Mulroy’s concern. He 
noted, “we don't want to build any more dams, reservoirs, or construction projects. 
We want to do things that cost less and that are more politically, socially and 
environmentally acceptable.”25  
The SNWA only found out about the negotiations after Cahill had publicly 
announced the “gentleman’s agreement.” For Mulroy, the CRC’s decision to keep the 
Roan Creek negotiations secret was simply one more reason why the SNWA needed a 
presence on the River Commission’s board. From her point of view, not only had the 
CRC acted unprofessionally by not notifying SNWA staff about the negotiations, it 
was pursuing a strategy that was fundamentally at odds with Mulroy’s. From the 
SNWA’s inception, Mulroy and her staff adopted a comprehensive strategy of 
identifying any and all types of local water resources, and carefully managing them, a 
policy formalized in the Paradigm Shift.26 Mulroy believed policy should be a two-
part equation, one based on both conservation and the acquisition of new resources. 
The problem, from Mulroy’s point of view, was that the CRC’s pursuit of the Roan 
Creek Deal, provided only one half of the equation – obtaining more supply. The 
SNWA, on the other hand, could provide both.  
Mulroy and Donnelly were incensed that the CRC had left the Authority out of 
the negotiations.27 Technicians in the SNWA would have no way to accurately plan 
for the future it they were unaware of what water was available to them. These 
concerns helped support the SNWA’s larger argument that the CRC had pursued 
water to the best of its abilities for two decades, but it was an agency that was not 
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designed to operate effectively in the Las Vegas metro-area of the 1990s. Conditions 
had changed too much for a state level agency to effectively manage urban water 
policy. The CRC was simply obsolete. The SNWA, on the other hand, had been 
specifically designed for the conditions facing the metro-area. It simultaneously 
possessed a local and regional orientation with respect to water resource management, 
and SNWA officials were eager to establish its supremacy in southern Nevada.  
Given the history of water politics in the Colorado River Basin, it is fair to 
question the judgment and optimism of the CRC for pursuing water in the Upper 
Colorado River Basin. Mulroy was well schooled in the region’s history as well, and 
would have been aware of the failed Galloway Plan, an attempt by San Diego in the 
mid 1980s to purchase water from oil companies in the Upper Colorado River Basin. 
In some ways, San Diego occupied a similar legal position in its relationship to the 
Colorado River as the Las Vegas metro-area. San Diego, like Las Vegas, was almost 
entirely reliant upon the Colorado River for its water needs, having virtually no other 
local water resources upon which to rely. In a drive to seek resource independence, 
San Diego water officials approached private interests in the Upper Basin to directly 
purchase rights to a portion of the Colorado River. However, this plan met with fierce 
resistance from other California water users, as well as from the State of Colorado. As 
a result, the plan failed.28 Examples like Galloway served as reminders that prospects 
for any type of water transfer between the basins would be politically challenging.  
CRC Director Cahill anticipated the critical comparison between San Diego’s 
Galloway Plan and the River Commission’s Roan Creek Deal and attempted to draw 
distinctions between the two examples by pointing out “the main difference is that the 
Galloway Plan did not identify specific things that were going to be done. It was 
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largely a speculative venture that was going to make money for the people who were 
doing it.”29 He failed to point out, however, that the Galloway plan was the result of 
San Diego attempting to establish some measure of water independence from the 
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, an agency dominated by the city 
of Los Angeles. The motivation behind San Diego’s Galloway plan was the same as 
that behind the CRC’s Roan Creek Deal – to provide water to a large and arid 
metropolis. Cahill’s assertions to the contrary, the two deals were quite similar. 
Despite the SNWA officials’ public castigations of the Roan Creek Project, they 
quickly withdrew their opposition when news that Governor Robert Miller himself 
sanctioned these negotiations. Mulroy did not want to publicly embarrass the 
governor and the Authority quietly withdrew its opposition. Instead, Mulroy and her 
colleagues turned their attention to a legislative solution to their problem.30    
 
1993 Legislative Session: A.B. 692, the CRC Restructuring Initiative 
SNWA officials realized that outright abolition of the CRC was unlikely. 
Instead, they sought a compromise of sorts – to restructure the CRC board to include 
at least three SNWA board members. The venue to seek such a compromise was at 
the state legislature. In the 1993 legislative session, the SNWA proposed a bill to 
restructure the CRC board of directors. Under the present system, the governor 
appointed each of the five-member CRC board. The SNWA proposed raising the 
board membership total to seven, three of whom the SNWA board would appoint. 
The Governor would retain the right to appoint the remaining four. Though Mulroy 
considered the bill a reasonable compromise it was met with passionate, though not 
widespread, opposition. The most vocal critics of A.B. 692 were State Senator Hal 
Smith of Henderson, a politician with several decades of experience in water issues, 
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CRC Chair Karen Galatz, a former journalist with strong ties to the local business 
community, and Colorado River Commissioner Garth Winckler, Chief Executive of 
the Las Vegas branch of the United Way Charity.  
During the course of the legislative session Smith argued that the CRC was 
better equipped to manage Nevada’s Colorado River allocation and to negotiate with 
other states. Smith reminded the committee that he had sponsored legislation the 
previous legislative session that clearly stipulated the CRC was “the sole authorized 
negotiating agency for the State of Nevada.”31 The tension among metro-area water 
agencies was one likely reason Smith introduced this legislation in 1991. That year, 
political relations among local governments were severely strained as they navigated 
their way toward a sharing agreement, one that ultimately resulted in the creation of 
the SNWA. While Smith lauded the creation of the Authority, he also did not have 
confidence that it would survive. Smith, with over three decades of experience in the 
legislature, thought the historic animosity among local governments over water 
sharing was too great, and that ultimately they would revert to waging political 
battles. Smith did not want the state’s Colorado River allocation mixed up in 
metropolitan internecine political battles.32  
For her part, Galatz argued that the Colorado River was a state resource that 
belonged to all Nevadans, and was too valuable to be entrusted to a county level 
agency. Like Smith, Galatz also thought the state was in a position to more 
responsibly manage water for a historically fractious collection of metro-area water 
agencies. Galatz criticized the SNWA’s CRC restructuring campaign during her 
testimony, stating that the water shortage Mulroy complained about so bitterly was 
actually the result of poor planning by the SNWA’s member agencies themselves.33 
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To support this claim, she invoked the example of the 1991 “St. Valentine’s 
Massacre,” in which Mulroy’s Water District had to take the draconian step of 
implementing a water permit moratorium. Galatz pointed out that the District had to 
take this action because the agency had not kept track of how much water it had 
promised developers.34 While the Water District had in fact overpromised water 
delivery service, Mulroy made a politically dangerous decision to stop issuing will 
serve letters. Her choice could just as easily be regarded as the responsible course of 
action.  
Furthermore, Galatz ignored SNWA conservation efforts. Conservation was in 
fact a fundamental tenet of the SNWA. Indeed, during the SNWA negotiating process 
1989-1991, representatives from the individual metro water agencies agreed that a 
conservation program had to be part of the standard SNWA operating plan. In other 
words, establishing a conservation program as part of the SNWA standard operating 
procedure was a precondition to the creation of the agency. After all, the amount of 
water waste occurring in the metro-area was one of the reasons these agencies came 
together in the first place to create the SNWA.35 Additionally, as noted in the second 
chapter, the SNWA also began publishing an annual water resource plan in 1996 and 
implemented a new water commitment process by which the Authority would only 
provide water to developers after they were well into the construction phase of their 
projects.  
It was clear to the SNWA, and likely Galatz herself, that her statements were 
disingenuous. Not only did she fail to credit the SNWA for its major policy changes, 
she also failed to acknowledge the rather pronounced lack of leadership by the River 
Commission to push for a stricter conservation policy. As the only agency in southern 
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Nevada with the ability to operate across municipal boundaries, the CRC had a 
responsibility to assume leadership. On this score it had failed. Rather than attempting 
to moderate the conflict among metropolitan water agencies it had remained outside 
the fray continuing its policy of providing allotments base on prior use. This made the 
Commission just as complicit as any other metro-area entity in the water shortage 
crisis.  
Opponents of the SNWA pipeline into rural Nevada also weighed in on the 
CRC restructuring initiative. The SNWA maintained its goal was to assert control 
over the metro-area’s Colorado River supply. Pipeline opponents, however, feared the 
CRC restructuring would increase not only the agency’s interstate capabilities, but its 
political reach within the state of Nevada as well. State Senator Dean Rhoads, who 
represented the rural eastern part of the state, read a letter from one of his constituents 
who wrote that restructuring the CRC was akin to “allowing the fox to be in charge of 
the henhouse.” Letters like this indicated the concern that once the SNWA acquired 
some measure of state authority, there would no longer be a check on its ambition. 
Citizens Alert, a government watchdog group, and well-known critic of the SNWA 
pipeline project, also expressed reservations about the concentration of power within 
the SNWA and its intra-state ramifications.36  
State Senator Mark James of Las Vegas and Mulroy argued this scenario 
could not legally occur. They noted the CRC’s mandate was specifically worded to 
include only matters relating to the Colorado River. A restructuring of the board 
would not alter its purview. James asserted, “if southern Nevada is going to solve its 
water problems, the solution revolves around the Colorado River … southern Nevada 
does not have a shortage of water, it has a shortage of rights to the waters of the 
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Colorado River.” His solution to this problem would be the creation of “a body in the 
state that would be an effective, unified voice for the State of Nevada,” and that “this 
body would be responsible for changing the law of the river … as well as effectively 
negotiating for water rights in other states.” The entire basis for the SNWA’s 
campaign was to enable the Authority to focus its energy toward the Colorado River 
Basin, not rural Nevada.37   
While rural residents were suspicious of James’s and Mulroy’s assurances, 
evidence shows that in 1993, the SNWA was overwhelmingly focused on Colorado 
River issues. SNWA officials remained optimistic that they would be able to affect 
some type of political agreement among the Basin States allowing them to obtain 
additional Colorado River water. Indeed, the SNWA was already in talks with 
California and Arizona officials about potential water storage plans in which Las 
Vegas could acquire additional Colorado River water above its legal entitlement.38 
Considering the amount of Colorado River water the SNWA was poised to receive, it 
makes little sense to assume that the pipeline into northern Nevada would have been a 
priority. The SNWA considered the pipeline project a last ditch option should the 
metro-area’s Colorado River supply fail.39  
James and Mulroy did, however, issue a subtle threat during their testimony. 
James alluded to the possibility that “if water is not available in the southern portion 
of the state, other options will have to be pursued.” The “other options” in question 
was the SNWA pipeline project. Mulroy echoed this sentiment. She stated that “there 
are two solutions to solving southern Nevada’s water problems: one, by pursuing the 
cooperative water project; or two, by changing the makeup of the CRC in an attempt 
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to increase Nevada’s allocation to the Colorado River water.” The message was clear: 
approve the CRC restructuring initiative or the SNWA will build the pipeline.40    
Galatz warned against these assurances. Concerned over the SNWA’s growing 
power, Galatz argued that until 1993 a series of “checks and balances” had existed 
among southern Nevada water agencies. She explained that the CRC had safeguarded 
the state’s water from the excesses of the metro-area’s water agencies. Fellow board 
member Garth Winckler supported this view during his testimony. According to 
Winckler, restructuring the River Commission: 
 
represents verticle [sic] integration of resource development, policy 
development, implementation, and management of water and water issues. 
Checks and balances are greatly diminished in this structure. This committee 
must weight these conflicting concepts of representation and oversight. 
Verticle [sic] integration might be good business, but is it good government, 
or is it self-dealing? The real issue is power – not the electrical kind (which 
this proposed legislation totally ignores) but the back-room, closed-door kind 
of power that lets a few individuals seal the fate of the future of southern 
Nevada by controlling water.  
 
The vehemence and public nature of Winkler’s denunciations are striking. He was, 
after all, making these statements in his official capacity as a member of the Colorado 
River Commission.41   
Based on the tone of Galatz’s and Winckler’s testimony it is evident they 
considered the SNWA campaign audacious and even reckless. The sense of pride in 
the River Commission was evident in the legislative record. However, this pride did 
not trump effective management. The role of the state and its effectiveness in 
managing the Las Vegas metro-area’s water had become questionable. The River 
Commission’s comparatively simple mission – of protecting the Colorado River – 
was rapidly becoming outdated. Protecting the state’s interest on the river was not the 
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same as integrating this resource into the rapidly expanding Las Vegas metropolitan 
area. That task required a more comprehensive approach to water management, one 
that the SNWA provided, and the CRC lacked. Indeed, the CRC’s inability to 
function effectively as an urban water provider formed the basis of the SNWA’s 
central argument: that to properly address the rapidly growing population in the 
metro-area, a local agency needed to be in charge of water supplies.  
The pivotal element in this situation was that the metro-area’s central water 
source was an interstate river. For a metropolitan water agency to succeed it had to be 
focused on local and interstate issues.  This was the direction the SNWA was headed 
in 1993. It had consolidated metropolitan water policy and was orienting toward the 
political forum of the Colorado River Basin. The CRC had been focused on the 
interstate dimension and had neglected the metro-area’s water politics. As a result, in 
1993 the SNWA possessed political legitimacy among metro-area water managers, 
whereas the CRC did not. This made the SNWA the logical choice as the agency to 
assume responsibility for the state’s Colorado River allocation. It is possible that the 
CRC could have become the metropolitan area’s water agency, but because it stayed 
out of metro-water politics for decades, it lacked legitimacy at this critical juncture.  
Mulroy and Donnelly were the most visible supporters of A.B. 692 during the 
1993 legislative session. They were not alone, however. Mulroy recruited members of 
the Las Vegas metro-area growth coalition to testify in support of the restructuring 
measure. Accompanying Mulroy were several members of the Las Vegas 
metropolitan growth machine, to include representatives from organized labor, the 
construction and casino industries, and other locally elected officials. Spokespeople 
for these groups represented some of the most powerful interests in the entire state.  
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The growth coalition had good reason to support Mulroy. The construction 
and gaming industries saw A.B. 692 as a means of continuing the expansion of their 
businesses; local government in turn supported the legislation because it would help 
expand the tax base. More people and houses meant additional sales and property tax 
revenue. And, as the Paradigm Shift campaign demonstrated, local governments were 
unable to levy new local taxes without legislative approval. Since property taxes were 
already legally permissible, local governments were eager to take advantage of one of 
the only public funding sources available to them.42  
Representatives from each of these cross-sections of metropolitan Las Vegas’s 
development sector took the opportunity to voice their support for the CRC 
restructuring initiative. Stan Jones, spokesperson for the Southern Nevada 
Homebuilder’s Association, stated “the home building industry is a major employer in 
southern Nevada. These employees earn a living due to the area's high growth rate, 
spend their paychecks in the area, pay property taxes and vote.” David Belding, 
Chairman of the Nevada Resort Association (NRA), pointed out that the NRA 
represents the number one industry in the State of Nevada and in Clark County, and 
that the association was vitally concerned with the long-term economic health of the 
Las Vegas metropolitan community. Dan Thompson, Lobbyist, Nevada State 
American Labor Federation and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), 
said the AFL-CIO's interest in A.B. 692 was based upon continued growth in southern 
Nevada. Thompson stressed the importance of giving Nevada the chance to develop a 
unified voice when negotiating for additional water resources. Larry Scheffler, 
Councilman for the City of Henderson, testified “southern Nevada local governments 
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are in unison with the SNWA with regard to supporting passage of A.B. 692 … the 
City of Henderson supports passage of A.B. 692.” 43 
This coalition and its support for A.B. 692 reflected several fundamental 
realities that the Las Vegas metro-area faced. The first was that metropolitan Las 
Vegas was almost wholly reliant upon outside capital in the form of tourist dollars 
and home sales to thousands of out-of-state newcomers. And second, since the 1970s 
local water sources were inadequate to support the urban population, prompting the 
construction of the SNWP to bring a distant water source to Las Vegas. Reliance upon 
distant capital and water resources made for a somewhat precarious economic 
situation, a fact not lost on proponents on A.B. 692. Their support was an attempt to 
gain control over the metro-area’s destiny and to reduce economic and resource 
uncertainty in southern Nevada.44 
Once again Mulroy’s leadership came into play. The CRC restructuring 
initiative made sound economic sense for metropolitan Las Vegas. But it was Mulroy 
who marshaled representatives of the growth coalition and wielded them as political 
tools during the legislative session. The impact of their testimonies would not have 
occurred without Mulroy’s efforts. They were willing participants in the A.B. 692 
campaign because Mulroy showed them she could lead. Her efforts to unify the 
metro-area’s water agencies had provided the construction and gaming industry 
58,000 additional acre-feet of water to support their respective industries. At the time 
of the CRC restructuring initiative she was simultaneously engaged in bringing about 
the Paradigm Shift, which promised more water and infrastructure. Each of these was 
good for business. Lastly, Mulroy directly engaged the members of the business 
community to craft SNWA policy. The IRPAC was comprised almost entirely of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
112 
growth coalition representatives. Inclusion in IRPAC negotiations had given them a 
sense of empowerment and made them a part of a grand strategy for improving the 
metro-area. In short, Mulroy’s efforts created strong allies for the SNWA. Mulroy 
showed developers and gaming representatives that she had confidence in them to 
make wise decisions, a flattering move and sign of respect. According to John Ritter, 
a Las Vegas developer, Mulroy simply inspired confidence, and developers were 
happy to support her as she found ways of bringing the community more water.45 
In addition to the local political situation, there were larger, interstate 
ramifications of the CRC restructuring plan. Of particular concern to A.B. 692 
supporters at this time was the image the SNWA was presenting to Nevada’s 
neighboring Colorado River Basin states. SNWA officials did not want the Basin 
states to perceive Nevada as being unable to address its own internal issues over water 
management. Indeed, it was of special interest for SNWA officials to gain a timely 
resolution because the restructuring campaign was occurring at the same time that the 
other Basin states were engaged in separate negotiations over the Colorado River. 
Delegates from the seven Basin states were meeting to establish the guidelines 
specifying each state’s rights to the Colorado River. The stakes in these negotiations 
were extremely high, with California and Nevada both seeking additional water from 
the Colorado River. The negotiations would ultimately last over ten years and 
significantly alter Colorado River management policy.46 
The driving force behind these interstate negotiations was California’s water 
use. Since the 1960s California had drawn more Colorado River water that its legal 
entitlement of 4.4 million acre-feet. This was permitted under the Arizona v. 
California decree, which specified that Lower Basin States were entitled to use any 
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surplus that other Basin states had not consumed. Because Upper Basin states had 
remained comparatively less developed, the Upper Basin never used its entire 
Colorado River allocation of 7.5 million acre-feet. California made use of that water 
for three decades. However, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, heavy growth in the 
Upper Basin caused states such as Colorado to increase their water use. Anticipating 
the Upper Basin’s increased use of the Colorado River in the coming years, water 
managers in Colorado initiated legal proceedings to compel California to decrease its 
usage. An additional challenge was the fact that California had been in the grips of a 
drought since the mid 1980s. It was thus simultaneously facing both legally and 
environmentally imposed water shortages. By 1991 the crisis became so acute, in fact, 
that Interior Secretary Manuel Lujan suggested Colorado “donate” some of its unused 
water to California. Yielding to this pressure, Colorado Governor Roy Romer sent a 
letter to California Governor Pete Wilson offering to provide assistance to help it 
through its challenges. This was cautious generosity, however. Romer made it clear 
that it was a temporary measure.47 
The apparent willingness of the Upper Basin states to help California, coupled 
with federal support for redistribution of the Colorado River prompted Nevada’s 
water managers to act. In 1993 state officials took advantage of the Colorado River 
Basin political situation and petitioned the Secretary of Interior to also consider 
providing aid to Nevada. All of this was occurring in the midst of the CRC 
restructuring campaign. However, some observers, including U.S. Senator Harry 
Reid, worried that the political infighting between the SNWA and CRC had weakened 
the state’s standing within the Basin State discussions.48 
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Senator Reid sent a representative (Larry Werner) to Carson City to testify on 
his behalf before the Natural Resources Committee on the issue of A.B. 692. Werner 
stated “Senator Reid is concerned that the state of Nevada act with one voice on water 
policies that have a far-reaching affect [sic] on our neighboring states. The Senator 
believes that A.B. 692 is an acceptable compromise that enhances the existing 
Colorado River Commission and its ability to fulfill its mission.” Werner noted that 
the SNWA had “already gained recognition” at the federal level for its recent 
accomplishment of uniting the Las Vegas metro-area’s water agencies, but despite 
this initial success, the current tension between the Authority and CRC was impeding 
Reid’s ability to propose water legislation with his congressional colleagues from the 
other Basin states. According to Reid, “the more unified the state is in presenting its 
proposals to the other Colorado River Basin states and to congress, the more effective 
Nevada will be in securing future water supplies,” concluding, “any additional delay 
would cause us to lose ground as the federal government moves ahead to refine the 
distribution of Colorado River water among thirsty Western states.” Werner closed by 
noting the favorable relationship Nevada and Las Vegas currently enjoyed with the 
Clinton Administration, and especially Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt and warned 
that the state could lose this ally if Clinton was defeated in the 1996 election. It was 
therefore incumbent upon the legislature to pass A.B. 692 as quickly as possible.49  
State Senator Smith pushed back, questioning Werner over the supposed level 
of divisiveness within Nevada. Smith asked Werner “to be more specific about 
exactly ‘whom’ in the State of Nevada is divided over water policy.” Werner 
explained that the federal government had “received mixed signals” and clarified that 
it was not so much about the actual level of divisiveness, but the way in which the 
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other basin states and federal government perceived southern Nevada’s internal 
divisions.50  
In June 1996 interstate political developments overshadowed the CRC 
restructuring campaign. That month Governor Romer publicly declared his 
unequivocal opposition to the CRC’s Roan Creek Deal, a revelation that was clearly 
an embarrassment for the River Commission. While Galatz and Cahill continued to 
argue that the deal was not yet defeated, most people within the metropolitan water 
community, as well as local journalists, understood that opposition from the state of 
Colorado effectively killed the deal.51 
Not only had the CRC failed to anticipate Colorado’s reaction, but the CRC 
also failed to consider the wider regional political ramifications of its Roan Creek 
proposal. Governor Fyfe Symington of Arizona was incensed over Governor Miller 
and the CRC’s campaign, stating:  
 
It is disturbing that Nevada interests have gone outside the ongoing 
discussions and negotiated a solution without any mention of the solution to 
the other states participating in the discussion. Furthermore, it is extremely 
disquieting to find one Colorado River Basin state dealing with private 
interests in another state when the Seven Basin states had agreed that all 
negotiations should be on a state-to-state basis. The proposed project [Roan 
Creek] has a direct adverse impact on Arizona’s water supply.52  
 
After Governor Romer’s and Symington’s public declarations of opposition to 
Nevada’s Roan Creek deal, Governor Miller became more openly supportive of the 
CRC restructuring initiative.  
By this point in the legislative session it seemed that A.B. 692 was destined 
for passage. Nevada Governor Bob Miller himself came out in support of the measure 
reversing his earlier stance. Like Senator Reid, Miller had become concerned that the 
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division between the CRC and the SNWA was affecting interstate water negotiations, 
and saw passage of A.B. 692 as a way to put the controversy to rest and to move 
forward.53  
In addition to wanting a strong position for the state in Colorado River 
negotiations, two more factors probably influenced Miller’s decision. The first was 
that he was from southern Nevada. Having grown up in Las Vegas and served as 
Clark County District Attorney, the governor had long and deep ties to the southern 
part of the state. Secondly, the Governor was only losing the ability to appoint a 
single seat. Under the old system he appointed five members. Under the SNWA 
proposal this would only decrease by one.54  
The legislature passed A.B. 692 on June 27, 1993; three days later the 
governor signed it into law, effective July 1. The new board was almost entirely 
southern Nevadans. Gone were Karen Galatz and Garth Winckler, the vocal critics of 
the SNWA. The new CRC board was predominantly comprised of members of the 
Las Vegas metropolitan growth coalition. The Governor appointed Janet Rogers, 
Chief Counsel and Executive of Sunbelt Broadcasting Company, a television station 
with affiliates in Reno and Las Vegas, and Richard Bunker, president of the Nevada 
Resorts Association.55  
The SNWA appointees, Scott Higginson, Larry Scheffler, and Jay Bingham, 
also boasted growth coalition credentials. Las Vegas Councilman Higginson had 
worked for a host of Nevada’s most powerful politicians, including Congressman 
James Santini, Governor Richard Bryan, and Senator Harry Reid. He also started an 
advertising firm and a political consultation business before serving on the Las Vegas 
City Council.56 Henderson City Councilor Scheffler was involved in real estate in the 
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metro-area.57 Bingham, a Clark County Commissioner, owned a local construction 
and development business. Two individuals from the previous board remained, both 
gubernatorial appointees: Bob Crowell of Carson City, and Tom Coward of Las 
Vegas. Crowell was a lifelong public servant who served in the military during 
Vietnam and later entered politics after leaving the army. Coward moved to Las 
Vegas in 1979, whereupon he opened a car dealership. According to one former CRC 
board member, Coward understood the need for water based on his business 
background.58  
The CRC’s new composition was oriented wholly toward southern Nevada. 
The SNWA had achieved its goal of absorbing state power to help administer water 
policy in the metro-area. One of the first acts of the restructured board was to jointly 
host a “water summit,” a public forum in which the Water Authority and River 
Commission would hear proposals from a host of water interests throughout the 
Colorado River Basin on the issue of increasing the Las Vegas metropolitan area’s 
water supply. The water summit led to further negotiations with the Colorado River 
Basin states.  
The final act of SNWA consolidation came in 1995, when the River 
Commission transferred ownership and operation of the Southern Nevada Water 
System to the SNWA. Once again, this took legislative approval. However, this time 
the process lacked the drama that surrounded the 1993 session. During testimony 
before the Assembly Committee on Government Affairs, CRC Chairwoman Rogers 
stated that the River Commission “no longer wants to be in the plumbing business and 
instead will focus on acquiring additional regional water supply.”59 What is most 
telling about this is that during the 1995 session there was virtually no opposition to 
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this final bit of consolidation. The bill to transfer the Southern Nevada Water System 
to the Authority was an extremely important piece of legislation. It transferred the 
entire system of infrastructure that sustained Las Vegas to a local agency. From this 
point forward, power of administering and distributing Colorado River water resided 
with the SNWA. The SNWA had consolidated local control over all water sources 
and infrastructure. It had, essentially, vertically integrated the means of production of 
Las Vegas’ water supply. In the eyes of the public, state level politicians, and Basin 
state water agencies, the SNWA had effectively become the primary water agency for 
southern Nevada. 
 The restructuring of the CRC was the final phase of the SNWA’s 
consolidation of political control over local water resources and represents the end of 
the pre-SNWA water regime. The restructuring was also arguably the single greatest 
factor that contributed to the Water Authority’s emergence as a potent political 
agency within the Colorado River Basin. The SNWA now possessed local, county, 
and state level political authority, a combination that enabled it to directly engage 
other state governments over Colorado River matters. 
Prior to the legislative session SNWA staff declared it was its intention to 
work within the Colorado River Commission, stating the Authority did not want to 
threaten the River Commission’s role as the agency responsible for interstate water 
negotiations. Whether the SNWA staff had intended to or not, however, the 
restructuring provided the SNWA with an enhanced level of political legitimacy. 
Since the SNWA was now a part of a state level organization, in theory, it possessed 
some measure of state level power. Assembly Bill 692 established the legal 
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mechanism that would enable a local agency to vault up to the elevated political plane 
upon which the states of the Colorado River Basin operated.  
Without this change in the Nevada Revised Statutes, the SNWA would have 
remained a metropolitan water agency, one still entirely reliant upon a state or federal 
intermediary who may or may not have addressed the Las Vegas metro-area’s needs. 
The CRC restructuring created a new type of agency, one that allowed Mulroy to sit 
with other Basin State negotiators as an equal. To be sure, A.B. 692 did not eliminate 
the CRC’s official legal standing to negotiate for interstate water. However, with the 
backing of the state, the SNWA began to push the CRC out of the way and took the 
lead on interstate water acquisition efforts. These actions led to an increase in media 
attention and identification of the SNWA with Las Vegas and water.  
The Authority could now use its reinforced power base as a foundation from 
which to engage the other Colorado River Basin states. The importance of the 
restructuring to the SNWA and the metro-area is significant since it has infused the 
city with quasi-state level standing within the Colorado River Basin—no other urban 
area in the region is represented with as much force and singular focus. To this point 
in the narrative, the SNWA has been focused on control of local politics and water 
resources. In its next phase the SNWA reoriented itself to seek water resources 
hundreds of miles from the metro-area. In the next chapter we will see how the 
SNWA used its newly acquired strength to negotiate two key interstate water treaties, 
both of which represented unprecedented changes to the Law of the River. As we 
shall see, the SNWA was eager to press its case to the other Basin States for an 
increase in its share of the Colorado River. It is to these political developments we 
now turn.
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CHAPTER 5 | BRINGING POWER TO BEAR: THE VIRGIN RIVER 
DEVELOPMENT PLAN AND THE ARIZONA GROUNDWATER BANKING 
AGREEMENT  
 
 
Internal power consolidated, the SNWA launched a campaign in 1994 to 
change the Law of the River. Initially, the SNWA considered a strategy of pressing 
for an increase to Nevada’s Colorado River allocation. However, a challenge of this 
sort had little chance of success. In the early 1990s the three most powerful Basin 
states—California, Colorado, and Arizona—were opposed to SNWA efforts to alter 
the status quo. Even though the SNWA had acquired an unprecedented level of 
political power for a Las Vegas metropolitan water agency, it was still unable to 
overcome the opposition if faced from these three states. Instead of assaulting the 
Law of the River directly then, SNWA technicians decided to find other means of 
obtaining additional water for metropolitan Las Vegas. They would approach the Law 
of the River obliquely and exploit options no one had yet considered.  
Despite the fact that the Colorado River had entered an era of limits and 
seemed fully appropriated, Mulroy and her staff knew there were at least two ways of 
obtaining water from the Colorado River: wheeling tributary water through Lake 
Mead and storing surplus Colorado River water in aquifers. Ability to execute either 
of these options, however, required a change to the Law of the River. And changing 
the Law of the River required the support of the other Basin states. This support 
would be difficult to obtain.  
In 1994, a tense political situation existed among the Colorado River Basin 
states that in some ways mirrored that of metropolitan Las Vegas in 1989—increased 
population, shrinking regional water supplies, and a resultant increase in political 
tensions among governments. Despite the charged atmosphere and absolute advantage 
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of the larger states’ water agencies, the SNWA’s political composition provided it 
with certain comparative advantages. The most important was its political 
consolidation of city, county, and state power. Unlike California, Colorado, and 
Arizona, the SNWA faced no internal threats. All of Nevada’s Colorado River users 
were member agencies of the SNWA. It could therefore sustain a campaign to bring 
about a change to the Law of the River more efficiently than other states. The SNWA 
pursued this campaign for seven years, during which time intra-state disputes over the 
Colorado River occurred in both California and Colorado.1  
By 2001, the SNWA concluded its campaign after receiving approval from the 
other Basin states for its wheeling and aquifer storage initiatives. These achievements 
also demonstrate the limitations of the SNWA’s powers. Even with the SNWA’s 
consolidated powers it was unable to bring about fundamental change to the Law of 
the River—the alteration of allocations. Even so, the SNWA’s efforts represented the 
first time ever that Nevada had been able to alter the Law of the River to its 
advantage. While the SNWA campaign officially began in 1994, efforts to obtain 
exogenous water supplies began five years prior in the pivotal year of 1989.  
 
The Virgin River Development Plan 
One of the main reasons southern Nevada’s water purveyors came together to 
form the SNWA was to create an organization that could obtain more water for the 
Las Vegas metro-area from local and regional locations. The SNWA’s predecessor 
agency, the LVVWD initiated this trend in 1989 when it applied for rights to 
groundwater in east-central Nevada and to the Virgin and Muddy Rivers northeast of 
Las Vegas. However, in 1991, the territory in which the SNWA could seek water was 
rather limited. In 1991, out-of-state water acquisition efforts were still the purview of 
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the Colorado River Commission. Because of this constraint, the SNWA pursued 
several in-state resources. The first source was Nevada’s remaining 58,000 acre-feet 
of its Colorado River allocation (Chapter 2). The SNWA then purchased privately 
held water rights for 23,000 acre-feet from the Southern California Edison’s coal-
fired power plant in Laughlin, the emerging casino border town 100 miles south of 
Las Vegas. Finally, the Authority assumed responsibility for the LVVWD’s 
Cooperative Water Project (CWP), an ambitious water project that would develop a 
pair of in-state water resources: the Virgin River, a small waterway fifty-five miles 
northeast of Las Vegas, as well as several large groundwater reserves from east-
central Nevada.  
The Virgin River begins in the high plateaus above Zion National Park where 
it carves deep chasms in the earth on its 162-mile journey to its confluence with the 
Colorado River in Nevada. Its annual flow is approximately 175,000 acre-feet, 
making it a relatively small river.2 To put this in perspective, the Colorado River 
averages just under fifteen million acre-feet per year.3 The Virgin possesses value 
well in excess of its size, however, since it is a rare water source in an arid region. For 
most of its length, the Virgin River flows through southwestern Utah. Though the 
Virgin River flows through Nevada for only twenty miles, this short distance provided 
the SNWA the legal basis to claim the waterway. In the 1963, Supreme Court case 
Arizona v. California, the court ruled that Colorado River tributaries located in a 
Lower Basin state could not be counted against that state’s annual allocation.4 In its 
ruling, the Supreme Court was referring to Arizona’s claim to the Gila River, which 
flowed almost entirely within the Copper state. This ruling provided the LVVWD, 
and later SNWA, the legal precedent to claim the Virgin River. 
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There was one key difference between these two examples, however: the Gila 
River flowed directly through Arizona’s population centers. The Virgin River, on the 
other hand, flowed northeast of Las Vegas, never getting closer than fifty-five miles 
to the metropolitan area.5 In order to address this geographic challenge, the SNWA 
wanted to “wheel” the waters of the Virgin River through Lake Mead, that is, let the 
river enter Lake Mead and then withdraw a corresponding amount forty miles south 
from the SNWA’s withdrawal pumps near Hoover Dam. In 1994, however, this was 
not allowed under the Law of the River. 
While the Supreme Court gave Lower Basin states rights to in-state tributaries, 
there was a consequential stipulation: once tributaries intersect the main stem of the 
Colorado River, the water held in these streams become “system water.” If a state 
used its tributary water before it touched the Colorado River, it had the right to both 
the tributary water and its Colorado River allocation. But if a state failed to use its 
tributary and the water ended up flowing into the Colorado River, then it became part 
of the state’s overall allocation.  
For those reasons the SNWA’s “wheeling” plan was illegal, a fact that every 
state in the Colorado River basin soon pointed out. Each had its own reason for 
opposing the SNWA’s plan. The Upper Basin states (Wyoming, Colorado, New 
Mexico, and Utah) were unified in their opposition based on the fact that they did not 
want the SNWA to initiate any type of action that could potentially alter the Law of 
the River. The Upper Basin had long been leery of the Lower Basin. States like 
Colorado and Wyoming routinely accused California of attempting to increase its 
share of the Colorado River at the expense of the Upper Basin.6 Elected officials 
within the Upper Basin already felt that the federal government managed the river for 
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the Lower Basin’s benefit, pointing to the inordinate number of federally sanctioned 
projects built along the stretch of river in the Lower Basin. What’s more, Upper Basin 
states complained that the Environmental Species Act required them to send enough 
water downstream to ensure the health of the lower basin’s ecology.  
Additionally, critics pointed out that many of the projects built in the Upper 
Basin were constructed merely to ensure there was enough water to prevent a shortage 
in the Lower Basin. Indeed, this was one of the main reasons for the construction of 
the Glen Canyon Dam in 1966.7 As a result of this long-standing suspicion, the Upper 
Basin viewed any attempt to change the Law of the River as a slippery slope that 
would lead to further changes. Arizona, on the other hand, had a different, more 
pragmatic reason for its opposition.  
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Arizona v. California was a pyrrhic victory for 
the Copper State. Even though the Supreme Court affirmed Arizona’s right to 2.8 
million acre-feet annually of the Colorado River, there was no physical way of 
moving that water to the more populous central part of the state. To do so would 
require an infrastructure of pumps, pipelines, aqueducts, dams, and reservoirs, not to 
mention the electrical power needed to convey water to the higher elevation 
population centers. This system eventually came about largely because of the efforts 
of Arizona Senator Carl Hayden, who in 1947 first proposed what came to be called 
the Central Arizona Project (CAP). However, despite broad based support for the 
project within Arizona, it languished in Congress for the next two decades due to 
opposition from California’s delegation. 
Still angry over the state’s defeat in Arizona v. California, the Golden State’s 
lawmakers blocked CAP legislation until they exacted a rather sizeable concession 
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from Arizona: the CAP allocation would receive the lowest priority among the Lower 
Basin states. In other words, if the Lower Basin stretch of the Colorado River 
experienced shortage of any kind, the CAP would be the first to absorb that shortage. 
Not only would Arizona be the first state to lose water, it would also have to bear the 
entirety of the shortage before California had to sacrifice any amount of its 4.4 million 
acre-foot allocation. In 1968, Arizona agreed to these unfavorable conditions and 
received funding for the CAP. From that point forward, Arizona’s low CAP priority 
caused it to oppose almost any proposal to alter the Law of the River. 
For its part, California was opposed to Nevada’s efforts to tap the Virgin River 
because this action could potentially decrease the volume of Colorado River flows. 
The Golden State had grown accustomed to using a greater portion (5.2 million acre-
feet) of the Colorado River than it was legally allowed (4.4 million acre-feet). 
California, therefore, was weary of any efforts that could threaten the surpluses it had 
become reliant upon.   
Opposition to its wheeling proposal from the other Basin States put the 
SNWA in the absurd position of having to consider building a pipeline to convey 
Virgin River water fifty-five miles overland, merely so it would not run afoul of the 
Law of the River. The SNWA therefore found itself in a difficult position. In late 
1994, Nevada State Engineer Michael Turnipseed granted the SNWA rights to 
190,000 acre-feet annually of the Virgin River.8 As a result of the ruling, the SNWA 
had legal title to a quasi-local resource that, according to the Nevada State Engineer, 
the Authority could develop if it chose to do so. Despite obtaining state sanction, the 
SNWA could not develop the Virgin River without either building a pipeline or 
establishing some type of sharing agreement with the other Basin States. 9 If the 
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SNWA pursued the project without an interstate agreement (building a pipeline to 
prevent the Virgin River from intersecting the Colorado River), the project would 
likely cost over a billion dollars.10 This was a significant financial burden for a single 
water utility to assume. It was such a burden, in fact, that in 1994 the SNWA de-
emphasized the Virgin River plan and began pursuing other, less expensive resource 
options.  
During the winter of 1994 and 1995 the SNWA wound down its Virgin River 
campaign. It had done everything it could, short of withdrawing water. It held off on 
further development because the SNWA did not want to agitate the other Basin state 
governments. SNWA officials were confident they had done everything necessary to 
solidify the agency’s claim to the Virgin River, at least within Nevada. SNWA 
engineers had designed the infrastructure needed to store and convey the water to the 
metro-area, conducted the necessary hydrological studies to assess the amount of 
water available for consumption, and applied to the Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM) for rights of way to build a pipeline over federally owned land.11 In April 
1993, the SNWA board concluded these preparatory measures by ratifying water 
rights filings on the Muddy and Virgin Rivers. The board’s action represented a legal 
maneuver to strengthen the SNWA’s claim to the Virgin River. Mulroy explained 
“that there had been a great deal of discussion between the various local, state, and 
federal agencies involved with the Colorado River concerning the ‘wheeling’ of water 
through the Colorado River System…this application puts into practical application 
that ‘wheeling’ concept.”12  
The State Engineer had provided the SNWA with a legal placeholder of sorts; 
one that allowed the Authority to put its Virgin River development plans on hold and 
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to reorient its focus toward the development of different potential water resources.13 
Within the state of Nevada, at least, the SNWA’s claim to the Virgin River was now 
secure. 
 
Emergence of a Regional Strategy  
For the first few years of its existence the SNWA pursued only in-state water 
resources.14 However, in 1993, the same year the SNWA succeeded in its efforts to 
restructure the CRC, the Authority shifted its strategy. The SNWA realized early on 
that the there was a limited amount of in-state water resources. The Authority also 
knew that additional resources could be found beyond the state’s borders. Obtaining 
the legal authority to negotiate for these resources was, in fact, the driving motivation 
behind the CRC restructuring plan.  
Just prior to the culmination of the CRC restructuring campaign, the SNWA 
held an internal discussion about the way in which the Authority would pursue non-
local water resources. During this meeting Mulroy explained that “Ever since the 
inception of the Authority, the Board had never clearly given staff direction as to 
whether [it] wants to engage in discussions on acquiring water rights, whether those 
water rights are within the State of Nevada, or whether it even wants to participate in 
discussions with the Colorado River Commission outside the State of Nevada to buy 
water rights.” Vice Chairman Brent Hardy (Councilman, North Las Vegas) replied, 
stating that his “perception all along had been to look at every place there might be a 
drop of water, [and] that we’d be remiss not to look at every opportunity.” Director 
Scott Higginson (Councilman, Las Vegas) seconded this sentiment by recommending 
“that staff look at every alternative that comes along for future water supplies for this 
Valley, analyze them, and if staff feels it worthwhile, pursue it to a degree where it is 
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ready to come back to the Board for further direction. Any alternative that comes 
through the door that has some sort of viability to it ought to be explored until it is 
determined it has no use to the Valley.” Director Jay Bingham (Clark County 
Commission), one of the figures leading the charge for the restructuring of the 
Colorado River Commission at the legislature, weighed in as well: “the [SNWA] 
Board has matured enough in the last year, has gained stature and strength, and it’s 
time to put everything on the table and take a look at anything.” Bingham wanted “the 
Authority to be very aggressive, up-front, and open in the pursuit of water.” Hardy, 
Higginson, and Bingham were essentially outlining what would become Authority 
doctrine in regional water acquisition policy: pursue anything and everything (fig. 
8).15 
For the SNWA board, this any-and-all acquisition strategy was a necessity. 
The SNWA had to take a shotgun approach to water acquisition, because there was no 
one source that would fully satisfy its water shortage issues. The prime water 
resources in the Colorado River Basin had long been appropriated. By the time the 
SNWA was created in 1991, there were no more easily accessible sources available. 
The board therefore needed to pursue a wide range of options, in the hope that the 
broad spectrum of resources, when taken together, would provide a measure of 
stability with respect to southern Nevada’s water supply.   
During this same meeting, Mulroy established an additional guiding principle: 
the SNWA would pursue resources that offered the least political resistance. Unclear 
as to what sources the SNWA should seek first, Bingham asked Mulroy if the 
Authority “was looking for a priority list to bring back to the Board.” Bingham was 
thinking in terms of the technical feasibility of a particular water source, essentially, 
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what water sources would require the least energy to obtain. Mulroy replied that it 
“was a political issue not a money issue nor a[n] engineering issue … it was going to 
be a matter of where the politics break first, especially outside the State of Nevada.”16 
The SNWA board thus began establishing guidelines regarding non-local, intra and 
interstate water acquisition efforts using political considerations as the guiding factor. 
Two months after this meeting, the SNWA succeeded in its efforts to restructure the 
CRC. It had reconfigured itself in a way that would enable it to effectively take part in 
interstate water negotiations.  
As the SNWA leadership discussed strategy they kept the larger historical 
context of western water conflicts in mind. Mulroy and the SNWA board understood 
that conflict proved financially costly, made political enemies, and limited future 
policy options. They also knew that previous contests over water revealed that 
western water sources were already in short supply. Long before the SNWA formed, 
virtually every source in the American West had already been appropriated. Historical 
water conflicts possessed another lesson: the SNWA would almost certainly face 
opposition in its quest to procure more water.  
Two historical episodes that would have informed any western water 
manager’s view were San Francisco’s Hetch Hetchy plan of 1934, and Los Angeles’s 
1913 Owens River development project. In San Francisco’s case, the city sought to 
dam the Tuolumne River at the head of the Hetch Hetchy Valley, a site located 
entirely within Yosemite National Park. The Sierra Club, led by John Muir, waged a 
bitter, and ultimately losing, campaign against development interests. This loss 
provided the catalyst to grow the ranks of individuals willing to advocate on behalf of 
the environment. As historian Robert Righter explains, in 1956 two of these 
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individuals, Michael Brower of the Sierra Club and Howard Zahniser of the 
Wilderness Society, successfully defeated government efforts to place a dam in 
Dinosaur National Monument in Colorado. In this manner, the damming of Hetch 
Hetchy helped launch the modern environmental movement, a constituency that could 
potentially oppose the efforts of other cities in their quest for water. San Francisco 
and Hetch Hetchy reinforced in the public mind the conception of the greedy imperial 
city, one that steals resources from its surroundings. 17 
 San Francisco’s legacy on this score pails, however, when compared to the 
earlier example of Los Angeles, a city widely associated with the most famous rural 
water development plan in the history of the American West. Between 1904 and 1913 
the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP) purchased water rights in 
the Owens Valley of California and built an aqueduct to transport its water to Los 
Angeles. The prevailing view of this event is that agents of the LADWP unfairly 
acquired this water and drove the Owens Valley’s farmers off their land. This 
particular conception of the Owens Valley episode, though factually inaccurate, 
continues to be the predominant view to the present day. Historian Patricia Limerick 
accurately assessed the impact of these events when she asserted “the members of the 
Sierra Club and the residents of the Owens Valley succeeded in casting the cities of 
San Francisco and Los Angeles as imperial antagonists and shameless bullies and thus 
shaped the image of both cities for decades to come.”18 
Mulroy was acutely aware of this legacy as she appeared before the board on 
May 6th. Four years prior in 1989, Shortly after Mulroy became General Manager of 
the LVVWD, the District filed for rights to groundwater in east-central Nevada, some 
250 miles north of the metro-area. The applications set off immediate protests, and 
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rural residents and newspapers began to accuse first the District, then the SNWA of 
attempting to perpetrate a repeat of the Owens Valley episode. Mulroy knew that the 
historical legacies of Hetch Hetchy and the Owens Valley would influence the 
political strategy the SNWA could adopt. She also knew that these legacies would 
combine with the Law of the River to make the prospect of obtaining water of any 
kind very difficult for the Authority.  
 The seventy-year history of legal disputes contained within the Law of the 
River also influenced Mulroy’s strategy. The most significant event in the history of 
the LOR was the Arizona v. California lawsuit. In 1953, Arizona sued California for 
the fourth time in an attempt to secure 2.8 million acre-feet of Colorado River water 
per year. California, for its part, sought to increase its share from 4.4 million acre-feet, 
to 5.2 million acre-feet. Which, if successful, would have decreased Arizona’s 
allocation by 800,000 acre-feet.  
 In what would turn out to be the longest and costliest Supreme Court case in 
history, the justices found for Arizona, affirming the Copper State’s rights to 2.8 
million acre-feet. However, as historian Norris Hundley pointed out, there was a more 
consequential element of the court’s ruling. According to Hundley, the Supreme 
Court declared the federal government was the ultimate arbiter of the Colorado River, 
writing, “Congress, not state law, would determine priorities to Colorado River water 
within each Lower Basin state.”19  
This ruling accomplished two things. One, it affirmed Nevada’s allocation at 
300,000 acre-feet per year. Two, it showed that legal challenges at the level of the 
United States Supreme Court was costly and the outcome was unpredictable. Mulroy 
and the SNWA Board knew the SNWA could not sustain a long-term legal campaign, 
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and adopted the more pragmatic least possible resistance approach. The 1993 Nevada 
Water Summit was a direct reflection of the SNWA’s understanding of this legal 
reality.  
 
The Nevada Water Summit 
In November of 1993, shortly after the Colorado River Commission 
restructuring campaign, the SNWA and CRC held a joint convention, dubbed the 
Water Summit by local media, the purpose of which was ostensibly to solicit 
proposals from any individual or public or private entity that might help bring more 
water to southern Nevada.20 The more subtle—and important—message, however, 
was to use the forum to publicize southern Nevada’s inadequate Colorado River 
allocation to the other Basin States. 
In the period leading up to the Water Summit, the SNWA and CRC solicited a 
wide range of water proposals from dozens of interests. The SNWA and CRC had 
twin goals for the summit: to find new sources of water for the metro-area, and to 
demonstrate to the rest of the Colorado River Basin states the desperate nature of 
southern Nevada’s water supply. The SNWA and CRC had scheduled two days for 
various individuals and interests to present their proposals. Several proposals during 
the first day of discussions were at least technically feasible. One of these was the 
construction of a pipeline from Alaska to Southern California that would convey 
melted glacier water. Ross Cowan, a private citizen suggested that Nevada might find 
support for this project if it were to fund the construction of the pipeline. His proposal 
called for the construction of a pipeline made of PVC tubing from Alaska to Southern 
California (whereupon the water would be used, thus allowing for Nevada to 
withdraw a corresponding amount of water from Lake Mead), running submerged just 
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off the west coast of the continent. He said the pipeline could be built for one and a 
half billion dollars. This was an unrealistic proposal, however, considering that the 
SNWA groundwater pipeline—even in the early 1990s—was supposed to cost more 
than a billion dollars, and only extend for two hundred miles. Cowan’s proposal also 
seemed to elicit doubt among several of the panelists, some of whom noted that he 
had not considered many aspects such as interstate negotiations with Alaska over 
water rights, and with Canada for rights of way for a pipeline located along its 
shoreline.21  
One final example involved a proposal by Ric Davidge representing Alaska-
Water Exports, a private startup company. Davidge proposed the SNWA pay to have 
his company tow enormous bags of freshwater from Alaska to Southern California. 
Each of these bags could transport 225-acre feet of water, and would take twenty days 
to tow. Davidge presented a more detailed plan than either Spencer’s or Cowan’s; 
however, one must consider the resource expenditure to tow a bag of water over 2,000 
miles from Alaska to Southern California and whether this was a useful endeavor for 
the SNWA to fund.22 
On the second day of the Water Summit representatives from two oil 
companies—Chevron and Texaco—presented proposals describing their goal to lease 
water rights they possessed in Colorado (These are the same interests from the Roan 
Creek deal). Though Governor Roy Romer of Colorado officially opposed the deal 
the previous July, neither Chevron nor Texaco, nor the State of Nevada, had entirely 
given up hope that the deal might work out. Gary Bishop, chairman of Denver based 
Chevron Shale Oil Company, explained that both Companies would lease their water 
rights (for 175,000 acre-feet, enough to end southern Nevada’s water uncertainty) to 
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Nevada for thirty to fifty years. During this period, Nevada would uphold its end of 
the bargain by paying for the construction costs of Chevron and Texaco’s oil shale 
water system. At the end of Nevada’s lease, water rights would return to Chevron and 
Texaco. They would then use the water for their oil recovery operations. Chairman 
Bishop called it a “loan” to Nevada to give it “time to find a permanent, cost-effective 
source of supply.”23 The SNWA/CRC panel had high hopes for this potential source, 
but it was unclear from a legal standpoint whether Nevada would ever be able to 
access Chevron and Texaco’s water. The Law of the River prohibited interstate 
transfers of water. It became apparent in the final phase of the Water Summit that 
Nevada would face significant opposition from the other Basin states if it pursued 
Chevron and Texaco water rights.  
Present in the audience that day were representatives of California, Arizona, 
and Colorado. These individuals were not in attendance to propose methods of 
bringing water to southern Nevada; rather they were there to officially protest on 
behalf of their respective state governments. First to present was Jerry Zimmerman of 
the Colorado River Board of California. Zimmerman explained that Nevada’s efforts 
to lease water were inconsistent with the Law of the River and that a solution must be 
accomplished by working with the other Basin states. Zimmerman, rather 
patronizingly, explained that certain principles should guide all negotiations with 
respect to the Colorado River, the most notable being that “Nevada’s objectives 
cannot be accomplished at other states’ expense,” and less notably, that “all parties 
must recognize the need for accommodations.”24 There was a certain hypocrisy to 
Zimmerman’s advice about state’s working together, as California had a well-earned 
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reputation for using its economic and political muscle to craft regulations favorable to 
its own interests with little regard for the other Basin states.  
It seemed that Zimmerman was going to use the Water Summit as a forum to 
explain why California’s needs were superior to those of the other Basin states. He 
began by stating that “California in fact has a larger and more immediate need for 
water above the basic apportionment than does the State of Nevada” and went on to 
justify his state’s overuse of the Colorado River by attempting to differentiate 
between California’s basic apportionment and its “entitlement.” He justified this 
distinction by showing the state had contracts for 5.2 million acre-feet per year with 
the Bureau of Reclamation. In his view, contracts equated to entitlement. However, 
Zimmerman’s most brazen statement came when he admonished Nevada for rejecting 
California’s 1991 proposal to establish a water bank in Lake Mead. Under this plan, if 
Lower Basin states could use less than their annual allocation, they would be able to 
bank this water in Lake Mead. Legal scholar David Getches explained that it was not 
just Nevada that opposed this measure. Getches noted that the California proposal was 
universally condemned by all Basin states. The problem, from the other states’ points 
of view, was that California’s proposal included provisions that allowed the state to 
continue using an amount greater than its legal allocation for an additional twenty 
years. The other Basin states were not in favor of establishing a bank that would be 
used for a state (California) that was already using more than its adjudicated 
allocation. This key detail is something Zimmerman chose to omit during his 
presentation.25 
California’s habitual overuse increased the chance of a shortage in the Lower 
Basin. This was unacceptable to Nevada because it would increase the risks of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
139 
shortage, just when Nevada was attempting to get more out of the Colorado River.26 
Yet, during the 1993 Water Summit, Zimmerman acted as if his state had 
magnanimously presented a solution that would have solved Nevada’s problems, thus 
precluding the need to market upper basin water. Zimmerman closed by stating, “the 
Colorado River Board [of California] is committed to working with Nevada in 
addressing its need for additional future water supplies.”27 With this statement, 
Zimmerman established the theme the following state representatives would also 
follow—that Nevada needed to work within the parameters of the Law of the River 
and that the Basin states wanted to help. This admonition to work within the Law of 
the River was empty rhetoric. It essentially allowed Basin states to avoid meaningful 
policy discussions and the hard choices this would entail.  
The second state representative to present was Larry Linser, Deputy Director 
of Arizona Water Resources. Linser opened his presentation by stating that Arizona is 
“steadfast in its position in opposition to the marketing of waters from the Upper 
Basin to the Lower Basin.” Arizona, like Nevada, occupied a unique position within 
the Lower Basin, but for different reasons. Arizona’s opposition was based on its 
junior Colorado River priority. For Arizona, issues regarding water invariably came 
back to the Central Arizona Project’s junior priority on the Colorado River. Linser 
explained, “for us to get the Central Arizona Project authorized in 1968 one of the 
things that we had to give in the compromise in Congress was that the Central 
Arizona Project priority was the last priority of use in the Lower Basin.”28  
Linser also explained that there was an economic aspect at play as well. He 
pointed out that if there was any surplus on the River, by law Lower Basin states 
could use it free of cost. Arizona therefore did not want Nevada to upset this 
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economically favorable situation. Linser noted “When we started talking about 
marketing of … unused water from the Upper Basin to the Lower Basin we feel it is 
water that would probably go unused anyway and come to the Lower Basin and 
would be available to us.”  Linser concluded that ultimately, the  “marketing proposal 
in effect would be reducing the reliability of our water supply.”29 
Arizona was also likely resisting interbasin marketing for events occurring 
within its own borders. Farmers along the lower Colorado River in Arizona had 
formed the Cibola Irrigation District and approached numerous in-state, and out-of-
state interests about selling their water rights. Arizona officials viewed the Cibola 
District’s overtures as a potential threat to its Colorado River allocation. From 
Arizona’s point of view, California could theoretically exploit the fact that an internal 
organization was considering selling its water. California could then argue that if the 
Cibola District had water to sell, then Arizona possessed a surplus and was not in as 
dire need of its full allocation as it had earlier advertised. This was the same type of 
logic Colorado officials employed opposing the Roan Creak deal. They, like Arizona, 
did not want to present a possible legal opening for other states to exploit. Arizona 
had fought for its rights to the Colorado River for well over half a century and was not 
going to allow domestic interests to threaten its Colorado River allocation. As a result, 
Arizona was also reliant upon the legal protection the Law of the River provided.  
Linser closed by presenting the standard pleasantries that had become 
customary during the proceedings: “We in Arizona fully recognize the situation that 
you’re in and realize that you need a water supply and will get a water supply in the 
future, and we want to cooperate and work with you in doing that.” Yet, there were 
limits to what Arizona was willing to do. In an exchange with SNWA Director Paul 
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Christensen following Linser’s promise to cooperate with the Authority, the Arizonan 
demonstrated his agency’s inherent hypocrisy:  
 
Christensen: “I have one question. What portion of Arizona’s population – 
how many people in Arizona . . . [receive their water] . . . from the Central 
Arizona Project?”  
 
Linser: “I would say seventy and eighty percent of the population.”  
 
Christensen: “In round numbers?”  
 
Linser: “Three, three and one half million people.”  
 
Christensen: “Would Arizona be satisfied if they had three times our [NV’s] 
allocation out of the Colorado River?”  
 
Linser: “900,000 acre feet? Hardly.”30 
 
The final Basin state envoy to speak was James Lochhead, an eminent water 
attorney representing the Colorado Governor’s office. The SNWA and CRC panelists 
were interested in what Lochhead had to say because Colorado was the most 
politically influential state in the Upper Basin. Everyone in attendance knew that 
Colorado could make or break any private water-marketing plan in the Basin. 
Lochhead wasted little time dashing the panelist’s hopes. In Lochhead’s opening 
statements he asserted:  
 
Some of the proposals before you are, in the opinion of the State of Colorado, 
illegal, or would undermine the interests of the Basin states and the tribes in 
promoting security of operations in the balanced use of the resources. 
Therefore, such proposals are not in the interests of the State of Colorado and 
we believe are not in the ultimate long-term interests of Nevada and other 
states in the Basin.31 
 
Lochhead’s implication was that Colorado was willing to wage a legal battle with 
Nevada if the latter were to go forward with its water marketing plans.  
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Lochhead argued that Nevada’s strategy threatened the Upper Basin’s 
allocation of the Colorado River. Losing the Upper Basin’s water to the Lower Basin 
was a fear that shaped almost every aspect of Colorado’s water policy, stretching back 
to before the creation of the Colorado River Compact. Lochhead was certainly 
opposed to Nevada’s efforts to purchase private water, but for him and the state of 
Colorado, Nevada’s efforts were really a sideshow. For Lochhead and his Upper 
Basin colleagues, the real issue was California. If Nevada was able to weaken the 
Law of the River, this might then provide California with the opportunity to seek 
additional changes to the existing legal regime. 32 From Lochhead’s point of view, the 
only thing protecting Colorado’s river allocation was the Law of the River. The State 
of Colorado was therefore extremely sensitive to any action that could potentially 
weaken the Law of the River. While Lochhead closed with the assurance that 
“Colorado recognizes the legitimate future needs of southern Nevada for additional 
long-term water supplies and desires to work cooperatively with Nevada to assure that 
need is satisfied,” the fact of the matter was, Colorado was prepared to sacrifice 
Nevada to keep California’s Colorado River ambitions at bay.33  
Several years after the water summit Lochhead penned a two-part article titled 
“An Upper Basin Perspective on California’s Claims to Water from the Colorado 
River.” In it he argues in favor of the existing regime. Lochhead explains that 
Colorado’s primary concern at the time of the Water Summit was California’s 
potential to alter allocation levels under the Law of the River. Lochhead’s fears were 
understandable given California’s political power. California possessed more 
members of Congress than the rest of the Colorado River Basin states combined. This 
article provides some context to understand how Colorado official’s suspicions over 
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California’s ambitions negatively affected the SNWA’s efforts to get more water for 
Las Vegas. 
Lochhead’s argument was not without its flaws. While Lochhead and the other 
representatives insisted they wanted to assist Nevada, they added the caveat that all 
parties involved adhere to the Law of the River in these efforts. Nevada’s unique 
situation within the Colorado River Basin undermines the logical basis of Lochhead’s 
assertions. Not only did Nevada possess the smallest allocation of any state, it also 
had no sizeable agricultural sector. Every other Colorado River Basin state possessed 
a significant agricultural sector, one that consumed a majority of the state’s Colorado 
River allocation. This agricultural sector created what southern Nevada water 
managers called an agricultural buffer. In other states, especially California, 
Colorado, and Arizona, urban water managers could, in times of shortage, purchase 
water from agricultural interests. In the early 1990s the Colorado River Commission 
emphasized this condition during early regional negotiations for the Colorado River.34  
It was, in fact, a bit of a sticking point for the Colorado River Commission, 
whose members asserted that Nevada would not accept a lower allocation during 
times of shortage “if other states in the basin continued to use water for agriculture.”35 
Nevada’s water managers knew that agriculture accounted for over eighty percent of 
the water consumed in the Colorado River Basin. Its economic return, however, could 
not compare with that of the region’s urban areas. Given this wide inequity the CRC 
and SNWA have remained opposed to sharing in shortages with California and 
Arizona when regional agricultural interests remained flush with water. 
In the period following the Water Summit, SNWA officials realized that if 
they hoped to make any progress in water acquisition efforts, it would have to craft 
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policy in accordance with the Law of the River. This meant the Authority would have 
to become a partner with water agencies in the other Basin states. The regional 
opposition to the SNWA’s best hope – water marketing schemes in the Upper Basin – 
was simply insurmountable. Mulroy and the SNWA board realized that the Authority 
did not have the political and financial capital to wage a legal campaign against the 
Basin states. Especially since success was not guaranteed. There was speculation 
among various media that since the other Basin states seemed unwilling to help, the 
SNWA could initiate a lawsuit in the fashion of Arizona v. California in the hopes 
that the Supreme Court would reallocate a greater portion of the Colorado to 
Nevada.36 This, however, was probably not something the SNWA was fully prepared 
to do. Doug Grant, an attorney who assisted the SNWA during Colorado River 
negotiations, explains that altering the terms of an interstate water compact are 
extremely difficult.37 He states that even though Nevada had the option to seek 
redress for a Colorado River reallocation through Congress, California’s 
congressional delegation alone (as of 2010, fifty-three representatives as opposed to 
Nevada’s three) could prevent any movement on that front; therefore, the prospects 
for a congressionally sanctioned reallocation were “extremely poor.”38 
Nevada might have found a more sympathetic audience in the Supreme Court; 
however, seeking its assistance was not without risk. As the Arizona vs. California 
case shows, interstate legal conflicts could last decades. Arizona actually began suing 
California in the 1930s. It took until 1963 for the Supreme Court to finally settle the 
issue of Arizona’s Colorado River allocation. It was unlikely that the Court would 
alter the existing arrangement unless the SNWA had “met its duty to take reasonable 
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steps to conserve and augment its existing water supply.”39 In the early 1990s, the 
SNWA had not yet met this obligation. 
Considering the SNWA’s political situation, Mulroy realized that the SNWA 
could not accept the financial risk of a drawn out legal battle, one with an uncertain 
outcome. It was not simply a matter of finances, however, that influenced Mulroy’s 
views on strategy. Mulroy considered the establishment of federal control over water 
rights in the Lower Basin the most consequential result of Arizona v. California. From 
Mulroy’s point of view, the Supreme Court seriously limited the Lower Basin state’s 
ability to address water resource challenges, and that turning to the federal 
government in the future would likely restrict them even further. These challenges 
compelled Mulroy to adopt a new strategy. As she later came to say, “the Compact 
allows seven states to do whatever seven states can agree to do.” Rather than work 
against the other Basin states, therefore, the SNWA would instead initiate interstate 
collaboration efforts to address Nevada’s water needs.40   
The SNWA’s first step in this direction was to create a citizen’s advisory 
committee, the Integrated Resource Planning Advisory Committee (IRPAC). This 
was the same committee that also assisted the SNWA in establishing the sales tax 
initiative. The IRPAC met for two years to assist the SNWA in creating policy. The 
advisory committee’s initial task was to identify and recommend viable resource 
options, as well as finding a way to fund the Capital Improvement Project (CIP; 
Chapter 3). One of their primary recommendations was for the SNWA to shift focus 
away from the Virgin River and east-central Nevada groundwater and reorient its 
focus to the Colorado River.  
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The greatest concern to the committee was the financial and environmental 
cost of developing east-central Nevada’s groundwater basins and the Virgin River. 
The committee realized it would be far less expensive if the SNWA could gain access 
to additional Colorado River water since most of the infrastructure for that resource 
was already in place. Despite the political difficulties already mentioned, the 
Colorado River remained the least expensive option for the SNWA. The advisory 
committee recommended that the SNWA “place top priority on development of 
Colorado River water to meet future water demands over development of a Virgin 
River pipeline or a Cooperative Water Project.”41 These recommendations 
paradoxically led the SNWA to pursue what initially seemed an unlikely source: a 
groundwater storage agreement with the state of Arizona.  
Knowledge about the potential to store water underground had existed in 
southern Nevada since as early as the 1960s. That decade, geologists determined that 
the groundwater basins underlying the metro-area could be turned into natural storage 
structures. Interest in groundwater storage came about as a result of the strictures of 
the Law of the River and the desire to store Nevada’s unused apportionment for lean 
times. In 1979 officials with the Desert Research Institute of Nevada stated that it 
would be ideal if the state could store unused portions of its allocation in Lake Mead. 
This was by far the easiest place to store unused water. These same officials, realizing 
the Law of the River prohibited such a plan, lamented that Nevada’s “unused 
allotment in any year can not be carried over to a succeeding year and thus is lost 
forever to the State.” They estimated that between 1980 and 2000 the state would lose 
in total between 1.5 and 2.85 million acre-feet of water because it could not store its 
unused allocation.42  
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Though there was sufficient groundwater to support Las Vegas’s population 
growth into the 1970s, LVVWD officials realized at least two decades prior that they 
would need to begin using Colorado River water to support the city. Mass subsidence 
had occurred in many locations throughout the Las Vegas Valley during the 1950s 
and 1960s, as overdrawn groundwater basins began to collapse. This was a visual 
reminder that the metro-area was in need of a new water source, which it received 
when the SNWS was completed in 1971. That year the District shifted almost entirely 
from groundwater to Colorado River water. After the transfer to Colorado River 
water, local water planners were convinced they would have enough water for the 
next three decades.43 
Despite the Colorado River’s apparent plentitude, by the 1980s local agencies 
were once again looking to use groundwater. That decade the metro-area had grown 
by over 300,000 people, to the point that even Colorado River supplies were 
becoming stressed during the hot summer months. The LVVWD and North Las 
Vegas thus began to consider once again utilizing groundwater to meet this increased 
demand.44 However, the groundwater basins were depleted and pumping from them 
could have led to further subsidence. To avoid this calamity, beginning in 1987 the 
LVVWD and the City of North Las Vegas began a program of artificially recharging 
the valley’s aquifers with Nevada’s unused Colorado River apportionment during the 
low-demand winter months, and then withdrawing this water in the summer.45  
These early efforts served as precedents for Southern Nevada water managers 
who began to see increased potential for groundwater storage. Locally, however, this 
program had limitations. The Las Vegas Valley’s geology, for one, presented 
challenges. Most of the area is underlain with caliche, a type of sedimentary rock 
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formed when particles of limestone fuse together into a naturally occurring cement. In 
order to access the groundwater basin underneath the Las Vegas Valley, engineers 
needed to drill through the caliche and then use pumps to inject water into the aquifer, 
a time consuming and laborious process.46 There were also issues with the purity of 
the water once it was stored. District engineers intended to store Colorado River water 
in the underground aquifers. However, the PH balance of river water differed from 
existing groundwater. When LVVWD engineers began pumping Colorado River 
water into the aquifers the interaction of the two water sources caused minerals in the 
aquifer to dissolve, threatening the quality of the water.47 These challenges, at least in 
part, inspired the SNWA to approach Arizona during the early 1990s about banking 
water in that state.  
There were a number of additional factors compelling the SNWA to discuss 
groundwater banking with Arizona. The first had to do with the Copper State’s 
geology. Within Arizona, geological conditions were more favorable for groundwater 
storage than in the Las Vegas Valley. Large aquifers existed throughout the south-
central portion of the state, and were easily accessible. There was no need to pump 
water into these groundwater basins. Unlike in Las Vegas, a location that required 
pumps, engineers in Arizona merely had to let water flow into designated holding 
basins, and the water would simply percolate into the groundwater basins below.   
The second reason was that the surplus water that the SNWA had hoped to 
access was in danger of disappearing. The Law of the River held that states in the 
Lower Basin could use another state’s unused allocation. During the 1990s Arizona 
was only using about half of its Colorado River allocation. The SNWA (and 
California) thus began planning to use this water for its future water needs. Arizona 
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viewed this as a threat to its allocation. In order to protect this water, Arizona planned 
to bank its entire allocation each year in its aquifers.48  
In 1996 the Arizona Legislature looked to increase the state’s ability to store 
water. Of interest to the legislature was the fact that California and Nevada were 
becoming increasingly reliant upon Arizona’s unused allocation.49 Arizona lawmakers 
viewed this encroachment as the basis for a potential legal challenge from California 
to increase its Colorado River allocation. They had good reason for concern. 
Historical use of water has provided a compelling legal argument in water claims 
lawsuits. Indeed, historical use most often refers to the earliest user of a water source, 
which in turn forms the basis for the American West’s predominant water law, the 
appropriation doctrine. In reaction to California’s continued overuse, the Arizona 
Legislature created the Arizona Water Banking Authority (AWBA). This agency 
would pump the remainder of Arizona’s allocation through the Central Arizona 
Project and into the vast network of underground storage basins located throughout 
the central part of the state. Protection of Arizona’s Colorado River allocation was the 
primary goal of the groundwater storage project, but this protection would be costly. 
The CAP was going to cost Arizona at least 1.65 billion dollars.50  
A second consideration for Arizona’s lawmakers was the state of Arizona’s 
agricultural economy. In the early 1990s, Arizona’s agricultural sector, specifically in 
the area of cotton production, was in an economically depressed condition. Cotton 
growers faced increased global supply, costly increases in water rates, and 
competition for land by urban interests. This combination of factors contributed to 
declining rates of cotton production throughout the decade, which in turn decreased 
demand for water for agriculture.51 This presented a problem to Arizona lawmakers, 
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since the CAP was built to bring water to farmers, and these farmers would in turn 
help pay for the CAP. In 1993, however, several Arizona irrigation districts were 
unable to pay for their water, risking default.52 The threat of multiple irrigation 
districts facing bankruptcy compelled Arizona Governor Fife Symington to seek a 
way out of this predicament. The governor’s advisory committee recommended that 
the state government begin seeking ways to market CAP water, and it was from this 
that lawmakers created AWBA. If Arizona could bank water for other states for a fee, 
this would in turn provide funds the to subsidize farmers and ease them through the 
economic crisis. For Symington and others, ensuring enough water for agricultural 
usage was paramount. First, it would pay for the CAP; second, by keeping farmers in 
water, it would help justify the state’s claim to the Colorado River. For Symington 
and his colleagues, the equation was simple: if the state could not pay for the CAP, 
then it could not protect its allocation from California. The creation of AWBA was 
therefore largely a defensive maneuver. Nevertheless, lawmakers, sensing 
opportunity, included a provision that would allow California and Nevada to bank 
water in Arizona in exchange for cash payment. The deal could potentially help 
Arizona repay one fifth of CAP costs.53  
For the SNWA’s part, it approached Arizona in order to solidify its resource 
options from a legal standpoint. The SNWA was initially incensed over the creation 
of AWBA. Clark County Commissioner and SNWA board member Christensen 
stated the Arizona Legislature was essentially “spilling their milk on the ground so 
nobody else drinks it.”54 Mulroy declared that Arizona’s action dried “up the free 
water that [was] available to California and Nevada out of Arizona’s share sooner 
than it would have during the normal course of water development in Arizona.” 
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However, the SNWA’s view changed dramatically over the next year. When Mulroy 
addressed the SNWA board in February 1997 she explained that the creation of 
AWBA would ultimately offer the SNWA a more secure resource: “The positive side 
of the bill is the rapid progression of discussions with Arizona on participation in the 
Banking Authority and the commitment from the secretary of Interior, Bruce Babbitt, 
to expedite the process so Nevada can bank water as soon as possible.”55  
News that Secretary Babbitt was going to specifically address Las Vegas’s 
water needs in coming negotiations was a welcome development for SNWA officials. 
By 1997, regional discussions over the Colorado River had stalled because of internal 
political conflicts in California. The presence of a federal mediator in regional water 
negotiations could only strengthen the SNWA’s case that it needed more water.56  
Negotiations ensued between Arizona and Nevada following the board 
meeting. A key topic during these initial discussions was the length of time Nevada 
expected to be able to use the Arizona groundwater bank. Representatives of Arizona 
needed assurances from the SNWA that it would not become reliant upon banked 
water for the long term. They explicitly asked the SNWA “what are you going to do 
when this source [banked water] is gone?”57 The reason for this was simple: Arizona 
wanted to avoid providing Nevada with a legal justification for altering the Lower 
Basin state’s allocation levels. In reply, the SNWA pointed to its Cooperative Water 
Project, the water development plan that local water agencies had been working on 
since 1989. This provided the guarantee Arizona needed to begin groundwater-
banking negotiations.  
Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt had grown increasingly supportive of 
Nevada’s struggle to find more water. The previous year (1996), Babbitt publically 
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declared his support for Nevada and Arizona’s efforts to establish an interstate 
groundwater banking agreement.58 Since 1992, Babbitt had been involved in regional 
discussions over the Colorado River, discussions that by 1996 had ground to a halt. 
Since 1991, California had been trying to negotiate an internal political agreement 
among the state’s four agricultural districts and two urban water utilities with 
contracts for Colorado River water.59 Tensions between Southern California’s 
agricultural and urban interests were high throughout the decade, which contributed to 
the defeat of several Colorado River management initiatives brought about by the 
other Basin states and federal government.60 The other Basin states wanted California 
to decrease its use to its 4.4 million acre-foot allocation.  
During the 1995 Colorado River Water Users Association meeting in Las 
Vegas, Babbitt stated he would approve a groundwater banking deal between Arizona 
and Nevada. Frustrated with California’s lack of progress, Babbitt lent support for the 
agreement between Arizona and Nevada, in part, to spur California to resolve its 
internal political battles. Babbitt reasoned that when Arizona began banking its entire 
allocation, this would reduce the amount of water available to California. It was thus 
in California’s best interest to reach a political agreement to decrease its use of the 
Colorado River as quickly as possible to avoid undue stress to the state’s agricultural 
and urban areas.61  
Babbitt’s support for the SNWA marked a significant departure from his 
earlier stance. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, as a private citizen Babbitt 
represented Nevada rural interests in their fight against the CWP. His view shifted, 
however, five years into his tenure as Interior Secretary. Instead of attacking Las 
Vegas, he became a self-professed “advocate” for the metro-area and set about 
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finding a solution to its water shortage.62 As Interior Secretary, Babbitt was beholden 
to a broad political constituency. He began to gain a deeper understanding of the 
interconnectedness of interests within the Colorado River Basin, and realized the 
SNWA pursued the CWP in part because it was unable to get more water from the 
Colorado River. He could no longer ignore the challenges Arizona and Nevada faced, 
nor could he ignore California’s continued overuse of the river, a practice that, as far 
as Babbitt was concerned, occurred at the expense of the rest of the Basin states.  
In 1989 Babbitt viewed SNWA efforts to obtain groundwater from east-
central Nevada as a contest strictly between Las Vegas and the state’s rural 
communities. His conception of the situation evolved after he became Secretary of the 
Interior. From his vantage point at the national level, Babbitt could see that Las Vegas 
faced a difficult situation. Babbitt knew the Law of the River placed unique 
challenges upon Las Vegas, and that it was unlikely the SNWA could succeed in 
obtaining more water for Las Vegas without the help of a federal intermediary. 
California’s continued overuse of the Colorado would not stop unless an entity with 
greater political power forced it to do so. Explaining his rationale, Babbitt expressed 
that his “close-up view of Nevada’s problems strengthened his commitment to 
loosening the restrictions that prevented flexible use of Colorado River water.” He 
mentioned as much to Mulroy, stating that he would “solve southern Nevada’s 
problem with Colorado River water.” According to Mulroy, Babbitt “was always a 
firm believer that change needed to occur along the Colorado River.”63 With the 
blessing of the Secretary of the Interior, Arizona and Nevada began preliminary 
negotiations in 1996 over a groundwater storage agreement.  
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Meanwhile, the SNWA quietly continued to secure its Virgin River claim. The 
SNWA’s larger goal on this front was to continue pushing the wheeling concept. The 
SNWA had to continue developing the Virgin River to maintain the threat that it 
would build a pipeline from the river to the metro-area. The SNWA Board’s 1993 
Virgin River claims were intended as a demonstration for Basin states and federal 
government that the Authority was serious about its plans.64 From that point forward 
the Authority continued to methodically lay the groundwork needed to force the 
wheeling issue. Between 1997 and 2000 the SNWA purchased agricultural water 
rights on the Virgin River and then traded these rights with the Virgin Valley Water 
District (VVWD), the water utility that served the small town of Mesquite, located on 
the Virgin River. The SNWA was able to negotiate a deal in which it traded its more 
recently acquired rights to the Virgin River for those the VVWD possessed since 
before the 1929 Boulder Canyon Act. These older rights were not subject to the Law 
of the River, which gave the SNWA a stronger legal claim to the Virgin.65 When the 
Supreme Court ruled that a state possessed rights to its tributaries, it stipulated that 
these rights were contingent upon the state having claims that predated the Boulder 
Canyon Act.66 However, until the SNWA broke ground on a pipeline project, the 
Basin states could continue to call the Authority’s bluff. 
In 2001, the Federal Government established guidelines for interstate banking 
and in December of that year, Secretary Babbitt declared that Arizona and Nevada 
could begin official negotiations.67 By this point, engineers from the two states had 
already worked out the logistical and technological aspects of the project. It was 
therefore only a matter of deciding how much water would be stored and how much 
money the service would cost. Under the terms of the agreement Nevada would pay 
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Arizona 170 million dollars to store 1.2 million acre-feet of water. Of this amount, 
Nevada could withdraw up to 100,000 acre-feet in one year.68  
The onset of negotiations between Arizona and Nevada represented the first 
example of interstate water trading in the history of the Colorado River Basin. 
Reacting to news over the agreement’s success, an elated Mulroy said, “This was a 
very good day for Nevada. For the next couple of decades, we're in very good 
shape.”69 Mulroy’s good feelings would be short-lived. In what could only be 
considered the cruelest of ironies by Nevada and Arizona’s water managers, the 
Colorado River Basin entered into the driest period on record. At first, the SNWA 
hoped this would be a temporary event. But it soon became apparent that the 2001 
drought was not only the worst since record keeping began in the Basin, it was one of 
the worst in the past several centuries.70 Paleo-data indicates that the Colorado River 
Basin has experienced numerous prolonged droughts that have lasted as long as 
several decades.71 Archaeologists believe one of these droughts actually helped bring 
about the ultimate collapse of the Anasazi existed in the American Southwest during 
the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. The onset of drought was not something the 
SNWA, Arizona, or Secretary Babbitt anticipated. Indeed, these banking negotiations 
centered on Colorado River surpluses. The situation changed in less than a year, and 
instead of sharing surpluses, water mangers throughout the entire Colorado River 
basin began to wonder if they would have to share shortages.  
A further irony for the SNWA was that ever since the 1993 Water Summit, the 
Authority had worked to obtain additional water in ways consistent with the Law of 
the River. When the SNWA finally gained the right to additional water from the 
Colorado River, this water disappeared. In Mulroy’s words, “No sooner had the ink 
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dried on the river system’s various surplus agreements than they became largely 
obsolete as a result of the drought.”72 
 While the Basin states and federal government engaged in a new round of 
negotiations, again to pressure California to use less Colorado River water, the 
SNWA simultaneously pursued its own strategy to deal with the drought. In the early 
2000s the SNWA reinitiated its Virgin River development program and its 
Cooperative Water Project. Both programs had lain dormant as a result of the 
SNWA’s success in achieving a groundwater banking agreement. However, as a 
result of the drought and the lack of surplus Colorado River water the SNWA had to 
find other options in a relatively short amount of time.  
To help meet the challenge, in 2004 the SNWA commissioned a second 
citizens advisory committee to help the Authority decide upon a course of action. This 
time comprised of twenty-nine stakeholder representatives, which included civic 
leaders from the Las Vegas metro area as well as from outlying communities in 
Lincoln, Nye, and White Pine counties. The committee worked with the SNWA for 
over a year and in September 2005 finalized twenty-two recommendations.73 The 
most important recommendation was that the SNWA “Pursue development of all the 
resource options considered in the IWPAC planning scenarios.”74 In essence, the 
committee was urging the SNWA to pursue any and all water sources. For SNWA 
officials, the message was clear: the Authority had to re-initiate the Virgin River 
development plan. 
Some observers thought the SNWA’s Virgin River plan was a political ploy, 
meant to show the other Colorado River Basin states just how desperate the Authority 
was and the lengths to which it would go in order to get more water for the metro-
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area.75 Indeed, even within the Las Vegas water planning community there seemed to 
be an understanding that the Virgin River served as a bargaining chip to leverage a 
greater share of the Colorado River. A Colorado River Commission position paper 
from March, 1992 reads, “if it became obvious that Nevada was going to desalt and 
transport Virgin River water in southern Nevada the other states may back off because 
of the poor political position of forcing Nevada to spend huge amounts of money 
when they could take the water through Lake Mead and an addition to Southern 
Nevada Water System.” However, in a meeting later that year a CRC staff member 
indicated that southern Nevada needed to demonstrate that it would go forward with 
pipeline in order to ensure the threat’s effectiveness: “In spite of the fact that it 
doesn’t make economic or environmental sense, Nev. must demonstrate the 
willingness and ability to proceed with overland development of the Virgin (i.e., 
demonstrate additional depletion of the same order of magnitude will occur whether 
wheeling is permitted or not) before [we] can expect Calif. to agree to wheeling.”76 In 
other words, Nevada had to prove that it was willing to build a pipeline before the 
other Basin states would allow Nevada to wheel water through Lake Mead. Mulroy 
herself implied that the attempt to procure the Virgin River and east-central Nevada 
groundwater was in an effort to compel the rest of the Colorado River Basin to 
examine ways of increasing Las Vegas’s share of the Colorado River, stating that the 
“Virgin is the linchpin to the rest of the Colorado River.”77 
The SNWA hoped it would not come to that, but evidence suggests the 
Authority was willing to move forward with the project should its efforts fail. 
According to SNWA Deputy General Manager Kay Brothers, “if you had to have the 
water enough and that’s the only water around, you divert it, you treat it, and you 
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bring it to Las Vegas.”78 Brothers further explained that the SNWA’s “preference was 
to wheel it, but if you get to the point where you have to do it [build a pipeline], you’ll 
do it.”79 In 2005 the SNWA was still considering a pipeline because growth and an 
unyielding Law of the River were causing worry among SNWA staff that southern 
Nevada’s water supply would run out in a few years. During a presentation to the 
Department of Interior Mulroy indicated that she was fully prepared to go forward 
with the Virgin River development plan. She explained that the SNWA would either 
build a pipeline to convey water from the Virgin River fifty-five miles overland to 
Las Vegas, or that the Authority would wheel the water through Lake Mead. As she 
described it, she told the Department of Interior: “There are your options. You 
choose. I can go either way.”80 
In 2005, the other Basin states remained opposed to the Authority’s Virgin 
River development plan. By that point in history, however, the SNWA had become 
more politically powerful and had a stronger legal claim to the Virgin River. The 
SNWA realized it was in a favorable negotiating position. According to one SNWA 
official, the Authority offered a trade to the Basin states: “since the SNWA was 
already going to spend money to get the Virgin River, it could also give the money to 
the Basin States to explore ways of getting 75,000 acre-feet to Vegas by other means. 
If the Basin agreed to get water to the SNWA, the SNWA would provide money for 
the study.”81 A small caveat to this proposal was that the SNWA would gain access to 
a small amount of Virgin River water, which it could wheel through Lake Mead. The 
Basin states agreed to this proposal in 2007, and in 2008 the SNWA withdrew 10,000 
acre-feet of Virgin River water from its Lake Mead intake, marking the first time ever 
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that Nevada had obtained water from the Colorado River above and separate from its 
basic allocation.82 
While gaining access to the Virgin River was an important political 
achievement for the SNWA, the Basin states provided another, equally consequential 
concession: they agreed to allow the SNWA to use its in-state groundwater resources 
for return flow credits from the Colorado River. In other words, when the SNWA 
began to pump groundwater from east-central Nevada, the Authority could treat this 
water, send it to Lake Mead for return flow credits and increase the amount of water 
available to the Authority by a factor of 1.7.83 Under this scenario, if the Authority 
obtained 30,000 acre-feet of groundwater, it would also obtain rights to 21,000 
additional acre-feet per year through return flow credits. This greatly increased the 
viability of the SNWA groundwater development project, and it also held the prospect 
of introducing more water into the stressed Colorado River system.  
It is unlikely that either the Virgin River Development Plan or the Arizona 
Groundwater Banking Agreement would have come to pass had the SNWA not 
engaged in an earlier process of power consolidation. Both efforts required interstate 
and federal interactions, and the SNWA simply would not have been a prominent 
player in the process had it not possessed local, county, and state level power. While 
this composition proved effective in an interstate context, it has also made the SNWA 
well suited for in-state water projects as well. In 1989 when the SNWA applied for 
Virgin River rights, it simultaneously applied for groundwater rights in east-central 
Nevada. Since that time, the SNWA has been methodically pursuing these 
groundwater stores. While many critics depict the SNWA’s campaign as a contest 
between a large metropolitan area and in-state rural communities, the reality is that 
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this groundwater also has a Colorado River component. As noted above, the water the 
SNWA obtains from these aquifers will be pumped into the Colorado River, thus 
increasing the Authority’s return flow credits. As we will see in the next chapter, even 
Great Basin groundwater is ultimately tied to the Law of the River. 
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CHAPTER 6 | THE LAST, WORST OPTION: THE SNWA RURAL COUNTIES 
GROUNDWATER DEVELOPMENT PLAN. 
 
As the previous chapters have shown, the SNWA spent the better part of the 
1990s exploring political strategies for obtaining a greater share of the Colorado 
River. In 2004, Mulroy and other SNWA officials certainly continued to hold out 
hope. However, the drought was making this possibility increasingly unlikely. Indeed, 
it was becoming apparent to Mulroy that Secretary of Interior Gale Norton might even 
decrease Nevada’s Colorado River consumption by as much as 18,000 acre-feet per 
year.1 Under the Law of the River, if shortages occurred on the Colorado River, 
Arizona and Nevada would have to curtail their consumption, and California would 
be held to its 4.4 million acre-foot allocation. As local and regional demand for the 
Colorado River increased, the SNWA’s chances to increase its allocation decreased.  
The SNWA needed a backup plan. As a result, the SNWA decided to 
revitalize a groundwater-pumping project that had its roots back in 1989 (fig. 1). That 
year, the Las Vegas Valley Water District applied for groundwater rights in thirty 
desert valleys located in east-central Nevada, most of which lay in Lincoln and White 
Pine Counties. The amount of water the LVVWD applied for alarmed many rural 
residents—nearly 850,000 acre feet, an amount equivalent to nearly three times the 
state’s yearly Colorado River allocation.2 Originally called the Cooperative Water 
Project (CWP), by 2006 the SNWA had renamed the project the Clark, Lincoln, and 
White Pine Counties Groundwater Development Project (GDWP). However, most 
observers simply refer to the project as the SNWA pipeline. Additionally, the amount 
the Authority was seeking had dropped to 137,000 acre-feet per year.3 This decreased 
amount did not elicit a corresponding decrease in the protests, however. Rural 
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residents, as well as lawmakers in the neighboring state of Utah began to wage a 
coordinated legal and public relations campaign against the SNWA pipeline.  
Opponents of the GWDP have routinely portrayed the project as a contest 
strictly between residents of rural Nevada and Las Vegas. This David versus Goliath 
depiction has given the rural residents outsized influence in their struggle to resist the 
GWDP. They have solicited the public’s sympathy by shrewdly utilizing western 
ranching iconography, presenting the rural residents of east-central Nevada as rugged 
individualists resisting an immoral conqueror in the form of Las Vegas. Despite the 
rather skillful manipulation of this imagery, it is unclear whether the ranching 
communities of east-central Nevada will ultimately be able to withstand the SNWA’s 
ambitions. For the Colorado River remains the central factor in the GWDP.  
Despite the opposition’s insistence that the GWDP is a contest between 
ranchers and Las Vegas, the reality of the situation is that the SNWA is pursuing 
groundwater in east-central Nevada because it cannot get more water from the 
Colorado River. And the reason it cannot get more is because over twenty-five 
million people in the American Southwest rely on the Colorado River.4 The more 
people who rely on the Colorado, the less likely it is that Nevada will receive 
additional water from the river. This number sharply contrasts with the number of 
people reliant upon groundwater in east-central Nevada: less than five hundred.5  
Given this striking disparity, it is almost inevitable that the GWDP will eventually 
move forward.  
Opponents often portray Las Vegas as a city that should not exist, by virtue of 
its location in a harsh desert environment. This characterization, however, ignores 
examples, both past and present, of cities that exist in challenging environmental 
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settings. Indeed, the first cities on earth emerged from the desert landscape of 
Mesopotamia ten thousand years ago. For just as long societies have extended water 
infrastructure into their hinterlands. Historical examples include Rome, Jerusalem, 
Baghdad, Mecca, as well as dozens of other settlements throughout the ancient 
Middle East and the Indus Valley of India.6 Furthermore, desert cities are not the only 
cities that tap distant water sources; Boston, Massachusetts; Portland, Oregon; Seattle, 
Washington; and Atlanta, Georgia also obtain their drinking water from regional, non-
local resources. The fact is, virtually every city in every era and in every environment 
has built an urban water conveyance system that brings water into the urbanized area 
from some other location. Las Vegas is merely one of the latest to do so.   
As of 2014, however, the GWDP exists only as a concept. The SNWA has 
built very little in the way of physical infrastructure into the affected counties. The 
GWDP campaign has instead been one largely of a legal nature. Since 1989 the 
SNWA has been laying the legal groundwork – securing rights-of-way over federal 
land, purchasing water rights, and waging court battles against pipeline opponents – 
in anticipation of the day it is able to begin building its pipeline. This chapter is about 
that story.  
 
Dusting off the Old Plan: the “re” Initiation of the Pipeline 
In 2004, the SNWA re-initiated a decade-long dormant plan to pump 
groundwater from valleys in east-central Nevada, some 250 miles north of the Las 
Vegas metro-area. The project was estimated to cost nearly four billion dollars, had 
the potential to destroy vital fish habitat, and it was not clear how long the water 
supply would last once pumping began. In addition to these issues, the SNWA faced 
significant opposition from in-state constituencies, as well as from the state of Utah. 
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At the time of writing, the SNWA is vigorously pursuing the pipeline project. Why is 
the SNWA willing to pursue this politically difficult pipeline project? As with almost 
every aspect of SNWA water policy, the answer lies in the Colorado River.  
 By 2004 the SNWA had obtained as much as it possibly could from the 
Colorado River. Despite Mulroy’s and Babbitt’s grand rhetoric over how the Arizona 
Groundwater Banking Agreement represented a malleable and responsive Law of the 
River, it must be remembered that it took the SNWA over a decade to obtain a 
comparatively small, and temporary, increase in Colorado River water. The same can 
be said about the ability to wheel Virgin River water through Lake Mead in 2007; 
these agreements represented minor alterations that did not threaten the fundamental 
tenets of the Law of the River.   
During the course of the 1990s, pressure on the Colorado River steadily 
increased, especially within the Lower Basin. Agriculture continued to use seventy-
five percent of the river, and the urban populations of Southern California, the Las 
Vegas metro-area, and Arizona grew by nearly four million people.7 In the Las Vegas 
metro-area, developers built almost thirty resort casinos between 1990 and 2004, and 
the local population grew by over a million residents.8 Arizona had completed its 
Central Arizona Project (CAP) and began pumping the final 1.3 million of its 2.8-
million acre-foot Colorado River allocation, and California’s urban population and 
agricultural industry continued to consume water in excess of its yearly allocation. 
While these developments presented enormous challenges to water managers 
throughout the Colorado River Basin, they were not unexpected. The CAP had ben 
under construction since 1973 and the American West’s population had grown 
consistently since World War Two. One contingency that nobody, from the federal 
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down to the local level, had expected was drought. The last year of the decade marked 
the onset of a drought that by 2014 had not abated and that some climatologists are 
beginning to think could be one of the worst in the Colorado River Basin for the last 
eight centuries.9 In short, not only were more people withdrawing water from the 
Colorado River, but also less water was coming in.  
By 2004, each Basin state had become more reliant upon the Colorado River, 
and guarded their rights to it even more zealously.10 Arizona had, only ten years prior, 
completed the CAP, a massive investment of time as well as political and financial 
capital. To protect the state’s water and the CAP, in the midst of a drought, Arizona 
paradoxically had to use more water. If it did not withdraw its full allocation, CAP 
officials feared the state’s rights would come under threat.  
Additional pressure came as a result of California’s continued overuse. The 
other Basin states had pressured the federal government to decrease the amount 
available to the Golden State.11 In 2002, Secretary Norton declared there was no 
surplus on the Colorado River that year. California thus had to make do with its 4.4 
million acre-foot allotment. This caused significant problems within Southern 
California, in part the result of the 1931 Seven Part Agreement.  
This agreement apportioned California’s Colorado River allocation among in-
state users, to include agricultural districts in the Imperial Valley and coastal urban 
water districts. It stipulated that Imperial Valley agriculture interests had senior rights 
and were entitled to 3.85 million acre-feet of water, with the remainder (550,000 acre-
feet) going to urban areas between Los Angeles and San Diego.12 This amount was 
never enough for the urban areas; however, in 1931 it did not present a problem since 
urban centers were entitled to use any surpluses from the Colorado River, surpluses 
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that persisted every year until 2002. When Secretary Norton declared there was no 
surplus water left, Southern California’s agricultural interests chose not to share in the 
shortages – as was their right – leaving southern California’s cities to figure out how 
they were going to get by on the drastically reduced water supply.13 This combination 
of regional and state fights over Colorado River water further increased regional 
political tensions and served as a reminder to the SNWA that the acquisition of any 
additional Colorado River water was unlikely.  
 
The Beginning:  The Las Vegas Valley Water District’s 1989 Filings 
In 1989, the mood could be said to be one of near panic among the metro-
area’s water officials. The urban area was clearly growing at a rate that was 
impossible to keep up with. Housing tracts leapfrogged over one another, expanding 
across the Las Vegas Valley. Agencies like the LVVWD simply could not build the 
necessary infrastructure fast enough to keep pace with construction. In fact, it fell to 
the housing developers to put pipes in the ground and to build various components of 
urban water infrastructure. Out of necessity the LVVWD told developers to build 
their own water infrastructure, after which the District would reimburse them for their 
efforts and capital expenditure.14 With no way to acquire any additional water out of 
the Colorado River, LVVWD officials proposed a bold plan: to build a pipeline into 
the rural counties north of Las Vegas and tap the massive groundwater reserves 
known to be in the area.  
The idea for tapping Great Basin groundwater actually has a history stretching 
back as early as the 1960s. At that time, the Nevada State Engineer began conducting 
statewide water assessments, in part to plan for the water needs of the burgeoning Las 
Vegas metropolitan area. The State Engineer identified several areas around Las 
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Vegas that possessed significant groundwater stores including the Pahrump Valley 
and Amargosa Desert seventy miles to the city’s west, and the Pahranagat and 
Railroad Valleys fifty and seventy miles north respectively. While these locations 
possessed water, the State Engineer questioned their suitability as a viable urban 
water source, stating that the groundwater stores were finite and could not be mined 
indefinitely.15 
Between 1960 and 1989, various defense related studies indicated large 
sources of groundwater in Nye, Lincoln, and White Pine Counties, north of Las 
Vegas.16 Following the 1963 Aerial Test Ban Treaty the federal government began 
testing nuclear weapons underground at the Nevada Test Site, located some ninety 
miles northwest of Las Vegas. In preparation for these tests the Atomic Energy 
Commission conducted extensive surveys of the area, surveys that revealed 
significant sources of groundwater.17 Then, during the 1970s, the government began 
considering a strategy of placing nuclear ballistic missiles at various sites throughout 
the Great Basin Desert of Nevada and Utah. The reconnaissance of suitable sites 
yielded further evidence of large-scale groundwater stores in the east-central parts of 
Nevada.18 
In 1979, President Jimmy Carter initiated a plan to deploy a new type of 
nuclear weapon – the MX or “Missile Experimental” – in the Great Basin. The plan 
called for the construction of 4,600 individual launch sites, between which trucks and 
trains would shuttle missiles. The strategic principle behind this “race track” system 
was already in use with the United States’ nuclear missile submarine fleet, in which 
Carter had served as a nuclear weapons officer. The mobility and secret location of 
these submarines decreased the likelihood that they would all be eliminated in a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
172 
Soviet first response. Carter hoped to emulate the strategic characteristics of 
America’s nuclear submarine fleet with the MX system. In preparation for the project, 
the United States Air Force funded extensive geological tests throughout the affected 
region, in part to ascertain groundwater resources. Each of the MX missile 
installations would require water, initially for construction, and later for maintenance 
and staffing.19  
The Nevada State Engineer insisted upon being part of the process based on 
concerns over potential contamination of a water resource belonging to the state, and 
also the relationship between ground and surface water. Great Basin ranchers often 
relied on artesian springs to support their cattle operations. The state engineer 
suspected that Air Force use of water at MX sites had the potential to decrease, or 
even eliminate, water flow to springs.  
The surveys revealed a significant amount of groundwater in the region – 
certainly enough to support many MX sites. However, in 1981, President Ronald 
Reagan withdrew funding for the MX missile, which effectively killed the program. 
Reagan asserted the costs of the project were too high, and the “race track” system 
unlikely to withstand a nuclear attack.  
Air Force studies revealed an enormous groundwater reserve in east central 
Nevada, information that became part of the public domain and helped provide the 
technical foundation upon which the LVVWD based its 1989 groundwater 
applications. By that point, the Las Vegas metro area had become large enough to 
require an additional source of water. And so, on October 17, 1989, the LVVWD 
applied for groundwater rights in White Pine and Lincoln Counties for 800,000 acre-
feet per year.20 When this happened, Las Vegas took its place alongside countless 
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other cities, both contemporary and historical, who looked beyond their immediate 
surroundings for water to provide to their citizenry.    
 
The SNWA’s Colorado River Phase 
Between the LVVWD’s 1989 applications and 2004, the SNWA focused 
mainly on various Colorado River issues, such as establishing the groundwater 
banking agreement with Arizona and lobbying the other Basin states to allow for 
Virgin River wheeling. SNWA officials also began the process of building the 
necessary infrastructure in the Las Vegas Valley to handle the additional water it 
expected from the groundwater bank and Virgin River. Throughout all of this, the 
Authority was steadily solidifying its political power through the Paradigm Shift and 
CRC restructuring campaign. These successes prompted Mulroy – a one-time fierce 
opponent of the Law of the River – to reverse her position and instead emphasize the 
latitude the LOR afforded the SNWA. “My experiences on the Colorado River and in 
southern Nevada,” Mulroy declared, “have taught me that many of our most difficult 
water issues can be resolved if everyone is willing to work together, take the time to 
understand one another's point of view, and share in the occasional tradeoffs 
necessary to achieve meaningful, long-lasting outcomes.”21 
The fact remained, however, that the Law of the River remained resistant to 
fundamental change. Groundwater banking reserves and Virgin River water were 
temporary measures at best. The SNWA, therefore, continued to develop the pipeline 
project because ultimately the Basin states were not going to provide Las Vegas any 
more Colorado River water. Arizona was unwilling to allow the SNWA to use its 
groundwater basins as anything more than temporary resources, and Colorado resisted 
any attempt to market water from the Upper Basin to the lower.  
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The GWDP actually represents the inability of the SNWA to increase its 
Colorado River allocation and the rigidity of the Law of the River. If the LOR were 
more malleable, then the SNWA would not have had to pursue in-state groundwater. 
Proponents of the various Colorado River agreements extoll the accomplishments of 
the states involved, and effusively praise the “latitude” the LOR provides. This 
latitude is a mirage, however. The malleability only occurs because Nevada is 
introducing new water into the Colorado River system. And the permission the other 
Basin states gave the SNWA is not much of a concession in the first place. They 
allowed the SNWA to use Nevada’s own groundwater for return flow credits. These 
credits do not actually decrease the amount of water from the river system; on the 
contrary, they actually increase the amount of water available to the other Lower 
Basin states. The Basin states essentially granted permission to the SNWA to increase 
the amount of water for everyone else. This concession was not that significant, and it 
actually demonstrated the continued rigidity of the LOR. Despite the potential influx 
of water from east-central Nevada groundwater, the LOR remained fundamentally 
unchanged.  
As noted in the previous chapter, the Colorado River Basin entered a drought 
in 1999. This was a wakeup call for the SNWA, which had spent the past decade 
attempting to obtain a greater share of a river that, according to the most recent 
science, was only going to get smaller. In 2004, SNWA officials realized they would 
need to reconsider using in-state groundwater resources. The SNWA’s first step was 
to establish a strategy for the GWDP, and for this it once again turned to local citizens 
to aid in the process. The SNWA comprised a second advisory committee, the 
Integrated Water Planning Advisory Committee (IWPAC), to “assess alternatives and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
175 
develop general recommendations for the SNWA Board of Directors concerning the 
integration of in-state water resources into the water planning and management 
activities of southern Nevada.”22 Briefing the advisory committee, SNWA personnel 
explained that the region was experiencing an unprecedented drought that threatened 
not only southern Nevada’s, but also the entire region’s Colorado River supply.23 It 
was clear to both SNWA staff and the advisory committee that it would be nearly 
impossible to obtain any more Colorado River water. The SNWA reiterated the twin 
difficulties southern Nevada faced: that the metro-area was limited by the Law of the 
River to a small amount of Colorado River water, and that climate change further 
threatened the region’s water supply. SNWA staff explained that the committee was 
to consider all available resource options, but given the history of Colorado River 
politics, participants knew that east-central Nevada groundwater was going to be the 
primary focus. Authority staff instructed the Advisory Committee to create a 
comprehensive plan that used this groundwater along with conservation policies, and 
utilization of other sources such as the Colorado River and the Virgin River.  
The advisory committee comprised a cross-section of individuals from the 
metro-area representing a number of interests, including the gaming and housing 
industries, southern Nevada unions, environmental non-profits, senior citizen’s 
organizations, banking, the Las Vegas Paiute tribe, small business, as well as rural 
representatives from Lincoln, White Pine, and Nye County. Also included were a Las 
Vegas legislator, a representative of the governor, and a member of the Colorado 
River Commission.24 The committee took as their premise for the meetings that the 
Colorado River would remain the metro-area’s primary water supply, but that 
alternatives had to be found to augment that source. Indeed, it was the committee’s 
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concern that the Colorado was so threatened by climatological conditions that drove 
much of the discussion over the viability of various resource options. In 2004 the 
SNWA had in its possession, or had the potential to develop, groundwater in the Las 
Vegas Valley, the Virgin River, and the Arizona Groundwater Bank. But these 
sources would not provide enough of a resource base for long-term planning. 
Therefore, by necessity, SNWA officials also had to begin considering the use of 
groundwater from east-central Nevada.  
Southern Nevada water engineers had long been aware of several groundwater 
sources within Clark County. The two most prominent were located northeast of the 
metropolitan area in Coyote Springs, discovered during MX missile surveys in the 
1970s, and northwest of Las Vegas in the Three Lakes groundwater basin at the base 
of the Sheep Mountains. These two locations represented the closest groundwater 
sources for the SNWA to exploit; however, these basins were not rich sources of 
water. Both fell under the SNWA’s any-and-all strategy of resource acquisition. The 
Coyote Springs groundwater basin possessed 27,500 acre-feet of water and Three 
Lakes an additional 10,605, both modest amounts compared against the annual needs 
of the metro-area. The SNWA promptly acquired rights to these groundwater sources, 
but these initial sources served more as a stepping off point for the larger groundwater 
basins located north in Lincoln and White Pine Counties.  
The SNWA’s campaign to tap groundwater in Lincoln and White Pine 
counties occupied the greatest amount of time and elicited the most debate during the 
2004 IWPAC meetings. Under the parameters set forth by the SNWA, the advisory 
committee would examine the process of developing groundwater in either five or six 
valleys in east-central Nevada: Coyote Springs, Delamar, Dry Lake, Cave, Spring 
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Valleys, and possibly Snake Valley (fig.10). It was the SNWA’s intention to build a 
pipeline through Coyote Springs, Delamar, Dry Lake, and Cave Valleys, culminating 
in the Spring and Snake Valleys of White Pine County. These two valleys contained 
the greatest amount of groundwater of those under consideration.  
The reason the advisory committee had to examine both a five and six basin 
approach was because of political complications with Utah.25 The Snake Valley, the 
sixth under consideration, lay in both Utah and Nevada. Competing claims by the 
SNWA and Utah over the Snake Valley initiated a political dispute that has yet to be 
resolved. (I will return to the issue of this political dispute below.) First, let’s examine 
the geographical aspects of the GWDP located entirely within Nevada.  
While the IWPAC proceedings allowed the SNWA to create a more 
comprehensive strategy for overall water resource development, it also provided a 
forum for opponents of the GWDP to voice their concerns. These individuals 
consisted of ranchers, residents, and one elected official from east-central Nevada. At 
root, these people feared that the GWDP would bring about an end to their livelihood 
and way of life. As a result, they sought to derail the SNWA campaign by attacking it 
on a number of fronts. One theme that quickly emerged during IWPAC meetings was 
that opponents thought the SNWA was seeking to develop groundwater without first 
trying other options. Though the SNWA had in fact been seeking alternatives like 
Colorado River re-allocation, ocean desalination, and purchasing agricultural water 
rights in the Imperial Valley for at least ten years prior to turning its attention to east-
central Nevada groundwater, these efforts went largely unnoticed by GWDP 
opponents.  
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An additional argument was that the SNWA should work to renegotiate the 
Colorado River Compact. Glen Zelch, representative from Lincoln County, asked 
why “a reallocation of the Colorado River had not been included on the resource list.” 
And Peter Ford, a rural resident wrote to the IWPAC asking it to “please state your 
(SNWA’s) policy re: renegotiating the Colorado River compact.  I heard, in Baker, 
many excuses, but excuses do not make a policy.”26 These comments from Zelch and 
Ford demonstrate the centrality of the Colorado River to the overall SNWA water 
policy. From their residences in White Pine and Lincoln Counties, Zelch and Ford 
could look at a map and see that the obvious choice for the SNWA would be to take a 
greater amount of water from the Colorado River. The Las Vegas metro-area was, 
after all, virtually sited on the banks of the Colorado River. However, as we have seen 
in previous chapters, the SNWA, and CRC before it, had expended significant 
political capital trying to renegotiate a greater allocation of the Colorado River for 
Nevada, efforts that resulted in little reward. Indeed, the failure of the SNWA to 
obtain a greater Colorado River share directly led to the Authority’s GWDP 
campaign.  
Because of its experience in Colorado River negotiations during the previous 
thirteen years, by 2004, the SNWA had finally decided to take a different stance with 
respect to the Law of the River. The SNWA was no longer making public statements 
to the effect that the Law of the River should be renegotiated or that Nevada would 
seek redress with the Supreme Court over its Colorado River allocation.27 In reply to 
Zelch’s query, Kay Brothers, SNWA Deputy General Manager explained, “changes 
would take years to negotiate and may have extensive legal ramifications. Before any 
changes could occur, all of the seven basin states would have to agree.” She 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
179 
continued, “reopening the Compact could have serious consequences. For example, it 
might induce states to focus more on protecting their allocations, rather than working 
together on flexible solutions to ongoing problems, as is currently the case.”28 
For their part, the other Basin states had begun to press Nevada to develop in-
state resources before asking them for more Colorado River water.29 IWPAC member 
and Colorado River Commissioner Richard Bunker added to Brother’s explanation 
stating, “the state of Nevada and SNWA have pursued Colorado River resources and 
aggressively negotiated for flexibility on the River. While the SNWA and Colorado 
River Commission have been innovative and pushed the envelope over the course of 
the last ten years… there is little room for additional negotiations at this point without 
development of in-state resources.” Bunker concluded, “that Nevada was only 
successful in recent water banking negotiations because of the progress demonstrated 
by SNWA in its action to develop in-state resources.”30 
One of the obvious questions surrounding the GWDP was what happens if 
there is not enough water in the groundwater basins to support the GWDP? In 2005, 
scientific assessments of groundwater levels in east-central Nevada varied greatly. 
Opponents presented scientific viewpoints that indicated the levels of groundwater 
were not sufficient to support both the GWDP and ranching. The SNWA’s scientific 
reports, not surprisingly, indicated just the opposite.31 The lack of certainty was not 
lost on Zelch who asked the committee whether there was a “contingency plan” in 
place should there be insufficient water in east-central Nevada to justify the GWDP. 
In a revealing statement, demonstrating how deeply the GWDP factored into the 
regional political milieu, Bunker replied, “if the groundwater system is tested and 
found to be insufficient, then Nevada would be in a better position to ask the seven 
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states for more flexibility on the Colorado River.” He continued, stating, “after 
demonstrating a good faith attempt to develop in-state resources, Nevada would be in 
a better position to negotiate such options with the other basin states.”32  
Indeed, many critics and political insiders speculated that the pipeline project 
was ultimately a bluff meant to force the Basin states and federal government to give 
more Colorado River water to Las Vegas.33 If it proved there was not enough water in 
the groundwater basins to comprise a viable resource option for Las Vegas, the 
SNWA would most likely have gone back to the Basin States and insisted on a 
renegotiation of the allocations. Bunker’s argument was essentially that the SNWA 
was doing its due diligence, that it was exhausting all options before once again 
turning to the Colorado River for its salvation. The SNWA had achieved a greater, 
albeit temporary, increase in Colorado River water with the Arizona Groundwater 
Bank, but this was all that the Basin States were willing to concede until the SNWA 
looked to in-state water resources.34  
Zelch indicated that perhaps it was time to turn to the courts to assist Nevada 
in attaining an increased share of the Colorado River. This, however, further 
illustrated the rural opposition’s lack of understanding of the historical context on the 
matter. Nevada had actually attempted to increase its share using this method during 
the 1960s in the Arizona v. California court case. But at that time sufficient 
population in southern Nevada did not exist to sway the Supreme Court. Despite the 
steady population increase in southern Nevada during the next four decades, SNWA 
water mangers were still hesitant to turn to this method. According to Brothers the 
“SNWA has no intent to file a lawsuit to reopen the Colorado River Compact,” 
noting,  “that doing so would halt negotiations on the Colorado River for twenty years 
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or so while a lawsuit was underway and with no reassurance of a positive outcome.”35 
It took Arizona forty years to settle its legal differences with California; and even 
after the court ruled in 1963, Arizona had to accept a junior right to the Colorado 
River in order to obtain federal funds for the Central Arizona Project. As far as 
Arizona was concerned, its victory against California came with some major 
drawbacks. 
The SNWA realized this as well and was not interested in pursuing a legal 
option. Bunker explained, “that it is not in Nevada’s best interest to enter a lengthy 
legal process. The preferred approach is to pursue continued negotiations with the 
other basin states for flexibility.”36 Brothers added, “that under current conditions, 
opening the Compact may result in a lower water allocation for Nevada.” Though 
Zelch felt that  “the state couldn’t lose resources, since the allocations were unfair,” 
this was an untested theory. Since the time of the Compact negotiations, congress had 
enacted a number of environmental regulations, many of which had direct bearing on 
Colorado River management. It was entirely possibly that if the courts reopened the 
allocation process, not only Nevada, but each state in the Colorado Basin would lose 
water as the federal government reallocated water to environmental preservation 
efforts.37 
Pipeline opponents also pressed the SNWA to consider pursuing interstate 
transfers of Colorado River water. William Kogan, a resident of Lund, a small town in 
Lincoln County wrote to the SNWA stating, “the farmers in Imperial Valley, 
California have tried to sell to MWD and southern California a big surplus of water. 
They were turned down but were offered ten dollars per acre-foot to keep this offer 
open.  Why can’t SNWA and MWD-Southern California work together to switch 
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sources and utilize this water supply, so SNWA can take what is going to California 
and store in dam system as MWD did?”38 As it turned out, the SNWA already tried to 
do this in 1998. Mulroy and her staff attempted to establish a partnership with the 
MWD to share water between Nevada and California. Her actions, however, incited a 
potentially disastrous reaction from Arizona. Ever cautious about guarding its 
Colorado River allocation, the Governor of Arizona accused the SNWA and MWD of 
negotiating behind Arizona’s back and threatened to leave the multi-state negotiations 
occurring at that time. These were the negotiations that, among other things, helped 
lead to the Arizona Groundwater Banking Deal between Arizona and Nevada. It was 
paramount, therefore, that the SNWA avoid this type of unilateral deal-making in the 
future. Kogan failed to grasp the larger implications of his request, as well as the 
SNWA’s past efforts to establish just such an arrangement as he had proposed in his 
letter. 
The prospect of ocean desalination came up on several occasions during the 
course of the IWPAC process. Residents of White Pine and Lincoln County asked the 
SNWA what its position was on ocean desalination, and why the Authority was not 
doing more to pursue this option. In a written statement to the advisory committee, 
Jim Schlinkman, resident of Baker stated, “The facilitator threw out desalinization 
option too soon.  So what if it is more expensive?  Higher costs are a better option 
than ruining the resources and lifeways in Spring and Snake Valleys. Use ocean 
water!”39 
Ocean desalination has always been seen as a panacea for water short 
regions.40 Ocean water could conceivably serve as an inexhaustible resource, if only 
the technology were available to make it so. Las Vegas water managers had long 
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entertained the idea that at some point, technology would indeed make ocean water a 
viable resource option for the desert metropolis. It remains an illusory goal, though its 
promise proves irresistible.41 The SNWA’s argument against desalination centered on 
the fact that the process was energy intensive, suitable sites for desalination were 
either in California or Mexico – both over 250 miles away – had significant 
environmental downsides, and was more expensive than any other option under 
consideration. Mulroy and others within the SNWA were not optimistic about the 
chances for desalination in California. Given the environmental regulations in place, 
the SNWA would face considerable challenges building a desalination plant on the 
California coast.42 Mulroy also had concerns that desalination would actually do very 
little to alleviate southern Nevada’s water shortage. In the event that the two states 
could even establish an agreement, California would use water from desalination, 
which would enable Nevada to take a greater amount of water from the Colorado 
River. However, as far as Mulroy was concerned this defeated the purpose of an 
agreement since the Colorado River was already under threat. Even if there were a 
desalination plant, Las Vegas would still rely upon the Colorado River for its water, 
and the Colorado was in a drought. Desalination would provide no guarantee that 
Lake Mead would remain full, which is why the agency placed less emphasis on 
developing the desalination option.43 
Failure to recognize the need for an exchange agreement with California is 
common. But this is not the only example of ignorance. One individual wrote to the 
committee stating, “ocean water should be available to SNWA for desalination.  
Instead of building a facility in California, why couldn’t you pipe salt water to Las 
Vegas and have the desalination facility where the water will be used?”44 This 
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comment reveals a misunderstanding of the logistics of transporting water. To take 
water from the coast would entail pumping it to an elevation of approximately 2,000 
feet, and over a distance of 250 miles, not to mention over or around the numerous 
and significant mountain ranges that lie between Las Vegas and Southern California. 
It becomes easier to understand the power requirements involved in transporting 
water when one considers that an acre-foot is over 300,000 gallons, and each gallon 
of water weighs nearly nine pounds. To help understand the magnitude of moving 
water from coastal California to Las Vegas, consider the Edmonston Pumping Plant in 
the San Joaquin Valley, which pumps water from the California Aqueduct 1,926 feet 
up and over the Tehachapi Mountains. This is a comparable elevation change to that 
between the Pacific Ocean and Las Vegas. The Edmonston pumps require over six 
billion kilowatts of electricity per year to accomplish the task.45 By way of 
comparison, Hoover Dam generates four billion kilowatts per year.46  
In 2004 various entities in California were paying anywhere from 800 to 2,000 
dollars per acre-foot for desalinated water.47 These costs compare favorably with the 
cost of the GWDP estimate; however, the quotes above were what coastal 
communities paid for desalination. This cost would likely compound to transport 
water to the Las Vegas metro-area.  
A final point on desalination. There is a rather striking irony to GWDP 
opponents’ argument that the SNWA should use desalinated water before it looks to 
White Pine and Lincoln Counties. One of the main arguments of pipeline opponents is 
that the GWDP would have a catastrophic effect on east-central Nevada’s 
environment. This thinking, however, never seemed to enter into the equation when 
arguing the merits of ocean desalination. The desalination process creates greenhouse 
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gases, and increases the level of salinity in the ocean water surrounding the plant, 
often creating a biological dead zone. Viewpoints, such as Abby Johnson’s, are 
striking in that they argue for the preservation of one area by sacrificing another.48 
The issue of growth came up on numerous occasions throughout the course of 
the IWPAC meetings. The main criticism opponents leveled during the proceedings 
was that Las Vegas needed to control its growth and to live within its means. In a 
way, the SNWA’s and ranchers’ position on this matter were both reasonable. 
Ranchers were indeed threatened by Las Vegas’s growth. Many of the small ranching 
communities in White Pine and Lincoln Counties have existed since the nineteenth 
century, preceding Las Vegas’s urban development by a half-century or more. When 
cattle ranchers first moved into the high desert valleys of White Pine and Lincoln 
Counties, Las Vegas as a city did not exist, and was itself the cite of a handful of 
ranchers. Ranchers were merely trying to protect what they had considered their own 
water for many decades.  
On the other hand, SNWA Deputy General Manager Kay Brothers pointed out 
that the agency was not technically granted authority over growth policy. This is 
perhaps somewhat disingenuous, given that at the root of the SNWA’s groundwater 
project was a desire to protect the metro-area’s ability to grow and develop 
economically. There is also the historic example in 1991 of when the LVVWD ceased 
granting “will-serve” letters to new construction because it was out of water. This was 
a rather blunt instrument in growth control policy, however, but it did prove that the 
SNWA did at least have one method of controlling Las Vegas’s urban expansion. 
Brothers repeatedly argued that the advisory committee needed to decouple the 
concept of growth from its task of creating water policy, insisting “growth was 
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principally a land-use issue and that Clark County is not the sole land-use entity in the 
Las Vegas Valley.” She also pointed out that the “SNWA is not a land-use agency 
and therefore it was not appropriate for SNWA to take a land-use position.”49 The 
stated mission of the SNWA was that it was merely present to facilitate urban 
development in southern Nevada into the foreseeable future.  
Rancher Dean Baker, a vocal critic of the pipeline, explained that rural 
“residents see some irony in their circumstances.”50 Baker argued that it was ironic 
that the SNWA should justify the GWDP as a way to protect the future of the 
southern Nevada economy, when the project would threaten the future of the rural 
economy. Ranchers like Baker wanted to be sure they had enough water to support 
their agricultural operations and residents of the town of Baker (named after an earlier 
ranching family with the same last name, no relation to Dean) wanted to retain 
enough water to support their small, but steady tourist economy, one supported by 
nearby Great Basin National Park. Baker told SNWA staff that the local improvement 
district in the town of Baker had already begun to experience difficulties providing 
certain basic services to residents.51 These were all valid concerns. Many of the 
people living in rural east-central Nevada were longtime residents and had devoted 
several decades of their lives improving the land to raise cattle. However, long-term 
population and economic trends did not indicate that the rural economy would ever 
expand.  
During the course of the twentieth century, Lincoln and White Pine county 
steadily lost residents, and economic development decreased after various mines in 
the region ceased operations. In Ely, the largest town in White Pine County, the 
Kennecott Mining Company fully closed its operations in 1983, an act that drove the 
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local unemployment rate to twenty five percent.52 The decline of mining in the region 
was significant, since it was the only private industry capable of large-scale 
employment. Though ranching persisted in east-central Nevada since the nineteenth 
century, this was a marginal exercise at best. Nevada was, and is, one of the least 
productive agricultural states in the nation as a result of the harsh environment.53 
Indeed, Nevada out produces only six other states.54 Most of the land in White Pine 
County, for instance, sits at an elevation of over 6,000 feet, and receives less than ten 
inches of precipitation per year. Ranchers there are able to produce hay and raise 
cattle, but their production pales when compared to similarly based economies in 
California, Nebraska, and Texas. Furthermore, the number of people employed in the 
agriculture sector in Nevada comprises less than five percent of the state’s 
workforce.55 It was therefore unlikely that the SNWA’s pipeline would have a 
significant effect on east-central Nevada’s future economic development. As a word 
of caution, however, despite east-central Nevada’s lack of economic prospects, it was 
also true that no one foresaw the development of the Las Vegas metro-area back in 
the 1920s when lawmakers negotiated the state’s Colorado River allocation.  
Perhaps the most oft-repeated recommendation from GWDP opponents was 
that Las Vegas should simply conserve more water. This was an entirely logical 
suggestion, but it was also one born from the greatest degree of misunderstanding 
over southern Nevada’s water resource situation. Critics pointed to the fact that Las 
Vegans used more water than citizens of any other desert city in the region. While 
southern Nevadans averaged 265 gallons per day in 2003, their counterparts in 
Tucson used less than half that amount.56 This disparity, however, fails to account for 
one of the quirks of Colorado River water usage unique to southern Nevada. The 
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metro-area was entitled to 300,000 acre-feet of water per year, but was able to 
increase this total to nearly 500,000 acre-feet through return flow credits. No other 
significant population center in the Colorado River basin used, or was dependent 
upon, return flow credits. The problem, for the SNWA, was that the metro-area was 
reliant upon 500,000 acre-feet per year, not 300,000. The catch, in this case, was that 
the SNWA had to withdraw as much as it could in order to get enough return flow 
credits to maintain its annual supply. If the authority began conserving water, it would 
not be able to withdraw the additional return flow credits it needed. In fact, the more 
water southern Nevadans used indoors, the more the metro-area got out of the 
Colorado River.  
This is not to say that the SNWA was unwilling to conserve. The Authority 
actually instituted a major policy initiative during the 1990s to drastically reduce the 
amount of outdoor water usage. The water that people used on their lawns did not 
flow back into the metro-area’s water pipelines. It evaporated and was lost to the 
system. The SNWA could therefore not use water used outdoors for return flow 
credits. To remedy this, the SNWA instituted an incentive program in 1995 that paid 
customers to replace grass with desert tolerant plants.57 Through this program the 
SNWA reduced urban water consumption by over nine billion gallons, or nearly 
28,000 acre-feet, per year.58 Given the SNWA’s utter reliance on return flow credits, 
the agency did not require a corresponding decrease in indoor water consumption. 
From the SNWA’s standpoint, this would only shrink the metro-area’s water supply.  
 
Image is Everything: The Rancher Mystique and the Specter of Owens Valley 
Western iconography and cultural perceptions of American ranchers is a major 
part of the GWDP narrative. Pre-conceived notions, and an internalized understanding 
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of western iconography is a significant factor in the GWDP political campaign. 
Ranchers have long held a place in western American mythology. In popular 
portrayals they have consistently represented the themes of rugged individualism and 
struggling against long odds. This mythic representation is, in fact, the way in which 
many Americans like to view themselves. Indeed, this imagery frequently emerged 
during many of President George W. Bush’s speeches following the bombings of 
September 11, 2001, and during the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. And 
soldiers serving in those theaters routinely presented their situation as one akin to the 
western cavalry facing down hordes of Indian attackers.59 
Ranchers in east-central Nevada exploited the public’s sentimental view of 
this iconography, and have used it to great effect.60 In a series of articles by Las Vegas 
Sun reporter Emily Green, ranchers are portrayed as underdogs standing up to an 
abusive, unsympathetic aggressor in the form of Las Vegas. In doing so, pipeline 
opponents have evoked some of the same heroic iconography present in any number 
of western movies, television shows, or novels. Opponents contrast this view of the 
virtuous rancher with the iconic, Sin City image of Las Vegas. The public perception 
of Las Vegas is essentially that of a debauched Sodom and Gomorra rolled into a 
single unit, a place where vacationing adults can do whatever they want, because 
“what happens in Vegas, stays in Vegas.”61 
Rural opponents willingly seized upon the “Sin City” appellation, because the 
public’s perception of Las Vegas so effectively contrasted against the supposedly 
more virtuous character of western ranchers. When NPR decided to interview rural 
residents in east-central Nevada as part of their coverage of the GWDP, rancher Cecil 
Garland took the opportunity to emphasize the differences between his community 
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and Las Vegas. During his interview he asserted “What Las Vegas has got to learn is 
that there are limits to its growth…Gluttony, glitter, girls, and gambling are what [Las 
Vegas] is all about…What it’s all about here [in rural Nevada] is children, cattle, 
country, and church…Would it be crops or craps that we use our water for?”62  
Pipeline opponents then joined these two mythological views to a third: the 
Owens Valley, without question one of the most emotionally laden episodes in 
western American history. Given the high frequency with which GWDP opponents 
invoke the Owens Valley, it is necessary to first examine the history of the Owens 
Valley water transfer before progressing any further with the GWDP. 
 
The Owens Valley Water Transfer 
The history of the Owens Valley water transfer, when used by GWDP 
opposition, is a historically distorted version of actual events and for this reason it is 
useful to examine the manner in which others have portrayed the Owens Valley 
history. Most historical, literary, and dramatic portrayals depict the event as that of an 
imperialistic Los Angeles bullying the virtuous farmers of the Owens Valley into 
selling their water and property to the city. These accounts typically assert Los 
Angeles conducted transactions in secret so as to sow suspicion among farmers in 
order to drive down water and land values. In nearly every one of these treatments, 
Los Angeles is portrayed as a faceless and malicious entity, and farmers as virtuous 
stewards of the land. Common to all of these works is the central theme that the 
Owens Valley water transfer was an un-mitigated disaster.63  
 By portraying the Owens Valley water transfer in this manner, many 
historians, authors, and screenwriters have presented historical events in black and 
white terms. These portrayals of Los Angeles depict the city as a monolithic and 
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malicious entity. Using this trope, writers are able to strip Los Angeles of its 
humanity. Rarely, if ever, did Owens Valley critics present Los Angeles as a 
collection of two million individuals, people who were churchgoers, students, family 
members, moms, and dads.  
The omission of Los Angeles’ human side is also problematic because an 
overwhelming majority of Angelenos supported the Los Angeles Department of 
Water and Power’s (LADWP) efforts to procure more water from the Owens 
Valley.64 Common people who were concerned about their southern California 
community gave their blessing to the infrastructural expansion that would ensure they 
and subsequent generations would possess water. Owens Valley critics have largely 
ignored the human side of Los Angeles, and in doing so, are complicit in a 
simplification process that ultimately distilled the entire history of the Owens Valley 
water transfer to the oft-used phrase “Remember the Owens Valley.” Critics of the 
water transfer have used this battle cry since the 1920s and its use requires a 
simplistic, un-nuanced understanding of the event’s history.  
 Beginning in the early 1990s, scholars started to reexamine this history. 
Historians including Steven Erie, Patricia Limerick, Carl Abbott, Norris Hundley, and 
Gary Libecap, among others, have questioned the conventional wisdom surrounding 
the Owens Valley and have offered new appraisals.65 Two common aspects of older 
Owens Valley works is that the LADWP coerced farmers to sell their water and land, 
and that the transactions were conducted in secret. Erie dispels this version of events, 
pointing out that no land was ever taken either through the threat, or actual use, of 
eminent domain.66 Additionally, transactions between farmers and LADWP officials 
were conducted in full view of the public and were financially beneficial to many 
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farmers. Indeed, the public nature of these transactions served to drive up land and 
water values, a development that enabled Owens Valley farmers to receive 
substantially greater sums for their property and water rights than their counterparts in 
other locations in the Great Basin.67 
 Gary Libecap echoes Erie’s findings, explaining that many of the farmers who 
sold their water were glad to do so. The entire county was experiencing an 
agricultural depression during the first decades of the twentieth century, and farmers 
nationwide were leaving their farms for other opportunities. It was no different in the 
Owens Valley. Unlike in other parts of the nation, however, Owens Valley farmers 
had an eager buyer in the LADWP.   
 Later works take a more balanced approach and include analysis of the issue 
of tradeoffs. Most early Owens Valley treatments in many ways place the event into a 
historical vacuum. Absent are accounts of a resurgent Owens Valley economy, one 
based on recreational tourism, or the effect of Owens Valley water on Los Angeles 
and the city’s larger importance to the nation as a whole. Roger Lotchin wrote in The 
Bad City in the Good War: 
 
The impossibility of mounting a war effort in a desert like Los Angeles … 
without a well-developed water supply is clear. Los Angeles [has] been 
perennially denounced for the manner in which [it] acquired [its] long-distant 
supplies of water, but without the public aqueducts of … the Owens Valley … 
the war simply could not have been fought out of [that] geographic [site].  
 
In addition, both the Los Angeles and San Francisco aqueducts generated 
power in their fall from the mountains to the sea … This windfall of plentiful, 
cheap power aided the arsenals of democracy, especially the aircraft 
industry.68 
 
This is not to say that Los Angeles water officials had the clairvoyance to predict the 
rise of the Nazi Party and a militaristic, imperial Japan, but merely to point out that 
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other works of Owens Valley history present the event as a contest strictly between 
city and farmers, and fail to acknowledge larger historical context and subsequent 
developments.  
 Further utility can be gained by comparing Los Angeles during World War II 
to the Los Angeles portrayed in Owens Valley critiques. In numerous historical 
accounts of the era, the Los Angeles of World War II is shown to be the site of dozens 
of aircraft manufacturing plants, military training facilities, and a major port that 
served as a naval base and debarkation point for men and materiel.69 These treatments 
present a city that played a pivotal role in contributing to the nation’s survival during 
the Second World War. It is difficult to reconcile this version of Los Angeles with the 
rapacious monster that destroyed farmers’ lives in many of the older Owens Valley 
histories. However, as historians such as Erie, Limerick, and Libecap point out, 
mythic understandings of the Owens Valley are culturally deeply entrenched.  
The purpose of this analysis is neither to assert the Owens Valley water 
transfer did not have a social and environmental impact, nor to justify the LADWP’s 
actions. Rather, the intention is to highlight some consequential aspects of the Owens 
Valley history and how they are absent from the “Remember the Owens Valley” 
distillation of events, and to point out that past assessments of the Owens Valley as an 
unmitigated disaster overstate the impact. 
As shown above, the conception of the Owens Valley water transfer is based 
on a distorted view of history. However, opponents of the GWDP relied on the  
“Remember the Owens Valley” distillation of the event, and assume the larger public 
would not understand the nuances of the actual events. While use of the Owens 
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Valley myth has proven an effective political tool for GWDP opponents, it is a flawed 
comparison.  
The attempt to present the Owens Valley and GWDP as analogous events 
assumes that the same environmental conditions exist in both locations. Indeed, the 
comparison requires it. One of the main themes in literature about the Owens Valley 
is how the Los Angeles Aqueduct dried up the Owens Lake, which led to severe dust 
storms. Critics of the GWDP argue that a similar situation would arise in east-central 
Nevada. They assert that if the SNWA gets its way, harmful dust storms will result 
affecting population centers as far away as Salt Lake City. There is a major problem 
with this comparison: there is no lake in east-central Nevada. In fact, there is virtually 
no surface water at all in the region.  
To address this inconsistency opponents over-emphasized the role of 
phreatophytes. Phreatophytes are plants that rely on groundwater for survival, plants 
like greasewood. Opponents argue that the GWDP will draw down groundwater thus 
killing the region’s phreatophytes. They then assert that without these phreatophytes, 
there will be no plant cover to hold the desert soil in place. While harm to 
phreatophytes is a distinct possibility, it is entirely likely that the cause of windborne 
dust can actually be laid at the feet of the ranchers themselves. Cows were a far 
greater threat to air quality in east-central Nevada than the SNWA’s pipeline.  
Dust storms were not as common in the west prior to the advent of cattle 
ranching. Though dry, in its natural state western soils were held together by various 
types of plants and algae-like organisms. Known as crypto-biotic soils, they can 
withstand significant wind speeds without dispersing any particulates.70 Furthermore, 
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much of the region’s soil evolved completely independent of ground water levels. In 
other words, these desert soils naturally form whether there was groundwater or not.  
The range of crypto-biotic soils in the American West has been greatly 
reduced as a result of livestock grazing. Ranchers throughout the region have released 
hundreds of thousands of invasive ungulates to graze on western rangeland. As these 
animals foraged, their hooves destroyed the soils that held dust in place. It is now not 
uncommon to have severe dust storms, such as the one described in this 2008 Salt 
Lake City newspaper article:  
 
The last stragglers in April’s Salt Lake City Marathon were limping to the 
finish line when the air-warning alarm went off. State air-quality officials 
issued a health-advisory urging residents on the Wasatch Front not to exercise 
outside. The Skyline vanished. Utah’s Department of Environmental Quality 
declared a ‘red’ air day for Salt Lake, Weber and Davis counties. It was the 
second such warning in a week … the dust has literally brought close to home 
what is at stake in a fight between Las Vegas and west desert Utah ranchers 
over water.71  
 
Note, the article describes a “severe” dust storm before any component of the GWDP 
had been built.  
Scientific evidence supports the causal relationship between livestock grazing 
and dust storms; however, GWDP opponents counter that dust storms are actually 
caused by the elimination of phreatophytes.72 These plants, they argue, rely on 
groundwater, and it is their deep root systems that hold desert soil in place. Las Vegas 
Sun reporter Emily Green, an opponent of the GWDP, asserted that “Phreatophytes 
prevent dust storms …  Without a high water table saturating the valley floor and the 
long roots of phreatophytes anchoring the soil, Spring Valley could become the kind 
of dust bowl created by Los Angeles after William Mulholland began pumping 
Owens Lake in 1913.”73 Other regional papers have echoed this argument, thus giving 
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outlet to what became GWDP opponent’s signature assertion: the destruction of 
phreatophytes will cause dust storms that will blanket the Salt Lake metro-area.  
Pipeline opponents’ use of the phreatophyte theme to evoke images of a 
dustbowl has been politically effective. It taps into the extant myth of Owens Valley 
dust storms and has produced a significant level of public pressure in Utah to compel 
political leaders to oppose the GWDP. But while phreatophyte destruction may be 
effective politically, the science behind the claim is lacking. In fact, the science lacks 
on three counts. As indicated above, significant evidence shows that dust storms are 
caused by soil surface disturbance. Secondly, it is unclear what effect pumping, if 
any, will have on the phreatophytes. According to Dr. Dale Devitt, professor of geo-
sciences at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, while phreatophytes do in fact use 
groundwater, it is not their sole source of sustenance. He points out that during times 
of stress phreatophytes will use shallow roots to access near surface water, as well as 
absorbing atmospheric moisture. He is reluctant to say with certainty that the 
drawdown of the aquifer would kill off the phreatophytes in the GWDP region.74 
Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, the dominant plant species in the 
valleys in which the GWDP is planned are giant sagebrush and cheatgrass. These two 
species do not rely upon groundwater and would be unaffected by a drawdown. It is 
on this point that the opposition’s argument fully breaks down. Opponents argue that 
plants are needed to prevent dust storms. This argument then holds the dominant 
plants are phreatophytes and that if they are killed through lack of groundwater, then 
dust storms will arise. According to Devitt, even if the phreatophytes die, sagebrush 
and cheat grass will colonize the areas.75 In other words, the valleys of east-central 
Nevada will likely not lack for plant cover should the GWDP go forward.76  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
197 
In 2005 the IWPAC concluded its meetings and issued its official 
recommendations. Chief among these were to “Pursue development of all the 
resource options considered in the IWPAC planning scenarios.” This was essentially 
the advisory committee telling the SNWA that it needed to pursue in-state 
groundwater henceforth as part of its water resource policy. The advisory committee 
also recommended that the SNWA continue to work with the other Basin states to 
establish an agreement for Nevada to use in-state groundwater for return flow credits, 
and to be able to wheel the Authority’s Virgin River water rights through Lake Mead. 
The advisory committee’s recommendations served as tacit approval of the SNWA’s 
Groundwater Development Project.  
The citizen committee’s recommendation provided the SNWA with some 
much-needed political cover, given the controversy the GWDP had thus far elicited. It 
was, after all, not simply the SNWA recommending the use of groundwater, but a 
broad cross section of concerned citizens as well. With the advisory committee’s 
recommendations in hand, the SNWA moved forward on two immediate goals: 
shortly after the conclusion of the IWPAC meetings the SNWA filed for rights of way 
over federal land with the Bureau of Land Management and began negotiating with 
Utah for the groundwater of Snake Valley. 77 
 
Powell’s Prescience: Political Geography vs. Physical Geography 
In the 1890s, long after his exploits rafting through the Grand Canyon, noted 
western explorer John Wesley Powell wrote a series of articles outlining his vision for 
the political future of the western United States. In the West water simply was not 
widely dispersed – it rained infrequently, and water concentrated in rivers and lakes. 
Consequently, western residents were more reliant upon these scarce water sources, 
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and were concentrated more densely, than their counterparts in the more humid 
regions of the eastern United States. Because of this condition, Powell understood 
there was increased potential for conflict over these rare western water sources. He 
therefore argued that political boundaries should adhere to physical geography and be 
established according to natural drainage. This way, political entities would not have 
the legal standing to compete with one another over water sources. Alas, Congress 
and western politicians ignored Powell’s counsel, as the long and contentious political 
history of the Colorado River shows.78 
The latest conflict to arise as a result of rational political boundaries (i.e., 
straight line political divisions that do not adhere to physical geography) is that which 
began in the early 2000s between Utah and Nevada over the groundwater of the 
Snake Valley. While the conflict is over groundwater, it is ultimately linked to the 
Colorado River. The Snake Valley – the sixth valley in the IWPAC’s “Six-Basin 
approach”– is an interstate valley, part of which lies in both Nevada and Utah. Both 
states have begun to contest the groundwater of the Snake Valley, evoking Powell’s 
warning against rational political boundaries.  
While Utah’s elected officials has been interested in the SNWA’s plans ever 
since 1989, it was not until 2004 that they began to take formal steps to protect their 
state’s interests in the Snake Valley. The first significant example occurred that year 
when congress passed the Lincoln County Conservation, Recreation, and 
Development Act. The Lands Act was an omnibus bill that set aside acreage in 
Nevada for wilderness protection and transferred some acreage from the federal 
government to local government. The bill also included a provision that set aside 
federal land for rights of way for the SNWA pipeline. Senator William Bennett (R) 
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Utah, recognized that the bill would increase the likelihood of groundwater pumping 
in the Snake Valley. He therefore inserted a clause into the bill that required a bi-state 
agreement between Utah and Nevada prior to construction of the GWDP into the 
Snake Valley. 79  
 Mulroy was not pleased with Bennett’s position and expressed her displeasure 
in an interview with the Salt Lake Tribune.80 Mulroy declared that the clause Bennett 
inserted into the bill “effectively equated to a veto” of the GWDP.81 Mulroy 
rhetorically asked, “Would Utah . . . allow Nevada to veto a water project being 
developed in Utah?”82 In what some critics have interpreted as a veiled threat, Mulroy 
continued, “Utah is in a precarious position. When one state tries to stop [internal] 
development of another state’s water supply, things can get dicey.”83 Nonetheless, the 
Lincoln County legislation did serve as an impetus for representatives of the SNWA 
and Utah to enter negotiations over dividing the Snake Valley’s groundwater. After 
several years of negotiations, in 2009 the SNWA and Utah’s representatives, 
including Utah Governor Gary Herbert, agreed to equally split the 132,000 acre feet 
of groundwater beneath the Snake Valley. 84 
News that Governor Herbert was prepared to support the agreement with the 
SNWA set off a wave of protests in Utah and east-central Nevada. The Salt Lake 
Tribune began running editorials and opinion pieces lambasting the agreement, and 
ranchers in Snake Valley renewed their attacks against the Las Vegas “water grab.”85 
Susan Lynn, spokesperson for the anti-pipeline lobbying group Great Basin Water 
Network condemned the deal stating that that the estimates were incorrect and that 
there was not enough to water for each state to withdraw 66,000 acre-feet per year.86 
Objections such as these became so fierce that in 2013, after years of federally 
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mandated negotiations, Herbert reversed his stance and rejected the agreement. 
Herbert’s decision won him immediate praise from GWDP opponents, but it is 
unclear what effect his actions may have in the long term.  
Some legal experts predicted the two states will eventually re-enter 
negotiations, but the next time around Utah might possess the stronger legal position 
and be able to increase its Snake Valley entitlement.87 Evidence supporting this came 
in 2012 when Steve Erikson of the Great Basin Water Network revealed that the 
SNWA had sent threatening emails to the Utah negotiating team to pressure them into 
signing the interstate agreement. These emails suggest that both the SNWA’s and 
Utah’s negotiators may have recognized a disparity in the agreement to split Snake 
Valley’s groundwater equally. Utah’s contention was that the majority of the water 
and residents lay on its side of the border, and that it should therefore receive at least 
sixty percent of the groundwater. The SNWA countered, stating that mountain ranges 
in Nevada produced nearly 100 percent of Snake Valley’s groundwater. If history is 
any guide, however, Utah does indeed possess the stronger claim. Utah employed a 
“historical use” argument, which almost always trumped the “basin of origin” 
argument the SNWA used.88 Ironically, the SNWA itself argued against the “basin of 
origin” position for the five valleys entirely within Nevada. Ranchers in these Nevada 
valleys argued water should not be taken out of the basin of origin, which the SNWA 
refuted. Nevertheless, perhaps sensing that Utah possessed the stronger legal 
argument, the SNWA attempted to bluff their way into a larger Snake Valley 
groundwater entitlement.89 
At the time of writing, legal theorists are still speculating over what Governor 
Herbert’s actions mean for the future of the GWDP.90 Ultimately, however, Herbert’s 
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actions do not change the fact that the Las Vegas metro-area occupies a subservient 
political position within the Colorado River Basin. The GWDP represents a 
conundrum for the Water Authority. The Authority first turned to east-central Nevada 
groundwater because it was unable to obtain a greater share of the Colorado River, in 
part, because of opposition from Utah. After working for over two decades to obtain 
in-state water, Utah once again began to resist the Authority’s efforts to obtain water 
for the Las Vegas metro-area. Ultimately, if the SNWA is unable to obtain east-
central Nevada groundwater it must necessarily turn back to the Colorado River. And 
if it has to do so, then its disproportionately small Colorado River allocation will once 
again come to the fore, thus shattering any illusion that the Law of the River is a 
malleable system of laws. 
In the spring of 2012, Nevada State Engineer John King issued his highly 
anticipated ruling on the SNWA’s groundwater applications for east-central Nevada. 
King declared that the SNWA was entitled to 83,988 acre-feet of water from Lincoln 
and White Pine Counties. He did not, however, grant the SNWA any rights to water 
in the Snake Valley, since political negotiations between the SNWA and Utah were 
ongoing. Though the amount was less than the SNWA had originally applied for, 
Authority staff voiced satisfaction with the ruling, given the struggle involved. King 
reaffirmed many of the points that the SNWA had made during its testimony. He 
acknowledged that southern Nevada is “almost entirely dependent on the Colorado to 
meet its water needs” and that “the Colorado River is [already] over-appropriated,” a 
reality that necessitated an independent water supply. King also demonstrated an 
awareness of the regional political complexities the SNWA had to deal with stating:  
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Colorado River issues are necessarily involved in almost every water-
management decision made by the Applicant [the SNWA]. The severity of the 
current drought has taught the basin states and southern Nevada that the 
Colorado River is a highly dynamic system with the potential for enormous 
fluctuations in the amount of water available. In light of that fact, southern 
Nevada’s almost total reliance on the Colorado River has injected a high 
degree of uncertainly into southern Nevada’s water-resource portfolio. 
 
The State Engineer finds southern Nevada needs a water resource that is 
independent of the Colorado River and that it would not be advisable for the 
Applicant to continue to rely upon the Colorado River for ninety percent of 
southern Nevada’s water when that source is over-appropriated, highly 
susceptible to drought and shortage, and almost certain to provide significantly 
less water to southern Nevada in the future.91 
 
While Mulroy was no doubt thrilled, the Authority provided a measured, 
though satisfied, response. According to SNWA spokesperson Scott Huntley, King’s 
ruling was both “reasonable and conservative” and that it was “driven by science and 
law and we’re pleased with that.”92 SNWA Deputy General Manager John 
Entsminger added to this air of satisfaction saying, “While the Nevada State 
Engineer’s ruling did not grant the SNWA the full amount requested through our 
applications, it did increase the amount we received by approximately 5,000 acre-feet, 
which is not insubstantial.”93 
GWDP opponents were less restrained in their reactions to King’s ruling. Rob 
Mrowka, an ecologist with the Tucson based Center for Biological Diversity stated, 
“The winner in today's ruling is mindless Las Vegas growth, while biodiversity, rural 
residents and future generations are the clear losers.”94 Susan Lynn of the Great Basin 
Water Network challenged the science upon which King based his conclusion 
asserting, “We believe that the State Engineer has ignored or dismissed compelling 
hydrological evidence that we and other protestants submitted – evidence that clearly 
showed that there is no unappropriated water available in Cave, Dry Lake and 
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Delamar Valleys. Pumping the granted water rights from Spring Valley would be 
unsustainable, environmentally destructive and illegal groundwater mining. We will 
consider our options carefully but this ruling will not go without challenge.”95 Anne 
Brauer of Indian Springs, northwest of Las Vegas, noted the social, environmental, 
and capital cost of the GWDP: “It is especially heart-breaking that we learned of this 
decision on World Water Day, a day that is supposed to be about human needs and 
the environment. Instead, this decision, if it stands, gives a green light to SNWA to 
defoliate the Great Basin, destroy Native American communities, dismantle 
conservation programs, plant water-hungry turf, encourage unneeded development 
and stick the ratepayers of Clark County with a fifteen billion dollar bill.”96 Launce 
Rake, a former Las Vegas Sun reporter and longtime opponent of the GWDP noted 
that the state engineer issued his ruling largely using language the SNWA itself had 
written.97 This did not surprise Rake, who had argued that local and state government 
had long ago allied themselves with the SNWA.98   
Five months after the State Engineer ruled, the Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM) completed its final environmental impact statement for the GWDP. In its 
report, the BLM stated that the GWDP would not have an adverse affect on the 
region, and that the SNWA could move forward with its project, save for the Snake 
Valley component. Given that the political situation between the SNWA and Utah had 
not yet been resolved, the BLM was reluctant to provide a ruling on the Snake Valley 
component of the GWDP. Despite only covering five of the six basins the SNWA 
wanted, news of the BLM’s approval seemed to take on the air that one of the last 
pieces of the GWDP puzzle had fallen into place. Mulroy voiced pleasure at the 
thought of having federal backing for her project. Speaking to the Las Vegas Review-
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Journal, she couched her satisfaction with the BLM’s decision in the context of Las 
Vegas’s dwindling Colorado River supply: “The project is now sitting out there as a 
safety net if the (Colorado) river really goes south. We now have the necessary water 
resources and the rights of way to protect southern Nevada.”99 The SNWA once again 
took a reserved tone with respect to the BLM’s decision. Although Mulroy would like 
the BLM to have included the Snake Valley in its decision, she stated that since the 
science and political negotiations over the Snake Valley had not yet been resolved, it 
was understandable that the BLM was unable to include it in its report.100 
The GWDP continues to be largely conceptual. Aside from rights of way and 
various underground monitoring facilities, the GWDP remains unbuilt. It is unclear 
when construction will begin, but it is likely that the SNWA is waiting for a final 
agreement with Utah. In April of 2013, Governor Herbert walked away from a deal 
between the SNWA and Utah.101 While a popular decision among his constituents, it 
is not likely that the negotiating parties will remain estranged for too long. The 
SNWA represents an increasingly prominent population center, and Nevada’s senator 
Harry Reid also happened to be one of the most influential members of congress. In 
short, there is a tremendous amount of pressure on the SNWA and Utah to return to 
the negotiating table.  
 While negotiations are likely to resume, it is unclear what the future of the 
GWDP is, or, for that matter, the Colorado River Basin as a whole. For at its root, the 
GWDP is a manifestation of the inequitable nature of water distribution among the 
states that share the Colorado River. Looking at the GWDP and the contest between 
the SNWA and Utah from a broader regional perspective, one sees a fight over the 
region’s last, and least attractive water source. The water contained within east-central 
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Nevada’s aquifers is a pittance compared to the amount of water available regionally. 
The passion with which the SNWA pursues east-central Nevada groundwater and 
opponents defend it is testament to how desperate the situation is in Nevada. There is 
no water available to the SNWA through the Colorado River, so it must turn to a 
highly problematic, in-state water resource. And while the other Basin States argue 
that they too are experiencing water shortages, none of them are dealing with the 
combined effects of a legally and environmentally created shortage. 
Utah’s opposition illustrates the SNWA’s conundrum. The SNWA had been 
unsuccessful in obtaining long-term increases of water from the Colorado River, so 
the agency turned north to the groundwater basins of east-central Nevada. After it did 
so, however, one of the states that prevented it from getting additional water from the 
Colorado River began to oppose the GWDP. The question, not only for the SNWA, 
but the Colorado River Basin as a whole is: If the Las Vegas metropolitan area cannot 
get water from the Colorado, nor from in-state water resources, what options are left 
for Las Vegas? 
 
It’s the Colorado River, Stupid.  
 Most observers argue that the GWDP campaign began in 1989 when the Las 
Vegas Valley Water District applied for groundwater rights in east-central Nevada. It 
could more accurately be said to have begun on November 5, 1993. That day, 
representatives of California, Arizona, and Colorado stated unequivocally that they 
would oppose any effort by the SNWA to obtain an increase in Nevada’s Colorado 
River allocation. From that point forward, SNWA officials knew pursuing a change in 
allocation levels was futile, and instead directed their attention to in-state groundwater 
resources.  
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 As events have shown, the GWDP is intimately tied to Colorado River 
politics. According to SNWA officials, shortages on the Colorado River would 
prompt the initiation of GWDP construction. These shortages are not simply 
environmental in nature. In 2007, the Lower Basin States established a Colorado 
River shortage sharing agreement, in which Arizona and Nevada would be required to 
forgo a portion of their annual Colorado River allocation.102 Given the severity of 
conditions, Nevada could be expected to give up anywhere from 13,000 to 20,000 
acre-feet of its allotment. According to Mulroy:  
 
The agreement we signed with the (Interior) secretary in 2007 along with the 
other Lower Basin states, at elevation 1,075 the secretary declares the first 
shortage and Nevada gets cut back. At elevation 1,050 he declares the second 
shortage, and we get cut back more. At elevation 1,025 he declares the third 
shortage, and we get cut back even further. Well, at 1,025 in Lake Mead you 
have less water than what the annual demand is. If we get to an elevation less 
than 1,000 we have less than 500,000 acre-feet left in Lake Mead. 
 
The possibility of that happening puts this community in a horrible position of 
risk. You cannot conserve ninety percent of your water supply, it is physically 
impossible. You won’t have enough fire pressure in the hydrants to put out a 
fire. For that reason, to protect the community, we started developing the in-
state project, because you have to bring water in from a place that is 
geologically separate from the Colorado River. You can’t depend on the river 
anymore.103 
 
 
The GWDP and the politics surrounding the campaign together serve as an 
effective illustration of the inequity built into the Law of the River. The GWDP is the 
end result of a major metropolitan area being held to a set of laws largely created 
during the early twentieth century, at a time when the economic, political, and 
demographic conditions in the Colorado River Basin were radically different. The 
small allocation set aside for Nevada and the resistance to allocation redistribution not 
only reflects the inequity among the Basin states, but has also contributed to intra-
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state conflict within Nevada. Ranchers in east-central Nevada now face the prospect 
of losing much of the water to which they have grown accustomed, and are 
understandably opposed to the SNWA pipeline. It is unlikely that their livelihoods 
will remain unaffected. This is perhaps the biggest lesson of the GWDP – that 
henceforth, in this era of limits in which water is clearly a finite resource – there will 
be winners and losers. The reality of this new era is that groups with greater political 
power will likely come away with the region’s water. In this case, the other Colorado 
River Basin states have historically retained greater political power than Nevada, 
resulting in larger Colorado River allocations. Now, Las Vegas, by virtue of its larger 
population, has greater political power than rural east-central Nevada, and will likely 
gain access to a major portion of that region’s groundwater. Unless states agree to 
radically reassess where water goes within the Colorado River Basin, it is likely that 
regional contests such as that between Las Vegas and rural east-central Nevada will 
increase in number and intensity. 
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CHAPTER 7 | PROSPECTS: IT IS TIME FOR A NEW LAW OF THE RIVER 
 
 
Local water managers created the SNWA specifically to address the 
challenges presented by the Law of the River. The administrative composition of the 
SNWA has served it well during its two-decade history. The combination of local, 
county, and state level authority helped the SNWA increase efficiency locally and 
procure additional water resources regionally. There is the new challenge, however, 
of global climate change. Scientists predict it will affect precipitation levels in the 
Colorado River Basin especially. According to a 2008 Scripps Oceanographic Report, 
there is a fifty percent chance that Lake Mead could reach dead pool (the point at 
which power generation ceases) by 2021.1 These conclusions were not restricted to 
small scientific circles either. In August 2013, anticipating decreased levels of 
snowfall in the Rocky Mountains, the Secretary of Interior issued, for the first time 
ever, a shortage declaration for the Colorado River. This meant that Arizona and 
Nevada would be forced to curtail their use below their normal Colorado River 
allocations.2 Federal policies are beginning to reflect the reality that the Colorado 
River Basin is facing the worst drought since record keeping began over a century 
ago. Some estimates suggest it is the worst drought in the past eight centuries.3  
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, approximately twenty-five 
million people depended on the Colorado River, taxing both the legal and physical 
infrastructure in place to manage hundreds of competing interests. Las Vegas figures 
prominently in media accounts covering environmental challenges in the Colorado 
River Basin. Quite often, visual accounts depict the fountains in front of the Bellagio 
Casino Resort, a practice that implies Las Vegas will be the first to feel the effects of 
the impending water shortage.4 While this may be true, it also perpetuates a simplistic 
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presentation of the social and economic composition of the Colorado River Basin. 
Accounts that point to Las Vegas as the bellwether of effects of climate change fail to 
account for the role of the Law of the River in the Colorado River Basin or the entities 
that use the greatest amount of Colorado River water. There is no doubt that climate 
change presents a major challenge to the states sharing the Colorado River. However, 
when considering these challenges one must first understand where the vast majority 
of Colorado River water is used. Approximately eighty-five percent of the Colorado’s 
water presently goes to agriculture. And much of this amount is used to irrigate 
alfalfa, a crop not for human consumption, but for livestock. According to the Pacific 
Institute, “ninety [percent] of pasture and cropland in the 256,000-mile Colorado 
River Basin requires irrigation, with about sixty [percent] of the irrigated acreage 
devoted to pasture, alfalfa, and other forage crops used to feed cattle and horses. 
These forage crops consume about five million acre-feet per year, equivalent to a 
third of the river’s annual flow.”5 Both livestock and its feed are produced more 
efficiently outside the Colorado River Basin in places such as Nebraska and Texas.6 
Cities in the Basin States split the remaining fifteen percent of the river. Of the 
nation’s fifty largest cities, ten rely on the Colorado River for all or part of their water 
supply. These cities alone combine for a total urban population of over ten million 
people, a total that does not include the hundreds of small to medium sized suburban 
enclaves surrounding the previously mentioned larger cities.  
Urban areas form the basis for the region’s economy, and dwarf agriculture’s 
economic contribution. In 2011, the Imperial Valley, the most valuable agricultural 
area to use Colorado River water, generated just under two billion dollars in 
agricultural output.7 During the same period, the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana 
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standard metropolitan statistical area generated nearly 750 billion dollars.8 In fairness, 
Los Angeles does have a number of water sources it utilizes in addition to the 
Colorado River: the Owens River, the Central California Aqueduct, and the Los 
Angeles River. However, Las Vegas, like the Imperial Valley, uses only Colorado 
River water, and the southern Nevada metropolis generated over ninety billion dollars 
during the same period.9  
Furthermore, western American agriculture receives government subsidized 
water. As James Powell points out, “Imperial Valley farmers recently paid less than 
fifteen dollars per acre-foot, one twentieth the price of water in nearby San Diego.”10 
It should be noted, both Imperial Valley and San Diego rely on Colorado River water. 
Essentially, urban taxpayers are subsidizing water for farmers to grow crops that are 
either unneeded, or could be grown more efficiently outside the Colorado River 
Basin. And while some supporters argue that these farms are growing the crops that 
feed the cities of the basin, this is in fact not true, as significant portions of the 
Colorado River Basin’s agricultural production is exported out of the region.11  
This has been the situation facing the Colorado River Basin for many decades. 
However, in the twenty-first century, draught and climate change became a part of the 
geo-political context, which before had only included economic and demographic 
factors. As the drought continues, the economic and demographic composition of the 
Colorado River Basin will become increasingly apparent. The contrast between places 
that generate money and places that do not, and places that use Colorado River water, 
and places that use less will become increasingly stark. As the relief between these 
two areas increases, political pressure to change this arrangement will mount. Given 
the increasing number of voters in urban areas, lawmakers will inevitably be forced to 
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shift water to the highest and best use—which means to cities—as drought reduces 
the region’s water supply. Given that eighty-five percent of the Colorado River goes 
to the region’s agricultural sector, there is a significant buffer against catastrophe. 
Likely, there will be a difficult political process in which state governments 
appropriate agricultural water rights (with proper compensation for farmers, in the 
same fashion as imminent domain seizures) and then redistribute the water to the 
region’s urban areas. It is therefore unlikely that Las Vegas will experience the 
negative effects of the drought to the extent some prognosticators assert.  
As the process of water redistribution in the Colorado River Basin progresses, 
the lessons of the SNWA can serve as a guide. The Las Vegas metro-area’s water 
agencies worked at cross-purposes for several decades. However, as a result of 
environmental and legal pressure, they relinquished a significant amount of their 
autonomy and joined the SNWA. While there are a substantially greater number of 
political interests in the Colorado River Basin, the SNWA example can serve as a 
starting point. If nothing else, the SNWA example demonstrates that conflict is not 
the only option when negotiating for water.  
It would be ironic if the Las Vegas metro-area were able to export the SNWA 
model to its regional neighbors if it were not also accompanied by a change to the 
Law of the River. If, in the coming decades, neighboring states and internal political 
entities proceeded with a plan of agricultural to urban water rights transfers, this 
would mark the most significant political development in the history of the Colorado 
River Basin. However, in order to be of benefit to southern Nevada, the Law of the 
River itself will need serious revision, for as long as it prevents the interstate transfer 
of water, it will not matter that other states shift agricultural water to their cities. This 
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may help Denver and Salt Lake City, but it will do nothing for the Las Vegas metro-
area. Unlike the other states, which have multiple users of Colorado River water, the 
SNWA possesses rights to the entirety of Nevada’s allocation. As a result, there is no 
agricultural water within Nevada to transfer to the metro-area.  
 As part of the regional water rights shakeup, it would be reasonable then to 
propose the creation of a Colorado River Basin Water Authority, comprised of 
member agencies. Again, the SNWA model serves as a guide. One of the main 
reasons for the SNWA’s success was that under the Authority’s cooperative 
agreement, smaller agencies had the same political standing as the larger ones. This 
simple facet created a shared destiny for the water agencies of the Las Vegas metro-
area. They were all in their struggle together. It is time for the SNWA model to 
expand to the scale of the Colorado River basin. Climate change threatens every state 
in the Basin. Each state, like each one of the Las Vegas metro-area’s water agencies 
in 1989, faces a water shortage crisis. It is reasonable to suggest that the seven Basin 
states begin “thinking like a river basin” and accept their shared destiny and create an 
administrative agency that can manage the Colorado River as a single unit.12   
It is necessary, then, to throw out the Law of the River as it is now written. 
Thus far, the various agreements among states have been a series of half measures. 
None of them fundamentally alter the structure of the Law of the River. Even with the 
2007 sharing agreements in place, agriculture retains a favored position within the 
Colorado River Basin, courtesy of the Law of the River. A new Law of the River is 
needed if the urban centers of the Colorado River Basin states are to survive. These 
cities have proven to be the economic powerhouses of the Colorado River Basin, a 
status they will need to maintain if the regional prosperity is to continue. Agriculture, 
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on the other hand, has been in decline for decades. It is now time to accept this reality 
and adopt a legal regime to suit. This trend is well underway, in no small part because 
of the efforts of the SNWA.
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natural resource policies were established. It is therefore time to craft policy to fit this 
new reality.  
10 James Lawrence Powell, Dead Pool: Lake Powell, Global Warming, and the 
Future of Water in the West (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2008), 83. 
11 Imperial Valley’s own website describes how the area exports produce throughout 
the nation. Imperial Valley Agriculture, available from 
http://www.icfb.net/countyag.html, Internet, accessed 22 August 2013. 
12 Center for Natural Resources & Environmental Policy, The University of Montana, 
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APPENDIX A | ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AB  Assembly Bill 
AWBA Arizona Water Banking Authority 
BLM  Bureau of Land Management 
CAP  Central Arizona Project 
CIP  Capital Improvements Program 
CRC  Colorado River Commission of Nevada 
CWP  Cooperative Water Project 
GWDP Clark, Lincoln, and White Pine Counties Groundwater Development 
Project 
IRPAC Integrated Resource Planning Advisory Committee 
IWPAC Integrated Water Planning Advisory Committee 
LADWP Los Angeles Department of Water and Power 
LBS  Lower Colorado River Basin States 
LOR  Law of the River 
LVVWD Las Vegas Valley Water District 
MET  Metropolitan Water District of Southern California 
MWD  Metropolitan Water District of Southern California 
MX  Missile Experimental 
SDCWA San Diego County Water Authority 
SNPLMA Southern Nevada Public Lands Management Act 
SNWA Southern Nevada Water Authority 
SNWP  Southern Nevada Water Project 
SOI  Secretary of the Interior 
UBS  Upper Colorado River Basin States 
USBR   United States Bureau of Reclamation 
VVWD Virgin Valley Water District 
WRMI  Water Resources Management, Incorporated. 
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APPENDIX B | GRAPHICS
 
Figure 1. SNWA Pipeline and Colorado River Basin (adapted from SNWA map, created by Andrew G. 
Harrison)
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Figure 2. 1989 Las Vegas Metropolitan Area Water Regime 
 
Figure 3. SNWA Member Agencies 
Figure 4. 1995 Las Vegas Metropolitan Water Regime 
1989$Las$Vegas$Metropolitan$Water$Regime$$ CRC$
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Boulder$City$
SNWA$
LVVWD$ Boulder$City$ Henderson$ North$Las$Vegas$ Clark$County$Sanitation$District*$ Big$Bend$Water$District*$ The$City$of$Las$Vegas*$
1995$Las$Vegas$Metropolitan$Water$Regime$ SNWA$
Local$ 7$Member$Agencies$
Interstate$ 3/7$of$CRC$Board$
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Member Agency Annual Allotment (acre-feet per year) 
Boulder City 8,918  
Henderson 27,021 
LVVWD 232,426 
North Las Vegas 26,635 
Figure 5 Pre-SNWA water allocations 
 
Allocation of New Water Supplies The First 58,000 acre-feet 
Big Bend 5.52% 
Boulder City 5.17% 
Henderson 20.79% 
LVVWD 55.17% 
North Las Vegas 13.35% 
The Next 50,000 acre-feet (For any water obtained after the initial 58,000 acre-feet 
was obtained and distributed, 1993 forward) 
Big Bend 3.5% 
Boulder City 1.5% 
Henderson 12.0% 
LVVWD 72.0% 
North Las Vegas 11.0% 
Figure 6. Post SNWA member agency allocations1
                                                
1 Southern Nevada Water Authority, “Southern Nevada Water Authority: 1995 
Amended Cooperative Agreement Among Big Bend Water District, City of Boulder 
City, City of Henderson, City of Las Vegas, City of North Las Vegas, Clark County 
Sanitation District, and Las Vegas Valley Water District” (Southern Nevada Water 
Authority, January 1, 1996), Nevada Division of Water Resources, 
http://water.nv.gov/hearings/past/springetal/browseabledocs/Exhibits%5CSNWA%20
Exhibits/SNWA_Exh_197_Amended%20Cooperative%20Agreement.pdf; Southern 
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Nevada Water Authority, “Southern Nevada Cooperative Agreement” (Southern 
Nevada Water Authority, June 27, 1991), Author’s Collection/Las Vegas Valley 
Water District. 
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Figure 7. SNWA Laterals Map (SNWA.com).
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Figure 8 Las Vegas Metropolitan Area (adapted from SNWA map, created by Andrew G. Harrison). 
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Figure 9 The Colorado River Basin: the SNWA's Political Region (adapted from SNWA map, created by 
Andrew G. Harrison).
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Figure 10 SNWA Pipeline, Five Basins (adapted from SNWA map, created by Andrew G. Harrison) 
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